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

POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY

THE JOURNAL OF PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

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From the Editor:

In this issue . . .

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON examines the disappearance of jobs in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods and the impact of that grim reality for the future of many large cities. He offers long-term policy proposals for alleviating the problems of jobless ghettos, including school reforms and new public sector employment programs.

MICHAEL N. BARNETT explores the prospect of regional security in the Middle East by examining the discussion over the political rules of the game, the chances for cooperative security, and the relationship between domestic and regional order.

RICHARD HERRERA examines the meanings ascribed to the ideological terms "liberal" and "conservative" by political elites and citizens. He argues that contrary to expectations, there is remarkable similarity in their definitions and suggests that political communication between leaders and the electorate may be more promising than previously believed.

GLENN CHAFETZ investigates the sources of Russia's current foreign policy. He shows that the inconsistencies in policy spring from competing conceptions of Russia's identity in the minds of different top officials as well as from their different domestic political needs.

J. PHILLIP THOMPSON examines how the flawed policy positions of homeless advocates and of the Koch and Dinkins administrations led to unworkable housing policies in New York City.

DORIS A. GRABER summarizes and critiques the major findings presented by media critic James Fallows in the book *Breaking the News*. She explains why the book has created a major stir among Beltway pundits and assesses its likely long-range impact.

BILL GREEN reviews the autobiographies of two very different senators—Bill Bradley and Al D'Amato—and offers insights on the motivating forces influencing their distinct political styles.

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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When Work Disappears

WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON

For the first time in the twentieth century most adults in many inner-city ghetto neighborhoods are not working in a typical week. The disappearance of work has adversely affected not only individuals, families, and neighborhoods, but the social life of the city at large as well. Inner-city joblessness is a severe problem that is often overlooked or obscured when the focus is placed mainly on poverty and its consequences. Despite increases in the concentration of poverty since 1970, inner cities have always featured high levels of poverty, but the current levels of joblessness in some neighborhoods are unprecedented.

The consequences of high neighborhood joblessness are more devastating than those of high neighborhood poverty. A neighborhood in which people are poor but employed is different from a neighborhood in which people are poor and jobless. Many of today's problems in the inner-city ghetto neighborhoods—crime, family dissolution, welfare, low levels of social organization, and so on—are fundamentally a consequence of the disappearance of work.

The disappearance of work and the growth of related problems in the ghetto have aggravated an already tense racial situation in urban areas. Our nation's response to racial discord in the central city and to the growing racial divide between the city and the suburbs has been disappointing. In discussing these problems we have a tendency to engage in the kind of rhetoric that exacerbates, rather than alleviates, urban and metropolitan racial tensions. Ever since the 1992 Los Angeles riot, the media have focused heavily on the factors that divide rather than those that unite racial groups. Emphasis on racial division peaked in 1995 following the jury's verdict in the O. J. Simpson murder trial. Before

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WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON is Malcolm Wiener Professor of Social Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and chairman of the Russell Sage Foundation. He has authored many books on urban social problems and policy including *The Declining Significance of Race*, *The Truly Disadvantaged*, and the just-published *When Work Disappears* (Alfred A. Knopf) from which the present article is adapted.

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the verdict was announced, opinion polls revealed that whites overwhelmingly thought Mr. Simpson was guilty, while a substantial majority of blacks felt he was innocent. The media clips showing public reaction to the verdict dramatized the racial division—blacks appeared elated and jubilant; whites appeared stunned, angry, and somber. Blacks believed that O. J. Simpson had been framed by a racist police conspiracy; whites were convinced that he was guilty of the murder of two people and was being allowed to walk free. The racial divide, as depicted in the media, seemed as wide as ever.

The implications of these developments for the future of race relations and for programs perceived to benefit blacks remain to be seen. As one observer, on the eve of the Simpson verdict, put it: "When O. J. gets off, the whites will riot the way we whites do: leave the cities, go to Idaho or Oregon or Arizona, vote for Gingrich . . . and punish the blacks by closing the day-care programs and cutting off their Medicaid."[1]

The extent of the racial divisions in this country should not be minimized. The different reactions to the Simpson trial and the verdict reflect in part the fundamentally dissimilar racial experiences of blacks and whites in America—the former burdened by racial injustice, the latter largely free of the effects of bigotry and hatred. Nonetheless, the emphasis on racial differences has obscured the fact that African-Americans, whites, and other ethnic groups share many common concerns, are beset by many common problems, and have many common values, aspirations, and hopes.

Job Shrinkage in the Global Economy

Changes in the global economy are placing strains on the welfare state in both the United States and Europe and are contributing to growing social dislocations, including racial conflicts. The question that Secretary of Labor Robert Reich raised at a 1994 conference of finance and labor ministers from seven industrial democracies is central and timely: "Are we condemned to choose between more jobs but greater inequality and insecurity, as we have in this country, or better jobs but higher unemployment and a thicker social safety net, as in Europe?"[2] This question implicitly asks whether Europeans and Americans can learn from one another in the creation of programs that simultaneously address the problems of economic growth, joblessness, and wage inequality.

There is a growing recognition that proposed solutions to the problems of jobs and wages in any of the major industrial democracies cannot ignore developments in the highly integrated global market place. Indeed, because of concerns about the problem of creating good jobs in the global economy, the finance and

[1] Frank Rich, "The L.A. Shock Treatment," *New York Times*, 4 October 1995.

[2] Thomas L. Friedman, "World's Big Economies Turn to the Jobs Issue," *New York Times*, 14 March 1994.

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labor ministers from the major industrial democracies (Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United States, or the Group of Seven, commonly called G7) held a jobs conference in Detroit in March 1994. In previous years, only heads of state and finance ministers met "to discuss high diplomacy and the high finance exchange rates and interest rate management."[3] However, that exalted approach was considered insufficient to address the concrete issue of jobs that now confronts all of these nations.

In addition to the more familiar themes, such as the importance of stimulating economic growth and of avoiding protectionist policies to safeguard shrinking job markets, the officials at the conference also agreed "that the only way to create more jobs in the face of rapid technological change was to upgrade education, particularly for those who are least skilled."[4] It was the first time the G7 policy makers had addressed, as a global problem, the widening gap in wages between skilled and unskilled workers and the strong association between low levels of education, joblessness, and poorly paid work.[5]

Although the conference did more to highlight than to solve these problems, the main hope of the ministers was that the discussions could "teach them something about what each of them has done right, and wrong, in confronting the jobs question."[6] As I examine possible policy prescriptions in cross-national perspective, a framework for discussing the appropriateness of long-term solutions to the jobs problem in the United States (solutions that take several years before the desired ends are achieved or realized) and one for discussing more immediate solutions come to mind.

My framework for long-term solutions outlines two types of relationships in an effort to address the issues of generating good jobs and combating the growing wage inequality among workers—namely, the relationship between employment and education and family support systems and, in the metropolitan context, the relationship between the cities and the suburbs. My framework for immediate solutions delineates ways in which to either revise current programs or create new programs to decrease joblessness among disadvantaged adults. Each framework involves the integration of programs that involve both the public sector and the private sector.

I hasten to point out that the following presentation and discussion of policy frameworks is not constrained by an awareness of the current political climate in the United States. The dramatic retreat from using public policy as a means to fight social inequality has effectively discouraged calls for bold new social programs. Indeed, at the time of this writing, the trend is toward slicing or

[3] Ibid.

[4] Thomas L. Friedman, "Accent on Education as Talks on Jobs End," *New York Times*, 16 March 1994.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

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reducing social programs and the spending for such programs. The emphasis is on personal responsibility, not inequities in the larger society, and therefore the assumption is that people should help themselves and not turn to the government for handouts. It is said that the growth of joblessness and welfare receipt mainly reflects a declining commitment to the core values of society and therefore that the incentives for idleness or the factors that lead to a lack of personal and family responsibilities ought to be removed.

These arguments have been advanced with such force and consistency in public discussions since the 1994 congressional elections that even some of the most dedicated liberals feel intimidated and powerless. Accordingly, traditional programs benefiting the poor, such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, and the earned income tax credit, have either been eliminated or are being threatened with severe reductions.

This retreat from public policy as a way to alleviate problems of social inequality will have profound negative consequences for the future of disadvantaged groups such as the ghetto poor. High levels of joblessness, growing wage inequality, and the related social problems are complex and have their source in fundamental economic, social, and cultural changes. They therefore require bold, comprehensive, and thoughtful solutions, not simplistic and pious statements about the need for greater personal responsibility. Progressives who are concerned about the current social conditions of the have-nots and the future generation of have-nots not only have to fight against the current public policy strategies; they are morally obligated to offer alternative strategies designed to alleviate, not exacerbate, the plight of the poor, the jobless, and other disadvantaged citizens of America.

My aim, therefore, is to galvanize and rally concerned Americans to fight back with the same degree of force and dedication displayed by those who have moved us backward, rather than forward, in combating social inequality. I therefore do not advance proposals that seem acceptable or "realistic" given the current political climate. Rather, I have chosen to talk about what *ought to be done to address the problems of social inequality*, including record levels of joblessness in the inner-city ghetto that threaten the very fabric of our society.

Some who acknowledge the need to confront the growing social inequality also feel that new social programs should be put on hold until the huge budget deficit has been significantly reduced. In the final analysis, however, we must recognize that spending is directly related to political priorities. Decisions about budget cuts for federal programs now indisputably favor the advantaged segments of the population at the expense of the disadvantaged. (See Figure 1).

I believe that steps must be taken to galvanize Americans from all walks of life who are concerned about human suffering and the public policy direction in which we are now moving. I therefore present policy frameworks that call for the integration and mobilization of resources from both the public and the private sectors. We need to generate a public/private partnership to fight social inequality. In the final analysis, I hope to stimulate thought about what ought to be done

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FIGURE 1

LOW-INCOME PROGRAM SHARE OF FEDERAL BUDGET AND HOUSE SPENDING CUTS IN THE YEAR 2000



Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 1995.

and how we should do it among those who support positive social reforms and see the need for action now. The following policy frameworks, therefore, are suggestive and provide a basis for further discussion and debate. Let me begin by first focusing on the part of my framework for long-term solutions that involves relationships between employment and education, and family support systems.

Creating National Performance Standards for Schools

The United States can learn from industrial democracies like Japan and Germany. These countries have developed policies designed to increase the number of workers with "higher-order thinking skills," including policies that require young people to meet high performance standards before they can graduate from secondary schools and that hold each school responsible for meeting these national standards. As Ray Marshall points out, "Standards are important because they provide incentives for students, teachers and other school personnel; information to employers and postsecondary institutions; and a means for policy makers and the public to evaluate schools. Indeed, by strengthening linkages, standards have helped fashion systems out of disjointed activities."[7]

Students who meet high standards are not only prepared for work, they are ready for technical training and other kinds of postsecondary education.[8]

[7] Ray Marshall, "School-to-Work Processes in the United States" (paper presented at the Carnegie Corporation/Johann Jacobs Foundation, Marbach Castle, Germany, 3–5 November 1994).

[8] Ibid.

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Currently, there are no national standards for secondary students or schools in the United States. Accordingly, students who are not in college preparatory courses have severely limited options with respect to pursuing work or secondary technical training after high school. A commitment to a system of national performance standards for every public school in the United States would be an important first step in addressing the huge gap in educational performance between the schools in advantaged and disadvantaged neighborhoods.

But because the quality of local public schools in the United States is in large measure related to the resources of local governments, national standards may not be attractive to taxpayers and local officials in some areas. Also, some schools will encounter greater difficulties in meeting a national performance standard because of fewer resources and a greater concentration of students from disadvantaged backgrounds and neighborhoods. The question raised by the Columbia University educator Linda Darling-Hammond is important in this connection: "Can the mere issuance of standards really propel improvements in schooling, or are there other structural issues to contend with—issues such as funding, teachers' knowledge and capacities, access to curriculum resources, and dysfunctional school structures?" She goes on to state:

> If the goal of standard setting is the improvement of education for all children, rather than merely a more efficient means of sorting students and schools into "worthy" and "unworthy" categories, attention must be paid to building the capacity for schools to teach in the manner envisioned by these learning goals. This requires carefully developed policy efforts in the areas of teacher development, school development, and equalization of resources.[9]

Accordingly, if standard-setting is to be a meaningful route to reform, it will have to address the current inequalities in the public school system in the United States. In contrast to the more central and equal supports for schools in European countries, funding for public education in the United States is dramatically uneven, "with wealthy schools commonly spending two to three times as much as poor ones."[10] The result is significant differences in educational experiences. Whereas public school students in advantaged neighborhoods enjoy airy facilities and well-equipped small classes, those in poor neighborhoods are more likely to enter dilapidated schools and attend classes that are large and poorly equipped.[11] Even more important is the differential student access to a high-quality curriculum and well-trained teachers, all of which can be traced to the unequal allocation of funds. As Iris C. Rotberg and James J. Harvey put it:

> More often than not, the "best" teachers, including experienced teachers offered greater choice in school assignment because of their seniority, avoid high-poverty

[9] Linda Darling-Hammond, "National Standards and Assessments: Will They Improve Education?" *American Journal of Education* 102 (August 1994): 480.

[10] Ibid., 499. See also Educational Testing Service, *The State of Inequality* (Princeton, NJ: Educational Testing Service, 1991).

[11] Darling-Hammond, "National Standards and Assessments."

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> schools. As a result, low-income and minority students have less contact with the best-qualified and more experienced teachers, the teachers most likely to master the kinds of instructional strategies considered effective for all students.[12]

Recent research on the nationwide distribution of science and mathematics opportunities indicates that low-income, minority, and inner-city students are in school environments that are not as conducive to learning because of less qualified teachers, fewer material resources, less engaging activities for learning in the classroom, and considerably less exposure to good training and knowledge in mathematics and science.[13] The problem of finding qualified teachers is particularly acute. Teacher shortages in many central-city and poor rural schools have resulted in a disproportionate number of underprepared and inexperienced teachers, many of whom provide instruction in fields outside their areas of preparation, and a continuous flow of short-term and long-term substitutes.[14]

A system of national performance standards should include the kind of support that would enable schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods to meet the standards that are set. State government, with federal support, not only would have to create equity in local school funding and give birth to programs that would foster teacher development (through scholarships and forgivable loans for teacher education to attract more high-quality teachers, through increased supports for teacher training in schools of education, and through reforms in teacher certification and licensing) but would also have to ensure that highly qualified teachers are distributed in local school districts in ways that provide all students with access to excellent instruction. In some cases this would require greater flexibility in the public school system, not only to attract and hire qualified teachers, but also to displace those who perform poorly in the classroom and lack a dedication to teaching. Local education agencies and state education departments should be helped to identify schools that need support in curriculum development and assessment, teacher development, educational and material resources, and so on.[15]

One important area that could be addressed in programs to equalize resources in the public schools is the availability of computer facilities. Since two-thirds of all new jobs will require the use of computers, all schools should require that students become competent in the use of computers.[16] According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, only 35 percent of black youths ages 3 to 17 use a computer

[12] Iris C. Rotberg and James J. Harvey, *Federal Policy Options for Improving the Education of Low-Income Students* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1993).

[13] Jeannie Oakes, *Multiplying Inequalities: The Effects of Race, Social Class and Ability Grouping on Access to Science and Mathematics Education* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1990).

[14] Linda Darling-Hammond, "Teacher Quality and Equality" in John Goodlad and Pamela Keating, eds., *Access to Knowledge: An Agenda for Our Nation's Schools* (New York: College Entrance Examination Board, 1990); Darling-Hammond, "National Standards and Assessments."

[15] Darling-Hammond, "National Standards and Assessments."

[16] Reed Hundt, "The Information Superhighway: Ensuring that Poor and Minority Children Do Not Fall Further Behind" (paper presented at the Children's Defense Fund's Black Community Crusade for Children Working Committee Planning Retreat, Knoxville, TN, 8 July 1995).

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at school. Half of their white counterparts have access to in-school computers.[17] It is imperative that the public schools provide each student with a computer work station in the elementary, secondary, and high schools and develop linkage to the information superhighways, including access to the Internet. Some public schools already have this capacity and will not need to be upgraded, but others, such as many inner-city schools, must be earmarked for more resources.

Targeting education would be part of a national effort to raise the performance standards of all public schools in the United States to a desirable level, including schools in the inner city. Every effort should be made to enlist the support and involvement of the private sector in this national effort. Corporations, local businesses, civic clubs, community centers, churches, and community-based organizations should be encouraged to work with the schools to enhance computer-competency training. Some examples of private-sector involvement in such endeavors should be touted to spur others on. For example, Frank C. Weaver, director of the Office of Commercial Space Transportation at the U.S. Department of Transportation, reported:

> Bell Atlantic and Tele-Communications, Inc. announced in 1994 that they would provide free linkage to the information superhighways for 26,000 elementary and secondary schools in areas served by the two companies. Under the plan, known as the Basic Education Connection (BEC), the school would receive free educational cable television programming and free access to certain data and online services, such as access to the Internet.
>
> Another project, the Hughes Galaxy Classroom, is enabling 51,000 elementary school children around the country to access more of the educational resources on television available via satellite. Under the auspices of the Galaxy Classroom Foundation, which provides antenna dishes and related equipment to schools, the project offers a science and English curriculum beamed into classrooms through satellite transmissions. Student feedback and questions are faxed to the producers of the program for inclusion in subsequent shows. Particular attention is paid to inner-city and minority schools. There are 480 schools participating this year, and the goal for next year is 1,500 schools with 150,000 to 200,000 students.[18]

Since the creation of national performance standards would provide a clear means for the public to evaluate the different schools, data on school performances could be widely disseminated. This would enable parents of all backgrounds, including those in disadvantaged neighborhoods, to compare nearby schools and make appropriate decisions about which ones their children should attend. However, families from disadvantaged neighborhoods would be in a much better position to make and act on such decisions if an effective public school choice program were in place. This would involve the availability not only of vouchers

[17] Frank C. Weaver, "Preparing Our Youth for the Information Age," *Focus*, Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, May 1995, 7.

[18] Ibid., 7. See also Richard M. Krieg, "Information Technology and Low Income Inner-City Communities," *Journal of Urban Technology* (forthcoming).

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for the selection of public schools but also information about school performance that could be interpreted with ease. Although the empirical data on the effectiveness of existing school choice programs on student achievement is scant, new evidence suggests that increased competition among public schools (as reflected by a larger number of school districts in a metropolitan area) improves average student performance and restrains levels of spending.[19]

A step toward the development of national performance standards was taken in the spring of 1994 when Congress passed the Goals 2000: Educate America Act. This act identified a number of goals to be achieved by the year 2000, ranging from student-demonstrated competence in challenging subjects (science, English, mathematics, geography, and history) to the professional development of teachers. The basic assumption underlying the act is that the role of the federal government is to "encourage experimentation within the framework of broad federal guidelines," not to mandate uniform changes in the educational system.[20]

Congress appropriated $125 million for Goals 2000 in 1994 and $700 million for 1995.[21] The act encourages states to apply for grants so that their schools can participate in educational improvements outlined in the legislation. Communities and local schools are encouraged to develop clear and high standards pertaining to instruction, curriculum, technology, professional development, and parental and community involvement. The Goals 2000: Educate America Act is a first step toward the development of national performance standards, but since it is not mandatory and only a small amount of money was appropriated, it is unlikely to produce major and widespread changes in the nation's educational system. Yet educational issues are critical and will require a much stronger commitment to change.

Improving Family Support Programs

The learning system in other industrial democracies has also been strengthened by family policies to support children. Among industrialized countries, the United States is alone in having no universal preschool, child-support, or parental leave programs. "The absence of such policies makes many of our families, particularly low-income families, very poor learning systems," states Ray Marshall. "Many of our children therefore start school far behind their more advantaged counterparts, and subsequently receive inadequate learning opportunities at home as well as in school."[22] The family structure has undergone fundamental changes

[19] Lawrence F. Katz, "Work-force Preparation Policies to Promote Economic Opportunity" (paper presented at the Domestic Strategy Group Meeting on "Opportunity in the United States: Social and Individual Responsibility," Aspen Institute, Aspen, Colorado, 19–23 August 1995); and Caroline Minter Hoxby, "Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?" (working paper no. 4979, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA, December 1994).

[20] Marshall, "School-to-Work Processes in the United States," 21.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid., 7.

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in the last several decades. There has been a sharp increase in single-parent families, and many of them are trapped in persistent poverty. Also, in many "intact" families both the husband and wife must work outside the home to make ends meet. The absence of widely available high-quality preschool and child-support assurance programs places additional stress on these families and hampers their ability to provide a learning environment that prepares children for school and reinforces the learning process.

The French system of child welfare stands in sharp contrast to the American system. In France, children are supported by three interrelated government programs—child care, income support, and medical care.[23] The child care program includes establishments for infant care, high-quality nursery schools (*écoles maternelles*), and paid leave for parents of newborns. The income support program includes child-support enforcement (so that the absent parent continues to contribute financially to his or her child's welfare), children allowances, and welfare payments for low-income single mothers. Finally, medical care is provided through a universal system of national health care financed by social security, a preventive care system for children, and a group of public health nurses who specialize in child welfare.

The *école maternelle* is perhaps the most distinctive institution in the French system. Children who are no longer in diapers may enter the nursery school and attend until they are enrolled in the first grade. Because parents view participation in the *école maternelle* as highly beneficial to their children, even those mothers who are not working send their children.

As the economist Barbara Bergmann points out:

> *The école maternelle* serves the integration of all children, minority children included, to full participation in regular school and as future citizens. One of its most important functions, especially for the 4- and 5-year-olds, is getting the children ready for the regular school. Each year a child spends at an *école maternelle* reduces considerably the likelihood that the child will fail the rigorous first grade and have to repeat it. Of children from poorer backgrounds who have not attended an *école maternelle*, more than half fail the first grade. Four years of preschool attendance for such poorer children cuts their first grade failure rate in half. Children from more affluent backgrounds are also materially helped to pass.[24]

Linking Families, Schools, and Work

The combination of a system of national performance standards in public schools and family policies to reinforce the learning system would greatly facilitate the transition from school to work in the United States. "America has the worst school-to-work transition process of any industrialized nation," states Ray Mar-

[23] Barbara Bergmann, "The French Child Welfare System: An Excellent System We Could Adapt and Afford" in William Julius Wilson, ed., *Sociology and the Public Agenda* (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), 341–50.

[24] Ibid., 343–44.

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shall. "Put simply, we have no systematic processes to assist high school graduates to move smoothly from school into employment." The focus of U.S. secondary schools and counseling programs is to encourage young people to enter college and obtain a degree. But high school graduates who are not college-bound represent nearly one-half of each graduating class. Thus, they "are left to sink or swim—without advice or career counseling and without any job placement assistance."[25]

Unlike employers in Germany and Japan, employers in the United States who have jobs that offer good wages, career potential, and attractive benefits usually do not hire workers immediately out of high school. America's largest and best corporations virtually ignore youthful workers. As Marshall points out, "Only a handful of the Fortune 500 firms hire fresh high school graduates for entry jobs offering career opportunities." The larger firms in America do eventually hire high school graduates, but normally not until they have reached their mid-20s, have accumulated some work experience, and have "matured and settled down." The practices of the larger firms are emulated by other employers. Even the "average starting apprentice in the United States is in his/her late twenties. This delay in hiring for career-track jobs results in many youths spending five or six years floundering in jobs that offer neither learning nor advancement opportunities."[26]

The delay in hiring youths has a number of critical consequences for school-to-work transition in the United States. It gives young people in Germany and Japan a five-to-ten-year head start in obtaining access to crucial occupational skills training; it removes our best corporations and their important learning systems from involvement in the processes of molding young workers; it eliminates a natural communication network for feeding employer information to schools about the changing skills required in the workplace; and, most important, it disconnects achievements in school from rewards in the workplace, thereby undermining the incentive for academic success.[27]

The problem of school-to-work transition confronts young people of all ethnic and racial backgrounds, but it is especially serious for black youths. According to a recent report by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, only 42 percent of black youths who had not enrolled in college had jobs in October after graduating from high school a few months earlier in June, compared with 69 percent of their white counterparts.[28] The figures for black youngsters in inner-city ghetto neighborhoods are obviously even lower. The inadequate system of school-to-work transition has also contributed significantly to the growing wage gap between those with high school diplomas and those with college training. In the 1950s and 1960s, when school-to-work transition was compatible with the mass production

[25] Marshall, "School-to-Work Processes in the United States," 3.

[26] Ibid., 9.

[27] Ibid.

[28] U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "College Enrollment of 1993 High School Graduates" in U.S. Department of Labor News Release, no. 94-252, May 1994.

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system, the average earnings of college graduates was only about 20 percent higher than those of high school graduates. By 1979, it had increased to 49 percent, and then rapidly grew to 83 percent by 1992.

Thus, the school-to-work transition is a major problem in the United States, and it has reached crisis proportions in the inner-city ghetto. In an initial step meant to address this problem, Congress passed the School-to-Work Opportunities Act (SWOA) in the spring of 1994. Providing the framework for the development of a national school-to-work program, the basic objective of the SWOA "is to build on the high standards encouraged by the Goals 2000 Act."[29] The SWOA assumes that the best way to develop a national system of school-to-work transition is to begin with voluntary demonstrations by state and local areas, including demonstrations whereby businesses work with educators in reforming school systems and integrating work and school. The act encourages federal, state, and local partnerships. It also, through an emphasis on business and education partnerships in local areas, follows the lead of Germany and Japan in stressing the critical importance of private-sector investment in education.

But once again, only a relatively small amount of money was allocated for this program. Total funding for SWOA for fiscal years 1994 and 1995 is less than $500 million. Also, there is no guarantee that the demonstration grants to states will ultimately lead to a more comprehensive national program of school-to-work transition. But such a program is critically needed not only to address the overall problem of growing wage inequality and economic marginality among high school graduates but also as one important weapon in the fight against acute joblessness in the inner-city ghetto.

City-Suburban Economic Integration?

If the other industrial democracies offer lessons for a long-term solution to the jobs problem involving relationships between employment, education, and family support systems, they also offer lessons on the importance of another solution from a metropolitan perspective—namely, city-suburban integration and cooperation. None of the other industrialized democracies has allowed its city centers to deteriorate as has the United States. In European countries, suburbanization has not been associated with the abandonment of cities as residential areas. "The central governments continued to treat cities as a national resource to be protected and nurtured."[30] Indeed, the city centers in Europe remain very desirable places to reside because of better public transportation, more effective urban renewal programs, and good public education that is more widely available to disadvantaged students. Moreover, unlike in the United States, cheap public transportation makes suburbanized employment sites more accessible.

[29] Marshall, "School-to-Work Processes in the United States," 22.

[30] Margaret Weir, "Race and Urban Poverty: Comparing Europe and America," occasional paper no. 93–9, Center for American Political Studies, Harvard University, March 1993, 26.

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It will be difficult to address growing racial tensions in U.S. cities unless we tackle the problems of shrinking revenue and inadequate social services and the gradual disappearance of work in certain neighborhoods. The city has become a less desirable place in which to live, and the economic and social gap between the cities and suburbs is growing. The groups left behind compete, often along racial lines, for declining resources, including the remaining decent schools, housing, and neighborhoods. The rise of the new urban poverty neighborhoods has exacerbated these problems. Their high rates of joblessness and social disorganization have created problems that often spill over into other parts of the city at large. All of these factors aggravate race relations and elevate racial tensions.

Ideally, we need to restore the federal contribution to the city budget that existed in 1980 and to increase sharply the employment base. Regardless of changes in federal urban policy, however, the fiscal crisis in the cities would be significantly eased if the employment base could be substantially increased. Indeed, the social dislocations caused by the steady disappearance of work have led to a wide range of urban social problems, including racial tensions. Increased employment would help stabilize the new poverty neighborhoods, halt the precipitous decline in density, and ultimately enhance the quality of race relations in urban areas.

Perhaps at no other time in the nation's history has it been more important to talk about the need to promote city and suburban cooperation, not separation. The political fragmentation of many metropolitan areas in the United States has contributed to the problems of joblessness and related social dislocations of the inner-city poor. As David Rusk, the former mayor of Albuquerque, New Mexico, has pointed out, because the older cities of the East and the Midwest were unable to expand territorially through city-county consolidation or annexation, they failed to reap such benefits of suburban growth as the rise of shopping malls, offices, and industrial parks in new residential subdivisions. As areas in which poor minorities live in higher and higher concentration, these cities face an inevitable downward spiral because they are not benefiting from suburban growth. Rusk argues, therefore, that neighborhood revitalization programs, such as community development banks, nonprofit inner-city housing developments, and enterprise zones, will not be able "to reverse the downward slide of inner cities" if they are not carried out within "a framework of actions to bring down the walls between city and suburb."[31]

Efforts to promote city and suburban cooperation will not benefit cities alone. There is mounting evidence that cities and suburbs are economically interdependent. The more central cities are plagued by joblessness, dysfunctional schools, and crime, the more the surrounding suburbs undergo a decline in their own social and economic fortunes. Suburbs that experienced increases in income

[31] David Rusk, *Cities Without Suburbs* (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1993), 121.

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during the 1980s tended to be linked to a thriving urban center.[32] In the global economy, metropolitan regions continue to compete for jobs. Suburbs that will remain or become competitive are those with a well-trained workforce, good schools, a concentration of professional services, first-class hospitals, a major university and research center, and an efficient transportation network to link executives with other parts of the United States and with countries around the world. However, many of these elements cannot come solely from suburbs. They require a viable central city. It is important for Americans to realize that city-suburban *integration* is the key to the health of metropolitan regions and to the nation as a whole.

Reforms put forward to achieve the objective of city-suburban cooperation range from proposals to create metropolitan governments to proposals for metropolitan tax base sharing (currently in effect in Minneapolis/St. Paul), collaborative metropolitan planning, and the creation of regional authorities to develop solutions to common problems if communities fail to reach agreement.[33] Among the problems shared by many metropolises is a weak public transit system. A commitment to address this problem through a form of city-suburban collaboration would benefit residents of both the city and the suburbs. Theoretically, everyone would benefit from mobility within the metropolitan areas, and inner-city residents would have greater means to prevent high joblessness.

Solutions to the Jobs Problem

The problems of joblessness and social dislocation in the inner city are, in part, related to the processes in the global economy that have contributed to greater inequality and insecurity among American workers in general, and to the failure of U.S. social policies to adjust to these processes. It is therefore myopic to view the problems of jobless ghettos as if they were separate from those that plague the larger society.

In using this cross-cultural perspective I am not suggesting that we can or even should simply import the social policies of the Japanese, Germans, or other West Europeans. As Ray Marshall has appropriately pointed out, the approaches in these other countries are embedded in their own cultures and have their "own flaws and deficiencies, as well as strengths." We should instead "learn from the approaches used in other countries and adapt the best aspects into our own homegrown solutions."[34]

The strengths of some of the approaches in other countries are apparent. For example, in Japan and Germany most high school and college graduates leave

[32] Derek Bok, "Cities and Suburbs" (paper presented for the Aspen Institute Domestic Strategy Group, Aspen Institute, Washington, DC, 1994).

[33] Ibid., 13. See also Margaret Weir, "Urban Policy and Persistent Urban Poverty" (background memorandum prepared for the Social Science Research Council Policy Conference on Persistent Urban Poverty, Washington, DC, 9–10 November 1993).

[34] Marshall, "School-to-Work Processes in the United States," 26.

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school with skills in keeping with the demands of the highly technological marketplace in the global economy.[35] In the United States, by contrast, only college graduates and those few with extra-specialized post-high school training acquire such skills. Those with only high school diplomas or less do not.

The flaws and deficiencies of some of the approaches in the other countries are also apparent. Except for Germany, European countries have the same gap in worker skills.[36] Because of the generous unemployment benefits, however, the low-skilled European workers tend to be less willing to accept the lower-paying jobs that their counterparts in the United States are often forced to take. Therefore, the problems of unskilled European workers are not only restricted to low wages, they also include high levels of unemployment. The growing problem of unemployment among low-skilled European workers is placing a strain on the welfare state. Immigrant minorities are disproportionately represented among the jobless population, and therefore tend to be publicly identified with the problem of maintaining welfare costs. These perceptions contribute to growing intergroup tensions. Accordingly, the problems of race, unemployment, and concentration of urban poverty that have traditionally plagued the United States are now surfacing in various countries in Europe.

Just as the United States can learn from some of the approaches in the other countries, the Europeans could learn from the United States how to make their workforces more flexible instead of paying them to stay unemployed indefinitely. In particular, they could learn how to get unskilled workers into low-wage jobs that would be buttressed by maintaining certain desirable aspects of the safety net, such as universal health insurance, that prevent workers from slipping into the depths of poverty, as so often happens to their American counterparts.

Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit

It is important to discuss immediate solutions to the jobs problem in the United States. Because of their level of training and education, the inner-city poor and other disadvantaged workers mainly have access only to jobs that pay the minimum wage or less and are not covered by health insurance. However, recent policies of the federal government could make such jobs more attractive. The United States Congress enacted an expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC) in 1993. By 1996, the expanded EITC will increase the earnings from a minimum-wage job to $7 an hour. Families with incomes from $8,400 to $11,000 will receive cash payments of up to $3,370.[37] This expansion, and the previous expansions of the EITC in 1986 and 1990 under the Reagan and Bush administrations, reflected a recognition that wages for low-paying work have

[35] Ibid.

[36] Thomas L. Friedman, "Accent on Education as Talks on Jobs End."

[37] "Clinton Wages a Quiet but Energetic War Against Poverty," *New York Times*, 30 March 1994.

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TABLE 1

Average Disposable Income for a Mother and Two Children from Wages, Food Stamps, EITC, and Federal Taxes (in 1993 dollars)

Year	Number of Hours Worked at Minimum Wage Throughout the Year		
	20 Hours	*30 Hours*	*40 Hours*
1972	$13,482	$14,602	$15,656
1980	11,479	12,870	13,792
1990	9,830	10,467	11,509
1993 (with EITC at fully phased-in 1996 levels)	10,612	11,956	13,653
Percentage Change in Average Disposable Income for a Mother and Two Children			
1972–1993	−21%	−18%	−13%

Source: Department of Health and Human Services. Adapted from data of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (1995).

eroded and that other policies to aid the working poor – for example, the minimum wage – have become weaker.[38]

However, even when the most recent expansion of the EITC is fully in effect in 1996 (as shown in Table 1), it will still fall notably short of compensating for the sharp drop in the value of the minimum wage and the marked reductions in AFDC benefits to low-income working families since the early 1970s. Nonetheless, "the 1993 law set the EITC for a family with two or more children at the level that would bring a family of four with a full-time minimum wage worker to the poverty line if the family also received food stamps and the minimum wage was modestly raised."[39]

If this benefit is paid on a monthly basis and is combined with universal health care, the condition of workers in the low-wage sector would improve significantly and would approach that of comparable workers in Europe. The passage of universal health care is crucial in removing from the welfare rolls single mothers who are trapped in a public-assistance nightmare by the health care needs of their children. It would also make low-paying jobs more attractive for all low-skilled workers and therefore improve the rate of employment.

However, at the time of this writing, not only has legislation for universal health care been shelved, but the traditional bipartisan support for the EITC is beginning to erode in the Republican-controlled Congress. In May 1995, the Senate passed a budget resolution that includes an assumption that the EITC would be cut by roughly $13 billion over five years and $21 billion over seven

[38] Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Is the EITC Growing at a Rate That Is 'Out of Control?'" Washington, DC, 9 May 1995; and "The Earned Income Tax Credit Reductions in the Senate Budget Resolution," 5 June 1995.

[39] Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "The Earned Income Tax Credit Reductions in the Senate Budget Resolution," 5 June 1995, 2.

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years. As pointed out by the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, a nonprofit public policy organization that examines federal and state fiscal policies:

> More than two-thirds of these cuts would be achieved by repealing the final phase of the 1993 EITC expansion for families with two or more children scheduled for 1996 and reducing the EITC below current levels (tax year 1995 levels) for both families with two or more children and families with one child. Ten million families with children would receive smaller EITCs than they otherwise would. . . . The 1993 EITC expansion is being phased in over several years. The final stage of the phase-in for families with more than one child is scheduled to occur in tax year 1996. *If this last stage of the expansion is repealed and the 1995 expansion is scaled back, a family of four in which a parent works full-time, year-round at the minimum wage will be pushed about $445 deeper into poverty.*[40]

Instead of rolling back the modest expansion of the EITC, it could be argued that the earned income tax credit could be further expanded at reasonable cost to lift all poor working families who work full-time year-round out of poverty, not just those who are currently working at the minimum wage. Further expansion of the EITC and the creation of universal health care legislation ought to be issues at the top of any progressive public policy agenda today.

Improving Accessibility to Suburban Jobs

The mismatch between residence and the location of jobs is a special problem for some workers in America because, unlike in Europe, the public transportation system is weak and expensive. This presents a special problem for inner-city blacks because they have less access to private automobiles and, unlike Mexicans, do not have a network system that supports organized car pools. Accordingly, they depend heavily on public transportation and therefore have difficulty getting to the suburbs, where jobs are more plentiful and employment growth is greater.[41] Until public transit systems are improved in metropolitan areas, the creation of privately subsidized car-pool and van-pool networks to carry inner-city residents to the areas of employment, particularly suburban areas, would be a relatively inexpensive way to increase work opportunities.[42]

In the inner-city ghettos, the problems of spatial mismatch have been aggravated by the breakdown in the informal job information network. In neighbor-

[40] Ibid.

[41] Mark Alan Hughes, "Over the Horizon: Jobs in the Suburbs of Major Metropolitan Areas," report to Public/Private Ventures, December 1993.

[42] Based on several local transportation programs in Chicago (especially the "JobExpress" program created by the Suburban Job Link Corporation), Public/Private Ventures, a nonprofit research organization, "has designed a research demonstration to test a transportation strategy that links inner-city residents to job opportunities outside city centers. The elements of Bridges to Work are transportation (public or private), a mechanism for connecting trained workers with available suburban jobs (a regional alliance of providers of employment services), and special support services (provided by a community agency). A four-year demonstration of the model is planned to begin in up to nine sites in Fall 1995." Annual Report, Public/Private Ventures (Philadelphia, 1994).

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hoods in which a substantial number of adults are working, people are more likely to learn about job openings or be recommended for jobs by working kin, relatives, friends, and acquaintances. Job referrals from current employees are important in the American labor market. Individuals in jobless ghettos are less likely to gain employment through this process. But the creation of for-profit or not-for-profit job information and placement centers in various parts of the inner city not only could significantly improve awareness of the availability of employment in the metropolitan area but could also serve to refer workers to employers.[43]

These centers would recruit or accept inner-city workers and try to place them in jobs. One of their main purposes would be to make persons who have been persistently unemployed or out of the labor force "job-ready" so that a prospective employer would be assured that a worker understands and appreciates employer expectations such as showing up for work on time and on a regular basis, accepting the orders of supervisors, and so on. When an information and placement center is satisfied that a worker is job-ready, then and only then would the worker be referred to an employer who has a job vacancy. Moreover, information and placement centers could coordinate efforts with the car-pool and van-pool networks to get those job applicants who lack private transportation to the employment sites.

As much of the foregoing economic analysis suggests, however, the central problem facing inner-city workers is not improving the flow of information about the availability of jobs, or getting to where the jobs are, or becoming job-ready. The central problem is that the demand for labor has shifted away from low-skilled workers because of structural changes in the economy.[44] During certain periods, this problem can be offset to some extent by appropriate macroeconomic levers that can act to enhance economic growth and reduce unemployment, including fiscal policies that regulate government spending and taxation and monetary policies that influence interest rates and control the money supply.[45] But given the fundamental structural decline in the demand for low-skilled workers, such policies will have their greatest impact in the higher-wage sectors of the economy. Many low-wage workers, especially those in high-jobless inner-city neighborhoods who are not in or have dropped out of the labor force and who also face the problem of negative employer attitudes, will not experience any improvement in their job prospects because of fiscal or monetary policies. Despite some claims that low-skilled workers fail to take advantage of labor-market opportunities,[46] available evidence strongly suggests not only that the jobs for such workers carry

[43] For this short-term policy recommendation I am indebted to James S. Tobin.

[44] William Julius Wilson, *When Work Disappears* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), chap. 2; and Sheldon H. Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, *America Unequal* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).

[45] Farrell Bloch, *Antidiscrimination Law and Minority Employment: Recruitment Practices and Regulatory Constraints* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).

[46] Lawrence Mead, *The New Politics of Poverty: The Working Poor in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1992).

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lower real wages and fewer benefits than did comparable jobs in the early 1970s, but that it is harder for certain low-skilled workers, especially low-skilled males who are not being absorbed into the expanding service sector to find employment today.[47] As the economists Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk put it:

> In our view, the problem is not that more people have chosen not to work, but rather that demand by employers for less-skilled workers, even those who are willing to work at low wages, has declined. We find it paradoxical that so much attention has been focused on changing the labor-supply behavior of welfare recipients and so little has been given to changing the demand side of a labor market that has been increasingly unable to employ less-skilled and less-experienced workers.[48]

Increasing Public Sector Employment

If firms in the private sector cannot use or refuse to hire low-skilled adults who are willing to take minimum-wage or subminimum-wage jobs, then the jobs problem for inner-city workers cannot be adequately addressed without considering a policy of public-sector employment of last resort. Indeed, until current changes in the labor market are reversed or until the skills of the next generation can be upgraded before it enters the labor market, many workers, especially those who are not in the official labor force, will not be able to find jobs unless the government becomes an employer of last resort.[49] This argument applies especially to low-skilled inner-city black workers. It is bad enough that they face the problem of shifts in labor market demand shared by all low-skilled workers; it is even worse that they confront negative employer perceptions about their work-related skills and attitudes.

If jobs are plentiful even for less skilled workers during periods of economic expansion, then labor shortages reduce the likelihood that hiring decisions will be determined by subjective negative judgments concerning a group's job-related traits. Prior to the late 1970s, there was less need for the creation of public-sector jobs.[50] Not only was economic growth fairly rapid during periods of expansion, but "the gains from growth were widely shared." Before the late 1970s, public jobs of last resort were thought of in terms of "a counter-cyclical policy to be put in place during recessions and retired during recoveries. It is only since the late 1970s that the disadvantaged have been left behind during recoveries. The labor market changes . . . seem to have been permanently reduced private sector demand for less-skilled workers."[51]

[47] Danziger and Gottschalk, *America Unequal*, 155; and Virginia L. Carlson and Nikolas C. Theodore, *Are There Enough Jobs? Welfare Reform and Labor Market Reality* (Chicago: Illinois Job Gap Project, Center for Urban Economic Development, University of Illinois, 1995).

[48] Danziger and Gottschalk, *America Unequal*, 156.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., 174.

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Given the current need for public jobs to enhance the employment opportunities of low-skilled workers, what should be the nature of these jobs and how should they be implemented? Three thoughtful recent proposals for the creation of public jobs deserve serious consideration. One calls for the creation of public-sector infrastructure maintenance jobs, the second for public service jobs for less-skilled workers, and the third, which combines aspects of the first two, for WPA-style jobs of the kind created during the Franklin D. Roosevelt administration.

Edward V. Regan has advanced a proposal for a public-investment infrastructure maintenance program. He points out that "infrastructure maintenance and upgrading can . . . benefit the economy by creating jobs, particularly for the relatively unskilled, and by raising productivity, thereby contributing to long-term economic growth."[52] According to one estimate, $1 billion spent on road maintenance will directly generate 25,000 jobs and indirectly put 15,000 people to work.[53] On the other hand, new construction creates fewer jobs at higher wages. Another study reports that new building projects or major construction employs 40 percent fewer workers than do maintenance projects.[54] Just as other low-skill jobs are made more attractive by programs of health care, child care, and earned income tax credits, so would low-skill jobs in infrastructure maintenance.

Aside from creating jobs, infrastructure maintenance could lead to higher productivity. On this point, Regan states:

> Intuitively, fixing roads and bridges means less axle damage to trucks, fewer road mishaps and congestion, lowered costs of goods, and increased transportation productivity. Congested and deteriorated highways, broken water mains, inadequate sewage treatment, reduced transit services—all of these infrastructure deficiencies reduce productivity, drive up costs of goods and services, and inhibit people's access to employment. Any state or local government official who has tried to attract business facilities to a particular area and has watched business decision makers turn up their noses at cracked concrete and rusting bridges knows the practical meaning of those statements.[55]

Regan also points out that there are many other benefits stemming from an improved infrastructure that are not accounted for in standard economic measures, including shortened commuting times and reduced traffic congestion. If well selected, public investment in infrastructure maintenance could contribute to economic growth. According to the Congressional Budget Office, the national real rate of return for investments to maintain the current quality of the highway

[52] Edward V. Regan, "Infrastructure Investment for Tomorrow," Public Policy Brief no. 141, Jerome Levy Economics Institute, Bard College, 43.

[53] Michael Montgomery and David Wyes, "The Impact of Infrastructure," *DRI/McGraw-Hill U.S. Review* (October 1992).

[54] Clark Wieman, "Road Work Ahead," *Technology Review* 96 (January 1993): 42–48.

[55] Regan, "Infrastructure Investment," 44.

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system would be 30 to 40 percent; those involving selected expansion in congested urban areas would be 10 to 20 percent.[56]

Although the creation of infrastructure maintenance jobs will provide some employment opportunities for low-skilled workers, the condition of today's labor market makes it unlikely that many of these jobs will actually go to high school dropouts or even to high school graduates with little or no work experience. To address this problem, the economists Sheldon Danziger and Peter Gottschalk, in a recently published book, have advocated the creation of a labor-intensive, minimum-wage public service jobs program of last resort for today's low-skilled and jobless workers.[57] They have in mind jobs such as daycare aides and playground assistants who can supervise in school gyms and public parks during after-school hours. These would be jobs for poor workers who cannot find a place in the private sector, jobs providing services that the fiscally strapped cities can no longer afford to supply through local resources.

Their plan for public service jobs differs in two important respects from recent proposals aimed at increasing work requirements and work incentives for recipients of welfare. First, their proposal is directed not just at welfare recipients but at *all poor workers* adversely affected by current economic shifts, including those who have been ineligible for, or who have chosen not to participate in, welfare. Only a small proportion of those whose labor-market prospects have diminished since the early 1970s have been welfare recipients. Second, their proposal addresses changes in the demand side of the labor market by emphasizing work opportunities and earnings supplements rather than work requirements or incentives.

It is important to distinguish clearly the view of public service jobs embodied in the proposal outlined in the Clinton administration's welfare reform plan that was pushed aside after the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1994. Under the Clinton proposal, welfare would change from an entitlement to a transitional system through which cash assistance would last only two years. For those welfare recipients who reach the time limit but fail to find jobs in the private sector, transitional public-work slots would be made available. However, as Danziger and Gottschalk appropriately point out:

> A program offering jobs of last resort *only* to welfare recipients who exhaust two years of cash assistance would have the potential for perverse incentives and serious inequities. Families who either were not eligible for welfare or chose not to participate would not have access to these jobs. Even if the incentive to go on welfare in order to gain access to the PSE jobs were small, offering jobs to welfare recipients but not to equally needy families who were trying to make it in the labor market could cause resentment.[58]

[56] Ibid.
[57] Danziger and Gottschalk, *America Unequal*.
[58] Ibid., 173.

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Danziger and Gottschalk recognize the fact that if programs provided "good" public-sector jobs, local officials would be tempted to fill them with displaced but experienced workers from manufacturing and other goods-producing industries. Therefore, workers with limited experience, skills, and training from high-jobless inner-city neighborhoods would very likely be passed over. Moreover, their proposal is designed to create public service jobs that produce goods and provide services that are not available in the private sector and would not displace private-sector workers.

Their proposal offers a subminimum-wage public service job to any applicant. They would set compensation at 10 to 15 percent below the minimum wage to encourage movement into private-sector jobs as they become available. Graduated job ladders would provide rewards to workers who succeed on the job, "but wages would always be lower than [that which] an equally successful worker would receive in the private sector."[59] These wages would be supplemented with the expanded earned income tax credit and other wage supplements (including a federal child care subsidy in the form of a refundable income tax credit for the working poor and refundable state tax credits for the working poor).

The Danziger and Gottschalk proposal obviously would not provide a comfortable standard of living for the workers forced to take public service jobs. Such jobs are minimal and are "offered as a safety net to poor persons who want to work but are left out of the private labor market." However, they maintain that their proposal is an improvement over the current system, "which offers a minimum wage if you find a job, but leaves millions of poor persons searching for work and many others poor even though they have jobs."[60]

The final proposal under consideration here was advanced by the perceptive journalist Mickey Kaus of *The New Republic*. Kaus's proposal is modeled on the Works Progress Administration (WPA), a large public works program announced in 1935 by Franklin D. Roosevelt in his State of the Union address. The public works jobs that Roosevelt had in mind included highway construction, slum clearance, housing construction, rural electrification, and so on. As Kaus points out:

> In its eight-year existence, according to official records, the WPA built or improved 651,000 miles of roads, 953 airports, 124,000 bridges and viaducts, 1,178,000 culverts, 8,000 parks, 18,000 playgrounds and athletic fields, and 2,000 swimming pools. It constructed 40,000 buildings (including 8,000 schools) and repaired 85,000 more. Much of New York City—including LaGuardia Airport, FDR Drive, plus hundreds of parks and libraries—was built by the WPA. . . . Lester Thurow has suggested that New York's infrastructure is now decaying because no WPA has existed to replace these public works in the half-century since.[61]

[59] Ibid., 172.
[60] Ibid., 173.
[61] Mickey Kaus, *The End of Equality* (New York: Basic Books), 259.

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Kaus advances what he calls a neo-WPA program of employment for every American citizen over 18 who wants it. The program would provide useful public jobs at wages slightly below the minimum wage. Kaus's proposed program would not only eliminate the need to provide public assistance or "workfare" for able-bodied workers but, unlike welfare, the WPA-style jobs would be

> available to everybody, men as well as women, single or married, mothers and fathers alike. No perverse "anti-family" incentives. It wouldn't even be necessary to limit the public jobs to the poor. If Donald Trump showed up, he could work too. But he wouldn't. Most Americans wouldn't. There'd be no need to "target" the program to the needy. The low wage itself would guarantee that those who took the jobs would be those who needed them, while preserving the incentive to look for better work in the private sector.[62]

Kaus maintains that the work relief under his proposal, like the work relief under Roosevelt's WPA, would not carry the stigma of a cash dole. People would be earning their money. Although some workers in the WPA-style jobs "could be promoted to higher-paying public service positions," most of them would advance occupationally by moving to the private sector. "If you have to work anyway," asks Kaus, "why do it for $4 an hour?"

Kaus's proposal would also place a time limit on welfare for able-bodied recipients. After a certain date they would no longer be eligible for cash payments. However, unlike the welfare program proposed in 1995 by the Republican-controlled Congress, public jobs would be available to those who move off welfare. Kaus argues that to allow poor mothers to work, government-funded day care must be provided for their children if needed. But this service has to be integrated into the larger system of child care for other families in the United States to avoid creating a "day-care ghetto" for low-income children.

In Kaus's proposal the WPA-style jobs would be supplemented with the earned income tax credit, which could be expanded at reasonable cost to lift all poor working families who work full-time throughout the year out of poverty. Because this subsidy would augment the income of all low-wage workers, those in low-level private-sector jobs would not be treated unfairly and their wages on average would be slightly higher than those in the guaranteed subminimum-wage public jobs.

Kaus maintains that there will be enough worthwhile WPA-style jobs for anyone who wants one. The crumbling infrastructure in American cities has to be repaired. Services cut back by the government for financial reasons, such as picking up trash two times a week and opening libraries every evening and on Saturdays, could be reinstated. Jobs for men and women could range from filling potholes and painting bridges to serving as nurse's aides, clerks, and cooks. "With a neo-WPA maintaining highways, schools, playgrounds, and subways, with

[62] Ibid., 125.

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libraries open every evening and city streets cleaned twice a day, we would have a common life more people would find worth reclaiming."[63]

In reviewing these three proposals, the Kaus neo-WPA jobs plan is the most comprehensive because it would include not only the kind of infrastructure maintenance advocated by Regan but also the labor-intensive public service jobs proposed by Danziger and Gottschalk. And unlike the program proposed by Danziger and Gottschalk, neither Kaus's WPA-style jobs program nor Regan's infrastructure maintenance program would be targeted to poor workers. Whereas Kaus explicitly states that the pay scale for the neo-WPA jobs would be set below the minimum wage, Regan does not address the question of pay scale for his infrastructure maintenance jobs. It is reasonable to assume, however, that the pay scale for the infrastructure maintenance jobs would be lower than that for comparable levels of employment in the private sector. Nonetheless, both of these programs would very likely attract a substantial number of displaced experienced workers willing to take lower-paying public-sector jobs until they find higher-paying work in the private sector.

Given the broader scope of Kaus's neo-WPA jobs program, a higher proportion of workers with few skills and little or no work experience would be employed than would be possible under the Regan program of infrastructure maintenance. Accordingly, Kaus's program would provide many more job opportunities for workers in high-jobless inner-city ghetto neighborhoods.

The labor-intensive public service jobs program advanced by Danziger and Gottschalk is designed to generate immediate employment opportunities for workers with low skills and little or no work experience. However, since it is explicitly aimed at poor workers, it runs the risk of carrying a stigma. The WPA-style jobs advocated by Kaus avoid this problem. The program would be presented as offering jobs to any American who wants a job. Given the subminimum-wage scale, it is likely to attract only a handful of workers who could readily find higher-paying jobs in the private sector. And even if local authorities succumbed to the temptation to fill the "good" WPA jobs with displaced experienced workers, there would still be a sufficient number of labor-intensive jobs requiring little skill, training, or experience. Moreover, the experienced and higher-paid workers who accept WPA-style jobs because of layoffs in the private sector would be likely to remain in the program for only a short period of time.

Furthermore, the Kaus program of WPA-style jobs would lend itself to a public rhetoric that focuses on problems afflicting not only the poor but the working and middle classes as well. Thus, the program would promote social and economic improvements benefiting all groups in society, not just the truly disadvantaged segments of the population. This is consistent with my argument that the joblessness of the poor, including the inner-city poor, represents the more extreme form of economic marginality experienced by large segments of

[63] Ibid., 137.

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the population and stems in large measure from changes in the organization of the economy, including the global economy.

Because it is comprehensive, less likely to carry a stigma, and lends itself to a progressive public rhetoric of social reform, I include the Kaus neo-WPA jobs plan in my package of proposed immediate solutions to the jobs problem. However, there is the problem of administering a neo-WPA program, which is not discussed by Kaus. This program must be administered by the federal government (as was the earlier WPA program under the Roosevelt administration) in order to avoid the problem of "fiscal substitution"—that is, the shifting of spending on public employment projects from the local or state level to the federal government. This problem accompanied the implementation of the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA). The creation of public service employment through CETA in the 1970s did very little to increase the *aggregate* number of jobs in the economy because states and localities over time used the program to substitute subsidized positions for previously nonsubsidized public service jobs. This had the effect of shifting jobs from one funding source to another. Our goal here is to increase the number of jobs, and thus broad federal oversight is required.[64]

As another way to avoid the problem of worker displacement, I would also recommend that the workers in the federal WPA-style program only produce goods and services that are not being produced in the private sector and are not presently provided by regular public-sector workers.[65] If this problem is not addressed, considerable opposition to such a program could arise from both private- and public-sector unions and from businesses in the private sector. Accordingly, following Kaus, I have in mind useful public work that is currently not being done for financial reasons.[66] This would include regular infrastructure maintenance; the cleaning of streets twice, not once, a day; the collection of trash twice a week instead of once a week; the opening of libraries on Saturday and in the evenings; the cleaning of municipal parks, playgrounds, and other public facilities at a level and with a frequency that would ensure their attractiveness and invite use; and the supervision of public playgrounds that would maximize safer, adult-sponsored recreation for all neighborhood children.

It is reasonable to anticipate that as WPA-style workers are used to replenish or revitalize public service staffs, certain states and localities might be tempted to scale back their regular workforce during periods of severe fiscal constraints and rely more on subsidized public service workers. To discourage this type of displacement of regular government workers, I would recommend that one WPA worker be removed for every regular worker's slot that is eliminated or not filled within a certain time period.

[64] Danziger and Gottschalk, *America Unequal*.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Kaus, *The End of Equality*.

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A WPA-style jobs program will not be cheap.[67] In the short run, it is less expensive to give people cash welfare than it is to create public jobs. Including the costs of supervisors and materials, it is estimated that each subminimum-wage WPA-style job would cost at least $12,000. That would represent $12 billion for every 1 million jobs created. This figure does not include additional funds to augment the subminimum wage from the earned income tax credit, nor does it reflect any long-run national real rate of return for public investment in infrastructure maintenance that would contribute to economic growth.

None of the immediate solutions I am proposing involves retraining workers for higher-paying positions in the highly technological global economy. The need to retrain low-skilled workers is generally recognized by policy makers and informed observers in both Europe and the United States. However, the most serious discussions about training for the new economy have focused on young people and their transition from school to work or from school to postsecondary training. The cost of retraining adult workers is considerable, and none of the industrial democracies has advanced convincing proposals indicating how to implement such a program effectively.[68] Moreover, a heavy emphasis on skill development and job retraining is likely to end up mainly benefiting those who already have a good many skills that only need to be upgraded.

Also, none of my immediate solutions offers a remedy for the growing wage inequality in the United States. The long-term solutions I have presented, which include those that prepare the next generation to move into the new jobs created in the global economy, are designed to combat that problem. But my specific recommendations for immediate action would address the employment problems of many low-skilled workers, including those from the inner city. They would confront the current and serious problem of the disappearance of work in the inner-city ghetto. The jobs created would not be high-wage jobs but, with universal health insurance, a child care program, and earned income tax credits attached, they would enable workers and their families to live at least decently and avoid joblessness and the problems associated with it. The United States Congress has already expanded the earned income tax credit. Universal health insurance and some kind of flexible child care program would be costly, but these programs would support *all* Americans. Furthermore, the nation has recognized the need for such social benefits and there remains considerable public support in favor of moving forward on both programs—especially in the area

[67] For a discussion of the cost of public-sector employment, see Danziger and Gottschalk, *America Unequal*; and Kaus, *The End of Equality*.

[68] According to one estimate, it would take an investment in education and training of "$1.66 trillion (in 1989 dollars) to restore the 1979 earnings ratios of less-skilled workers to workers with some college education, while holding workers with some college education at their 1989 levels of earnings." See James J. Heckman, Rebecca Roselius, and Jeffrey Smith, "U.S. Education and Training Policy: A Re-evaluation of the Underlying Assumptions Behind the New Consensus" in Lewis Solmon and Alec R. Levenson, eds., *Labor Markets, Employment Policy, and Job Creation* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), 84.

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of health insurance—despite Congress's retreat from public policy programs to combat social inequality following the 1994 congressional elections.

Ironically, at the same time there is growing pressure in Europe to reduce the social safety net, especially the entitlement of indefinite unemployment insurance. What might evolve in the future is a movement in both directions—toward a stronger social safety net in the United States and a weaker one in Europe—that would result in similar or more comparable social welfare programs sufficient to allow workers on both sides of the Atlantic to live free of economic deprivation or severe hardship. For this to occur, however, Americans concerned about combating social inequality will have to counter the current retreat in the U.S. Congress away from public policy issues that address joblessness and poverty.

Prospects

Programs proposed to increase employment opportunities, such as the creation of WPA-style jobs, should be aimed at broad segments of the U.S. population, not just inner-city workers, in order to provide the needed solid political base of support. In the new, highly integrated global economy, an increasing number of Americans across racial, ethnic, and income groups are experiencing declining real incomes, increasing job displacement, and growing economic insecurity. The unprecedented level of inner-city joblessness represents one important aspect of the broader economic dislocations that cut across racial and ethnic groups in the United States. Accordingly, when promoting economic and social reforms, it hardly seems politically wise to focus mainly on the most disadvantaged groups while ignoring other segments of the population that have also been adversely affected by global economic changes.

Yet, just when bold new comprehensive initiatives are urgently needed to address these problems, the U.S. Congress has retreated from using public policy as an instrument with which to fight social inequality. Failure to deal with this growing social inequality, including the rise of joblessness in U.S. inner cities, could seriously worsen the economic life of urban families and neighborhoods.

Groups ranging from the inner-city poor to those working- and middle-class Americans who are struggling to make ends meet will have to be effectively mobilized in order to change the current course and direction taken by policy makers. Perhaps the best way to accomplish this is through coalition politics that promote race-neutral programs such as jobs creation, further expansion of the earned income tax credit, public school reform, child care programs, and universal health insurance. A broad-based political coalition is needed to successfully push such programs through the political process.

Because an effective political coalition in part depends upon how the issues to be addressed are defined, it is imperative that the political message underscore the need for economic and social reform that benefits all groups, not just America's

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minority poor.[69] The framers of this message should be cognizant of the fact that changes in the global economy are creating growing social inequality and situations which intensify antagonisms between different racial and ethnic groups, and that these groups, although often seen as adversaries, are potential allies in a reform coalition because they suffer from a common problem—economic distress caused by forces outside their own control.

In the absence of an effective political coalition, priorities will be established that do not represent the interests of disadvantaged groups. For example, in the House of Representatives, 67 percent of proposed spending cuts from the federal budget for the year 2000 would come from low-income programs, even though these programs represent only 21 percent of the current federal budget (see Figure 1). Without an effective political coalition it is unlikely that Congress would be willing to finance the kinds of reforms that are needed to combat the new social inequality. At the time of this writing, the momentum is away from, not toward, social programs. Instead of recognizing and dealing with the complex and changing realities that have led to economic distress for many Americans, policy makers seek to assign blame and associate the economic problems of families and individuals with personal shortcomings such as lack of initiative, work ethic, or motivation. Consequently, there is very little support in favor of financing any social programs—even the creation of public service jobs for the limited number of welfare recipients who reach a time limit for receipt of welfare checks. Considering the deleterious consequences this shortsighted retreat from public policy will have for so many Americans, it is distressing that progressive groups, far from being energized to reverse the public policy direction in which the country is now moving, seem to be almost intimidated and paralyzed by the rhetoric of the Republican "Contract with America."

Accordingly, the kinds of long-term and immediate-term solutions that I have proposed stand little chance of being adopted, not to mention seriously considered, in the absence of a new political coalition of groups pressing for economic and social reform. Political leaders concerned about the current shift in public policy will have to develop a unifying rhetoric, a progressive message that resonates with broad segments of the American population, a message that enables groups to recognize that it is in their interest to join a reform coalition dedicated to moving America forward.

The solutions I have outlined were developed with the idea of providing a policy framework that would be suitable for and could be easily adopted by a reform coalition. The long-term solutions, which include the development of a system of national performance standards in public schools, family policies to reinforce the learning system in the schools, a national system of school-to-work transition, and ways to promote city-suburban integration and cooperation, would be beneficial to and could draw the support of a broad range of groups in America.

[69] William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).

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The short-term solutions, which range from the development of job information and placement centers and subsidized car pools in the ghetto to the creation of WPA-style jobs, are more relevant to low-income Americans, but they are the kinds of opportunity-enhancing programs that Americans of all racial and class backgrounds tend to support.

Although my policy framework is designed to appeal to broad segments of the population, I firmly believe that if adopted, it would alleviate a good deal of the economic and social distress currently plaguing the inner cities. The immediate problem of the disappearance of work in many inner-city neighborhoods would be confronted. The employment base in these neighborhoods would be increased immediately by the creation of WPA-style jobs, and income levels would rise because of the expansion of the earned income tax credit. Programs such as universal health care and day care would increase the attractiveness of low-wage jobs and "make work pay."

Increasing the employment base would have an enormous positive impact on the social organization of ghetto neighborhoods. As more people become employed, crime, including violent crime, and drug use will subside; families will be strengthened and welfare receipt will decline significantly; ghetto-related culture and behavior, no longer sustained and nourished by persistent joblessness, will gradually fade. As more people become employed and gain work experience, they will have a better chance of finding jobs in the private sector when they become available. The attitudes of employers toward inner-city workers will undergo change, in part because they would be dealing with job applicants who have steady work experience and would furnish references from their previous supervisors.

This is not to suggest that all the jobless individuals from the inner-city ghetto would take advantage of these employment opportunities. Some have responded to persistent joblessness by abusing alcohol and drugs, and these handicaps will affect their overall job performance, including showing up for work on time or on a consistent basis. But they represent only a small segment of the worker population in the inner city. Most workers in the inner city are ready, willing, able, and anxious to hold a steady job.

The long-term solutions that I have advanced would reduce the likelihood that a new generation of jobless workers would be produced from the youngsters now in school and preschool. We must break the cycle of joblessness and improve the youngsters' preparation for the new labor market in the global economy.

My framework for long-term and immediate solutions is based on the notion that the problems of jobless ghettos cannot be separated from those of the rest of the nation. Although these solutions have wide-ranging application and would alleviate the economic distress of many Americans, their impact on jobless ghettos would be profound. Their most important contribution would be their effect on the children of the ghetto, who would be able to anticipate a future of economic mobility and share the hopes and aspirations that so many of their fellow citizens experience as part of the American way of life.

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

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Regional Security after the Gulf War

MICHAEL N. BARNETT

The Gulf War of 1989–1990 unleashed a regional dialogue concerning what security arrangements should be established to discourage a repetition of this bloody encounter and to foster regional security. Predictably, many of the most affected states scurried in various and sometimes opposite directions in the hurried search for security. Numerous happenings reveal a region engaged in an intense debate over how to organize regional politics and how best to protect the security of its members: the 1990 Damascus Declaration that established a nominal military alliance between the Gulf Arab states, Egypt, and Syria; the rapid military build-ups and inflow of arms transfers; the series of bilateral agreements between various Western and Arab Gulf states; the continuing discussions among the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council; the 1991 Madrid Conference that inaugurated the multilateral talks between Israel and the Arab states; the Declaration of Principles between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) that established a framework for ending the conflict; and the tacit and explicit recognition of Israel's sovereignty by other Arab states.

This article focuses on three features of this debate. First, Arab states are exhibiting new patterns of interactions, departing from the promise of close association based on a shared identity and common values. Instead they have converged on "rules of the game" that revolve around sovereignty and are designed to protect the security of the separate Arab states. But Arab states are also addressing whether they and non-Arab states, notably Israel, should construct common institutions. In doing so they are considering the fundamental relationship between the state's identity and the desired regional order.

Second, the region is caught between the impulse of competitive arrangements that celebrate self-help and immediate security gratification and the promise of cooperation that relies on the language of assurance rather than deterrence. The

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prospect of regional security is highly dependent on whether the region establishes the conditions for strategic stability and mutual assurance. Third, these regional discussions over the future security arrangements largely overlook a primary source of regional instability: domestic politics. Regional security arrangements generally concentrate on interstate issues, yet some of the most pressing threats to the state derive from domestic politics, which, in turn, implicate the possibility of regional stability.

This article surveys these three issues in order to assess the prospects for regional security in the Middle East. My general thesis is that the construction of relatively stable expectations and norms that encourage the assurance that states will eschew violence as they attempt to settle their differences is based on: the acceptance of broad organizing principles that structure interstate relations (regional order); a cooperative security regime that encourages mutual assurance (strategic stability); and domestic stability and a domestic compact that generate a set of normative expectations for the state's foreign policy consistent with the normative expectations of the society of states (domestic order and stability). Although the Middle Eastern states have seemingly embraced sovereignty, the present predilection for competitive security arrangements and the continuing drama of domestic conflict undermines the promise of regional security.

Identity and Regional Order

The subtext to the current (and ongoing) debate over regional order is the relationship between the state's identity and the norms that should govern Middle Eastern politics. As actors defend or promote a political order, they present and define themselves in a particular manner. This can be understood in the following way. The norms that actors forward are usually connected to their identity and self-understanding; such norms may be considered constitutive.[1] In other words, individuals frequently behave in certain ways and not others because of the relationship between such behavior and the individuals' identity, the presentation of oneself in relationship to an "other." This is also true for states. Certain state behavior is considered inappropriate because it is inconsistent with what it means to be a "civilized" or "modern" or "sovereign" state; modern states do not possess colonies, settle differences through war, violate basic human rights, and so on. In these and other cases, certain behaviors are viewed as reflective of the state's identity. Constitutive norms, in short, signify how a state is or is not to enact a particular identity.[2]

These norms are usually connected to a desired order, by which I mean the development of relatively stable expectations and shared norms to govern relations

[1] Martin Hollis *The Cunning of Reason* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137–41.

[2] Peter Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).

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among actors; these norms, again, are linked to the actor's identity and self-understanding.[3] For instance, some versions of the "democratic peace" make a direct connection between the identity of the actors—that is, democratic-liberal states—and the norms that are to regulate their relations—for example, prohibiting violence to settle disputes. In Arab politics a shared Arab identity has long been associated with various political projects that are at odds with a regional order premised on sovereignty and exclusivity. In general, those states that share a basic identity and organize themselves into a self-constituted group will exhibit norms that are a direct expression of the state's identity.

Yet actors sharing a basic identity will disagree over the norms and desired political order that are associated with that identity. First, there is no reason to assume that those who share an identity will necessarily have a conflict-free environment. Second, conflict has many sources, and there is no reason to presume that conflict is always driven by the logic of anarchy. Third, a possible source of conflict among actors that share an identity is over their constitutive norms. That is, while members of a self-identified group might agree that they share a political identity, they might disagree over the practices and political projects that are associated with that identity. In this reading, states that share a basic identity and attempt to organize themselves into a self-constituted group may hold rival interpretations of the desired regional order. Such rival interpretations, in turn, can represent a source of conflict.

The debate over the relationship between the Arab identity and its associated political projects exists at the domestic and the regional level. A recurring debate in Egyptian politics has been the relationship between the Egyptian national identity and the Arab national identity, and, relatedly, the obligations that Egypt had, if any, to other Arab states. Such debates generally sprang up around seminal events, including the Arab Palestine Revolt in 1936, the creation of the Arab League in 1945, the defeat in the 1948 Palestine War, and Anwar Sadat's path to Camp David.[4]

At the regional level the debate over the constitutive norms of Arabism and the desired regional order have led to hostility and conflicts. This was particularly evident during the first decades of the Arab states system. Although all Arab leaders identified themselves as Arab nationalists, they had rival interpretations of the political projects that flowed from that identity that were directly tied to alternative visions of the desired regional order. For instance, the Ba'ath Party and Gamal Abdel Nasser's post-Suez War version of Arab nationalism envisioned

[3] Dennis Wrong, *The Problem of Order* (New York: Free Press, 1994), chap. 1.

[4] On the Palestine revolt, see Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Egypt, Islam, and the Arabs: The Search for Egyptian Nationhood, 1930–45* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). On the League of Arab States, see Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski, *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–45* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). On the 1948 war, see Ghada Talhami, *Palestine and Egyptian National Identity* (New York: Praeger Press, 1992), 63–66. And on Sadat's policies, see Saad Eddin Ibrahim, "Domestic Developments in Egypt" in William Quandt, ed., *The Middle East: Ten Years After Camp David* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1988), 19–63.

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an Arab order that erased its territorial segmentation to bring the state and the nation into correspondence. Yet others championed interpretations of Arab nationalism that were consistent with the territorial division of the Arab world and exclusivity associated with sovereignty. King Hussein of Jordan contrasted his understanding of Arab nationalism and how the Arab world should be organized from that of Egyptian President Nasser's in the following way: "My own concept . . . is quite different from Nasser's. . . . He believes that Arab nationalism can only be identified by a particular brand of Arab unity. . . . I disagree. . . . Arab nationalism can only survive through complete equality."[5]

This debate over the desired regional order highlights two central issues. Again, actors with a shared identity can differ over the norms that should govern their relations. The clash between Arabism and Westphalia—that is, whether Arab states, which were assumed to have a shared Arab identity and interests, should organize their relations around the principles of sovereignty and the norms of noninterference—represented nothing less than a debate over the desired regional order that reflected a debate over the norms that should govern actors with a shared identity. The Arab "cold war" was not simply another instance of balancing dynamics but rather represented a debate over the desired regional order.[6]

Because Arab states were caught between Arabism and Westphalia, they had difficulty establishing the stable normative expectations upon which any regional order would be based. Specifically, sovereignty demanded that Arab states recognize each other's legitimacy, borders, and the principle of noninterference. But Arabism held that Arab states were to defend the Arab nation, to uphold regional standards of legitimacy, to deny the very distinction between the international and the domestic.[7] National identities and aspirations frequently clashed with Westphalian principles and notions of territorial exclusivity, depositing a legacy of regional conflict. The contradictory normative expectations generated by Westphalia and Arabism made regional order an elusive and often violent quest.[8]

If the divisive theme of state versus nation dominated the debate over regional order through the 1960s, since then this debate has quieted and settled on sovereignty. That Arab states are converging on sovereignty can be directly attributed to the development of state-national identities and the weakening grasp of Arab national identities. A change in the desired regional order, in other words, reflects and reveals a shift in the identities of its members. As G. H. Mead observed:

[5] King Hussein, *Uneasy Lies the Head* (London: Heineman, 1962), 74–80.

[6] Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

[7] Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East* (New York: Praeger Press, 1983); and Paul Noble, "The Arab State System: Opportunities, Constraints, and Pressures" in B. Korany and A. Dessouki, eds., *The Foreign Policies of the Arab States* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984), 48–50.

[8] Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (September 1993): 271–296.

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> The changes that we make in the social order in which we are implicated necessarily involve our also making changes in ourselves. The social conflicts among the individual members of a given organized human society, which, for their removal, necessitate conscious or intelligent reconstructions and modifications of that society by those individuals, also and equally necessitate such reconstructions or modifications by those individuals of their own selves and personalities.[9]

The revolution in identities in the Arab world, involving a decline of Arab nationalism and the rise of state-national and Islamic identities, has altered the debate over the desired regional order. In recognition of this normative fragmentation, scholars and politicians speak of "the return to geography" and "the end of pan-Arabism."[10]

Two factors were most responsible for promoting state-national identities and encouraging Arab leaders to embrace the norms of sovereignty as the basis of their relations.[11] First, the quality of the interactions among Arab states, often premised on the belief that they shared fundamental identities and interests, created regional estrangement. Simply stated, familiarity bred suspicion, and interaction encouraged enmity.

Second, while Arab leaders attempted to maintain their standing by aligning themselves with Arabism, they also engaged in state-building projects that were intended to win over the political loyalties of their citizens. While paying tribute to the importance of the Arab and Islamic political community, Arab governments also were encouraging their citizens to identify with the state and the regime's goals. Therefore, many scholars attempt to account for remarkable regime stability since the 1960s by noting that states are no longer viewed as "artificial" by their citizens and now have a degree of permanence and legitimacy that they did not possess at independence.[12] Any domestic stability, in short, cannot be attributed to coercion alone; and state formation and the growing attachment to the state mean that state-national identities are better able to compete with transnational claims and symbols. Of course, attachment to the state as a territorial entity does not preclude opposition to the regime in power.

In general, as Arab leaders worked for integration at one level, they promoted fragmentation at another.[13] Both interstate interaction and state formation combined to erode transnational identities and obligations, to promote statism, and

[9] George Herbert Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 309.

[10] See, for instance, Ghassan Salame, "Inter-Arab Politics: The Return to Geography" in Quandt, ed., *The Middle East*; and Fouad Ajami, "The End of Pan-Arabism," *Foreign Affairs* 57 (Winter 1978/79): 355–73.

[11] Michael Barnett, "Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," *International Organization* 49 (Summer 1995): 479–510.

[12] Albert Hourani, *A History of the Arab Peoples* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 451.

[13] Giaccomo Luciani and Ghassan Salame, "The Politics of Arab Integration" in G. Luciani, ed., *The Arab State* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 398.

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to encourage Arab states to accept each other's sovereignty. To be sure, there remain running examples of Arab states violating the principle of noninterference: Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Sudan and Saudi Arabia accused of supporting Islamicist movements in other Arab states, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States were rumored to have had a hand in the 1994 civil war in Yemen, and on and on. Still, Arab states have generally converged on sovereignty to organize their relations and no longer deny each other's legitimacy; this in turn fostered regional order by encouraging them to limit their behavior in a continuous and predictable manner.[14]

The weight of pre-Gulf War opinion favored sovereignty as the basis of regional order, and the Gulf War only intensified such sentiments. The importance of sovereignty as the future basis of regional order was exemplified after the Gulf War by the Damascus Declaration, the first post-Gulf War security agreement. Announced in March 1991 as a pan-Arab security arrangement, the Gulf States, Syria, and Egypt pledged further strategic and military cooperation, with an understanding that the latter two would be well compensated for their military commitments and troops.[15] But the Declaration has had little operational value. Its real value, according to ex-GCC Secretary-General Abdullah Bishara, was its recognition of the legitimacy of the Arab state's borders, the right of each state to arrange its own security, and the exclusive claim to its resources.[16]

Coming on the heels of Iraq's denial of Kuwaiti sovereignty and claim that Gulf oil belonged to all Arabs, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states held sovereignty and security as indistinguishable and were intent on institutionalizing sovereignty as the basis of inter-Arab relations. The GCC states were not alone in recognizing this fundamental shift in the security practices of Arab states. The secretary-general of the Arab League nearly pronounced the last rites of the Arab Collective Security Pact:

> Each state determines the needs and boundaries of its security on its own, because this concerns its people and its future. We should basically assume that there should be no interference in any country's security. We must acknowledge and proceed from this basic principle.[17]

Any notion of Arab national security was now buried. The apparent consensus was that Arabism had long outlived its usefulness and that the region should sober up and embrace sovereignty.

The Gulf War, the insistence on sovereignty as the basis of regional order, and the emergence of statism contributed to two striking developments. The first was the division of the Arab-Israeli conflict into an interstate conflict (Israel and

[14] See Barnett, "Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Regional Order in the Arab States System," for indicators of this claim.

[15] For the text of the Damascus Declaration, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Near East Service (NES)-91-152, 7 August 1991, 1–2.

[16] FBIS-NES-92-241, 15 December 1992, 10–11.

[17] FBIS-NES-92-232, 2 December 1992, 1–2.

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the Arab states) and an intercommunal conflict (Israel and the Palestinians). Now reading their interests from the "logic of anarchy" rather than the "logic of community," many Arab states signaled their desire to transform the Arab-Israeli conflict from an ideological into an interstate contest. This transformation, of course, facilitated the détente between Israel and the Arab states. Many Arab states indicated their willingness to reconcile themselves to, if not recognize, Israel's legitimate presence in the region. Therefore, perhaps the surest barometer of the emergence of statist identities and sovereignty is the comparatively rapid integration of Israel into the region. The decline of the Arab political community, the hardening of the Arab states, and a diminished responsiveness to "core" Arab concerns mean that Israel is more fully recognized as a legitimate member of the region.[18]

That said, the election and policies of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu reveal how the conflict still reverberates throughout the region and can mobilize the Arab ranks, if only for presentational and instrumental purposes. Still, that Israel negotiates bilaterally with the Palestinians and various Arab states, and that many Arab leaders frame their objections to Netanyahu's policies on the grounds that they are a strategic setback for a region finally poised to cooperate on other economic and political issues, represents a fundamental change in the organization of the Arab-Israeli conflict and reflects the emergence of state-national interests that are linked to a regional order based on sovereignty.

A second development was the region-wide debate over the boundaries of the region, the desired regional order, security institutions, and regional organizations.[19] In recent years numerous Arab conferences, newspapers, and journal articles have highlighted the theme: What remains of the Arab states system? A conference at Cairo's Al-Ahram Centre in late 1994 was dedicated to the necessity of Arab reconciliation and maintainance of some semblance of an Arab order.[20] The fiftieth anniversary of the Arab League in 1995 provoked a debate with a subtext about the relationship between the identity of Arab states and future regional arrangements.[21] The Lebanese-based journal *al-Mustaqbal al-Arabi* (*The Arab Future*) has been consumed with the general issue of what remains of the Arab order, and, is there an Arab state?

The relationship between the state's identity and the regional order plays itself out in the debate over the concepts of "Middle Easternism" and the "New Middle East." Egyptian intellectuals and officials began to offer the concept of Middle

[18] On the decline of core Arab concerns, see Paul Noble, Rex Brynen, and Baghat Korany, "Conclusion: The Changing Regional Security Environment" in B. Korany, P. Noble, and R. Brynen, eds., *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 281.

[19] See, for instance, Ibrahim Karawan, "Arab Dilemmas in the 1990s: Breaking Taboos and Searching for Signposts," *Middle East Journal* 48 (Summer 1994): 433–54; Muhammad Faour, *The Arab World After Desert Storm* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993).

[20] Dooa el-Bey, "Mapping the Future," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 10–16 November 1994, 1.

[21] Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, "The Arab League and the Arab State," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 6–12 April 1995, 8.

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Easternism after the Madrid Talks of 1991 as they discussed the possible relationship between the Arab and non-Arab states in the region, including Ethiopia, Iran, and Turkey, and primarily Israel. Those who champion Middle Easternism envision an Arab order alongside a Middle Eastern order, with the former protecting the shared Arab identity and the latter recognizing that all states of the region have shared interests that can be furthered through close coordination and cooperation. Yet the critics of Middle Easternism portray it as burying Arabism and hence emphasize institutions restrictive to Arab states.[22]

The idea that the "Middle East" might supplant the Arab region is most closely associated with former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres's concept of the "New Middle East."[23] Not only does he hope that the Middle East's future will duplicate Europe's past, where modest experiments in cooperation snowballed into greater interdependence and institution-building, but his vision is premised on erasing the cognitive boundaries between Israel and the Arab states and declaring a region called the "Middle East." Few Arab politicians trust Peres's vision of the future Middle East or believe that it is attainable or even desirable. When Shimon Peres speaks the language of interdependence, many Arabs hear a future of dependence.[24]

During a talk at Ain-Shams University in Cairo in spring 1996, one listener responded to my discussion of the possibility of regionalism in the Middle East by asserting that this was "imperialism by regionalism." His views were seconded by many in the audience. Such fears have a number of sources. Israel's GNP equals that of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan combined, suggesting that the Israeli economy will overwhelm that of its neighbors. In the future regional division of labor, Peres has suggested that it will contribute the technology and know-how, while the Arab world will contribute vast markets, cheap labor, and ready capital. Simply put, Israel is poised to become the regional "core," while the rest of the Arab states will become the "periphery." Israel, in this view, stands to conquer through market power what it could not through military power.[25] That Shimon Peres and other Israelis suggest that Israel can provide something of an engine and nucleus for a future regional order only encourages suspicion and fear.

The concept of Middle Easternism and Peres's vision evoke concern not only over relative gains between Israel and the Arab states but also whether and what remains of any hope for inter-Arab cooperation. That Peres ties his concept to a region in which ethnic, religious, and national identities are no longer distin-

[22] Comments by Syrian Information Minister Muhammad Salman as reported in *Al-Muharrir*, 6 November 1995, 6; cited in "Minister Expects Disturbances in the Region," *FBIS-NES-95-215*, 7 November 1995, 50.

[23] Shimon Peres, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1994).

[24] Amos Elon, "Crumbling Cairo," *The New York Review of Books*, 6 April 1995, 42, 6, 32–36; and Sid-Ahmed, "The Arab League and the Arab State."

[25] See the comments by Ghayth Aramanzi, head of the Arab League's London office, at the conference on the New Middle East at the London University's School of Oriental and African Studies on 19–20 December 1994. Reported in *FBIS-NES*, 7 February 1995, 7.

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guishing criteria for interaction conjures up the fear of extinguishing what little remains of Arabism and an Arab identity. A window into this concern occurred when Shimon Peres was rumored to be seeking to gain Israel's admission to the League of Arab States.[26] In a well publicized chance encounter between Peres and Arab League Secretary-General Esmet Abdel-Meguid at the Casablanca summit in 1994, Peres asked Abdel-Meguid, "And when will we be joining the Arab League?" Somewhat surprised by the question, Abdel-Meguid retorted, "The day you decide to speak Arabic." Egyptian Ambassador to Israel Muhammed Bassouni, who supports normalizing Arab-Israeli relations, nearly portrayed the future of the Arab League as little more than a cultural parlor as more high-profile and central issues were handled through bilateral and multilateral channels, but he bristled at Peres's suggestion that Israel be allowed to join the Arab League, characterizing the request as insulting and offensive.[27] In a series of interviews with past and present Jordanian officials in September 1995, a running theme on the issue of the New Middle East was that Israel was attempting to douse what little remained of the Arab identity. As one past top-ranking official put it, "Israel is now trying to rid Arabism from the Arab states; this challenges us to work harder to retain some features of Arab unity."[28]

In general, the emergence of statist identities and the declining salience of transnational loyalties caused Arab states to shift the debate over the desired regional order in two ways. The first is a general disappearance of conflict over rival interpretations of Arabism that were inconsistent with sovereignty to versions that are in keeping with it. That the Middle Eastern states are converging on sovereignty as the basis of their relations represents an important step toward regional order. But there is an alternative possibility that must be raised here that previews the discussion in the next section: the end of Arabism and the rise of "realism" might encourage greater interstate conflict between Arab states. Although pan-Arabism did not stop Iraq from invading Kuwait, myriad instances of sabre-rattling, or attempts to destabilize Arab governments from within, the belief that "Arab states do not wage war on each other" arguably reduced the number of wars that otherwise might have occurred. Whereas pan-Arabism instructed Arab states to settle their differences short of war, realism contains no such rules.

While realists have consistently maintained that the practice of Arab leaders demonstrated that they were more interested in their own interests than those of the Arab nation, the novelty of the post-Gulf War period is that Arab leaders are now seemingly in open agreement with this view. They no longer feel as compelled to legitimate their policies according to the needs of some larger community; they are less hesitant to defend their foreign policies as in the state's

[26] Mohammed Sid-Ahmed, "When Israelis Speak Arabic," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 30 March–5 April 1995, 8.

[27] Interview with author, Tel-Aviv, Israel, 26 August 1995.

[28] Interview with author, 5 September 1995, Amman, Jordan.

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interests and are insistent that sovereignty regulate inter-Arab relations. The emergence of statism and the acceptance of sovereignty is consistent with the transformation of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

But the crisis in Israeli-Palestinian relations demonstrates the strong relationship between movement toward a solution to conflict and any plans for regional cooperation that might include Israel. For instance, even though the third Middle East and North Africa economic summit did take place in Cairo in November 1996 during a crisis in the peace process, the Mubarak government considered cancelling the conference, and the conference produced little of note. Even King Hussein, who champions regional cooperation and initially predicted that Netanyahu would adhere to Oslo, began to distance himself from Israel after the September 1996 riots. Israel's prospective ties to its Arab neighbors are dependent on progress in the peace process. But Arab states continue to keep open their bilateral channels and speak of the "strategic needs for peace." The contest over the desired regional order concerns what remains of the Arab order and what constitutes the Middle East. Flux rather than stability continues to define the debate over the regional order.

The Search for Strategic Stability

That the region has converged on the norms of sovereignty represents an important step toward regional security. But because sovereignty is a permissive institution that allows for war and threat-based security arrangements, the adopted security regime will greatly influence the prospects for regional security. Specifically, the end of the cold war and the Gulf War launched a debate over the region's security institutions that suggests two alternative roads: competitive and cooperative security. The prospects for regional security and strategic stability is highly dependent on the path that is chosen.

Competitive security is defined by the reliance on abject force and explicit balancing mechanisms to maintain interstate stability. States, in this view, have two stylized choices as they attempt to increase their security and to respond to security threats: internal mobilization, which involves the domestic mobilization and production of the means of war; and external alignments, which concern the construction of strategic alliances.[29] Although there are advantages and disadvantages to each strategy (generally cast as an "arms-autonomy" trade-off), the overall concern is to increase the state's relative power in order to maintain a balance of forces and a credible deterrent posture, which communicate that the costs of aggression will exceed any expected benefits.

[29] Kenneth Waltz, *The Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison Wesley, 1979); James Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Trade-offs in the Search for Security," *International Organization* 47 (Spring 1993): 205–234.

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Such competitive security arrangements are closely associated with the notorious security dilemma. Henry Kissinger's classic phrase captures its essence: "The desire of one power for absolute security means absolute insecurity for all the others."[30] Security dilemmas are hypothesized to reduce the security of both actors in the long term and also potentially to increase their strategic vulnerabilities, which exist to the extent that there is a military advantage to strike first. Said otherwise, if the strategic calculus gives a relative advantage to the side that strikes first, then both sides have an incentive to shoot first and ask questions later.

There are many sources of strategic vulnerabilities in the Middle East. Where there are few natural borders or barricades, defensive arrangements become more difficult and there is an advantage to offensive maneuvers. The same logic applies to military technology. Although some claim that the spread of missile technology and nuclear weapons raises the costs of war and therefore provides a robust deterrent capability,[31] such technology, to the extent that it gives an advantage to strike first, can be highly destabilizing. Indeed, although various arms control regimes have been established to try to limit the spread of missile and nuclear technology, the Middle Eastern states have demonstrated a real talent for circumventing them. Therefore, monitoring mechanisms do not provide sufficient assurance that the signatories of such control regimes will act in good faith. The aforementioned factors, in short, create strategic vulnerabilities, crisis instability, and an incentive to strike first.[32]

The dissatisfaction with competitive security strategies and their attending security dilemmas have led states to seek cooperative security arrangements.[33] Beginning with the recognition that the unilateral moves that generate security dilemmas reduce rather than increase security, cooperative security strategies look to construct institutions and norms to encourage trust and cooperation. Sometimes labelled multilateralism, the argument is that states have common interests that require joint action to obtain their common goals. Because states fear that others will defect from any agreement, they will construct institutions to monitor and encourage compliance. The resulting acts of security cooperation, therefore, are likely to include greater specification of those actions that are and are not considered threatening, policies that are designed to overcome collective action problems associated with interdependent choice, and the development of security procedures that are intended to serve mutual interests. Arms control agreements, defensive positioning, notification of military maneuvers, hot lines,

[30] Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored* (New York: Grosset and Dunlop, 1964), 2; also see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30 (January 1978): 167–214.

[31] John Mearshiemer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security* 15 (Winter 1990): 5–56.

[32] Janice Stein, "The Security Dilemma in the Middle East: The Prognosis for the Decade Ahead" in B. Korany, P. Noble, and R. Brynen, eds., *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 59.

[33] Janne Nolan, *Global Engagement* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1994).

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military exchanges, and other policies are intended to encourage trust and overcome the security dilemmas that are understood as an underlying cause of conflict.

At present various Middle Eastern states speak the language of cooperative security but act according to the logic of competitive security. The Gulf War caused nearly all states to scramble to increase their security in the most immediate way available: alliances and arms imports. This dash for security was particularly evident among the Gulf states. Eschewing notions of cooperative security that were supposedly the foundation of the GCC and discarding the Damascus Declaration, the Gulf states quickly demonstrated that they had greater faith in the United States and the West than they did in each other. They provided the United States with access to military bases and concluded stockpiling and over-the-horizon agreements.[34] In addition to these external security guarantees, most Gulf states developed a nearly unquenchable thirst for high-technology military hardware, and the United States was happy to oblige. In general, any notions of Arab collective security lay in ruins after the Gulf War as Arab states began emphasizing particularistic over collectivist interests, focusing on state security over core Arab concerns, and demonstrating a strong interest in establishing bilateral security pacts with Western states.[35]

This trend toward unilateralism and the reliance on military force was encouraged by the resurgence of regional rivalry.[36] Border disputes that had been relatively dormant erupted with force and occasional violence after the Gulf War. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Qatar and Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and Oman and Saudi Arabia have all exchanged barbs and the occasional bullet in the recent past. Moreover, there seems to be little zeal in attempting to arbitrate such disputes in anything but a bilateral fashion.[37] Consequently, while the Arab states might have recognized each other's sovereignty, they have not necessarily ended their discussion or their conflicts over their territorial boundaries. Saudi Arabia, always viewed suspiciously by its neighbors, became increasingly perceived as a budding hegemon with regional designs and aspirations. Iran, though insisting that Persian Gulf security was premised on mutual security, engaged in various provocative actions, including the military takeover of three islands claimed by the United Arab Empirates (UAE) in the Gulf. Iraq, though under a gripping sanctions regime imposed by the UN, did not relax its hostility and veiled threats against Kuwait and others. The lesson of the Gulf War seemed to be that too much trust and not enough firepower caused adventurism and war initiation.

[34] Anwar-Ul-Haq Ahady, "Security in the Persian Gulf after Desert Storm," *International Journal* 49 (Spring 1994): 219–40.

[35] Baghat Korany, "National Security in the Arab World: The Persistence of Dualism" in D. Tschirgi, ed., *The Arab World Today* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 166.

[36] See F. Gregory Gause III, *The Gulf Monarchies* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993), chap. 5, for a good discussion of the Gulf states' post–Gulf War security policies.

[37] "Border Disputes Discussed Bilaterally," *FBIS-NES*, 21 December 1994, 42. But border issues retain a place on the agenda of recent GCC summit meetings.

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That arms-building and rivalry are prominent themes of post-Gulf War security politics only heightens the security dilemmas and fears of strategic vulnerabilities. There are few natural borders or fortifications in the Middle East that provide for a defensive positioning. Moreover, qualitative and quantitative developments in missile technology have left most states more vulnerable and fearful. Iraq demonstrated during the Gulf War how highly mobile and easily camouflaged missiles are. Israel now concentrates on the potential missile capacities of Iran, Iraq, and Syria. Because of the nature of military technology and geographical proximity, it is difficult to distinguish offensive from defensive military formations and postures. What one state maintains is a defensive positioning, another reads as an offensive strategy. Numerous Egyptian policy makers and analysts with whom I spoke in March 1995 raised the issue that while Israel pushes the importance of cooperative security, it wants to retain its nuclear option. As Janice Stein ominously concludes: "The dynamics of the international security dilemma make the Middle East inhospitable to the creation of stable security. It does so by creating the legitimate fear of strategic vulnerability."[38]

Alongside the strong competitive disposition, however, are hints of a cooperative security strategy. The Middle Eastern states are involved in various discussions that suggest some recognition that long-term security is based on mutual trust and coordination: the multilateral talks, the recently created and practically defunct Conference on Cooperation and Security in the Middle East, the GCC, the bilateral talks between Israel and its neighbors. These and other regional discussions suggest an effort to overcome the security dilemmas that wreak havoc and encourage fear. Various forces are encouraging the region's leaders to consider a multilateral solution to resolve their ongoing security dilemmas.

The case of Israel is instructive here.[39] Israel has traditionally embraced a self-reliant strategic doctrine for a variety of reasons: an existential view of the precariousness of Jewish existence; a Waltzian realism that holds that anarchy generates self-help behavior; a military-industrial coalition that benefits from arms production; a geographical imperative that suggests a doctrine that is offensive minded and carries the war into the enemies' territory; and a strategic culture that is ultimately premised on deterrence and overwhelming use of force. Such factors contributed to Israel leaning heavily on competitive, rather than cooperative security strategies.

Yet events over the last decade have encouraged Israeli officials to consider the efficacy of cooperative security. First, the peace process and the perceived decline of Arab nationalism inform the emergent view that the Arab states are increasingly reconciled to Israel's existence. Second, the perception by Israeli military officials of an emerging symmetry between Israeli and Arab military

[38] Stein, "The Security Dilemma in the Middle East," 61.

[39] Efraim Inbar, "Contours of Israel's New Strategic Thinking," *Political Science Quarterly* 111 (Spring 1996): 41–64; and Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, "The Changing Israeli Strategic Equation: Toward a Security Regime," *Review of International Studies* 21 (January 1995): 41–60.

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forces means that Israel may be unable to carry its present military advantage into the future. Third, missile technology, as Shimon Peres frequently argues, makes defense of the Israeli population more difficult; this was made dramatically evident during the Gulf War when the Iraqi SCUDs rained on Israel. Fourth, the arms race has not necessarily increased Israeli security. Finally, economic constraints make a renewed arms race unattractive; not only are there fewer resources to channel to defense spending, but the high-technology weapons that are in the greatest demand are increasingly expensive. For these and other reasons Israeli officials are entertaining the desirability of a cooperative security strategy. There is evidence, moreover, that Arab governments are arriving at the same conclusion.[40]

The regional talks on security, arms control, the environment, and water resources are evidence of this cooperative view.[41] Although these talks have yet to produce any dramatic breakthrough, they reinforce the view that the Middle Eastern states—Arab and non-Arab alike—have shared interests that can only be solved through coordination and cooperation. This is the case not only for strategic cooperation but in other areas—most notably environmental and water resources—where cooperation might generate immediate payoffs. An underlying aspiration of these multilateral talks, moreover, is that cooperation and progress in one area might spill over into another area.

The obstacles to cooperation, however, extend beyond the absence of institutional mechanisms to overcome coordination problems. Along with continuing suspicions and fears of Israel by many Arab governments and societal actors, it is important to recognize that cooperation faces technical and material hurdles. Perhaps most prominent here are the obstacles to economic cooperation. To what extent can state-run economies that demonstrate little natural division of labor successfully coordinate their policies to their mutual advantage? How do these semiperipheral and peripheral economies loosen their ties to the core capitalist countries and strengthen their ties among each other? What are the economic costs and advantages to such a change? There have been countless studies of the benefits to be gained from economic cooperation; these surveys nearly always begin by proclaiming the economic and political advantages that will naturally flow from increasing interdependence. They nearly always conclude pessimistically by doubting that the intractable and nearly insurmountable obstacles to economic cooperation can be overcome.[42] Still, hope does remain: despite these

[40] Yahya Sadowski, *Scuds or Butter?* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1992).

[41] Stephen Spiegel and David Pervin, *Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, Vol. I: The Environment, Water, Refugees, and Economic Cooperation and Development* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995); and Spiegel and Pervin, *Practical Peacemaking in the Middle East, Vol. II: Arms Control and Regional Security* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1995). For a discussion of confidence building in the Middle East, see Gabriel Ben-Dor and David Dewitt, eds., *Confidence Building Measures in the Middle East* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994).

[42] Stanley Fischer, Dani Rodrik, and Elias Tuma, eds., *The Economics of Middle East Peace* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); and Stanley Fischer, Leonard Hausman, Anna Karasik, and Thomas Schelling, *Securing Peace in the Middle East* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994).

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problems and negative residues of the Casablanca economic summit, by most accounts the follow-on summit in October 1995 in Amman was more successful and encouraging. There continue to be sidebar discussions for other regional and joint arrangements.[43]

In general, where suspicions run deep and trust remains elusive, nearly all exchanges will be scrutinized in terms of the relative rather than the absolute gains that accrue to each party.[44] This is true not only of Israel and the Arabs but also of the Arab states themselves, who have produced few economic agreements. Functionalism might have worked in a Europe where there already existed relatively equal economies, something of a common identity, and an idea of progress. But these critical factors are in short supply in the Middle East. The combination of cognitive and capital obstacles means that there is little prospect of real economic interdependence in the near term; in this respect, zero-sum rather than positive-sum sentiments travel across categories of interactions.

If the regional players are unable to generate trust or build the institutions required for cooperation on their own, then might outside powers or third-party actors, notably the United States, contribute to this end? The United States can help move the process toward cooperative security in various ways by: providing the occasional divine intervention to nudge the parties forward; circulating proposals that derive from its own experiments in security cooperation with the Soviet Union and in Europe; offering to help monitor any interstate agreement; providing security guarantees to those who take a leap of faith toward Israel; demonstrating some self-restraint in its arms exports to the region, particularly of highly destabilizing technology, and encouraging others to follow suit; and attempting to construct and then helping to enforce a missile control regime.

Thus far, however, the record suggests that the United States is better at creating incentives for competitive rather than cooperative security, given its readiness to provide unilateral security guarantees and to fuel a region-wide arms race. In the past the United States has provided financial rewards to the participants in the peace process, most notably the 1978 Camp David Accords, but the end of the cold war has introduced a more frugal mind-set. The United States has provided relatively little to the Palestinians, and in 1995 King Hussein had to lobby various House members to help secure Bill Clinton's prior pledge to absolve Jordan's debts as a reward for Jordan's peace with Israel. As Yasir Arafat has been noted to exclaim: "Billions for war and nothing for peace." The overall post–Gulf War record suggests that the United States is encouraging a competitive security strategy and is either unable or unwilling to provide the carrots and sticks to invite a cooperative strategy.

[43] Serge Schmemann, "Mideast Leaders Confer, But This Time the Talk Is of Making Money as Well as Peace," *New York Times*, 30 October 1995. For various regional proposals, see "Impact of Israel on Middle East Common Market," *FBIS-NES*, 3 May 1994, 37; and "Arab League Studies Middle East Market," *FBIS-NES*, 22 March 1994, 3.

[44] David Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

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That said, ultimately the region's future will be determined by its members. The United States certainly has the capacity to encourage movement in some directions and discourage that in others, but it is the will of those who live in the region and their interactions that will largely determine whether they continue down a competitive path or veer toward a more cooperative future. Indeed, it is not exactly clear that many states in the region welcome a strong U.S. role.[45] There remain anti-Western sentiments throughout much of the Arab world, and a United States that actively attempts to stifle instability might very well create a self-fulfilling prophecy. Perhaps the best that the United States can do is, first, to encourage the region's members to develop their own cooperative security system, and, second, to renounce any attempt to construct a regional hegemony.[46]

In general, while many scholars expected that a more stable Middle East would emerge from the institutionalization of sovereignty and the end of ideology,[47] whether regional security materializes is dependent on strategic stability and mutual assurance. There is some movement in this direction, as evidenced by the on-going multilateral talks, which have encouraged the exploration of possible confidence-building measures that might lessen tensions, minimize the possibility of inadvertent war, reduce the conflict over longstanding issues and points of contention, and construct tacit, if not explicit, norms and rules of behavior that can encourage a more stable strategic environment. That, at least, has been the promise. Unfortunately, the region exhibits a loyalty to competitive security dynamics that only encourages strategic instability and undermines the prospects for regional security.

Domestic Disorder/Regional Disorder?

Middle Eastern states face a dizzying array of domestic challenges; in fact, many observers claim that domestic, rather than interstate security threats represent the real challenge to the state.[48] A host of ailments beset most states of the region—economic stagnation and deterioration, demographic pressures, the challenge of political liberalization and democratization, the lack of legitimacy and the resurgence of political Islam. The religiously based war in Algeria was certainly a wake-up call; Egypt is widely thought to be the next to go;[49] and the recent

[45] L. Carl Brown, "The Middle East after the Cold War and the Gulf War: Change or More of the Same?" in George Downs, ed., *Collective Security After the Cold War* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), 215.

[46] Ibid., 215.

[47] Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East*; Fouad Ajami, *The Arab Predicament* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[48] Mohammed Ayoob, "Unravelling the Concept: 'National Security' in the Third World" in Korany, Noble, and Brynen, eds., *The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World*, 31–55; and Korany, "National Security in the Arab World."

[49] Cassandra, "The Impending Crisis in Egypt," *Middle East Journal* 49 (Winter 1995): 9–28.

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bombings in Saudi Arabia and turmoil in Bahrain only demonstrate that even those states once thought invulnerable because of their tremendous resources and wealth are facing severe economic and political pressures.

The cure for these ills, however, appear elusive. The time-honored cooptive strategies are less effective and available than they once were. Arab governments have generally attempted to extract political, economic, and ideological resources from international sources in order to maintain domestic stability. The collapse of the cold war, the end of Arab nationalism, and the decline of oil revenues have deprived Arab states of many traditional external sources of material and symbolic capital that were highly important for regime maintenance. Governments have fewer economic resources to buy loyalty, are concerned that political liberalization might unleash a pandora's box of domestic pressures, are no longer able to capture the strategic rents of the cold war, and are less able to draw from various transnational ideologies or to manufacture "authentic" domestic bases of consent.

Although millennialists thrive in this environment, various forces favor the status quo. Perhaps most important is the fear of the unknown; this, above all else, appears to create a winning coalition in support of the government. But how long such a coalition can be maintained is the real unknown. These states also tend to rely on selective and not so discriminate use of force, not a commendable or long-term solution. Still, few states seem immune to the onslaught of domestic disturbances, and even fewer seem able to respond creatively or positively. Egypt, for instance, is the subject of numerous commentaries that recite a litany of the domestic political and economic challenges facing the Mubarak regime and then marvel at its seemingly oblivious disregard of these challenges.

These domestic problems can have regional consequences. Theories abound concerning the possible connection between domestic politics, an adventurous or aggressive foreign policy, and regional instability. There are various scapegoat theories that posit a relationship between domestic instability and foreign policy actions that are designed to increase national cohesion and regime stability.[50] For instance, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz intimated that a principal reason for Iraq's invasion of Kuwait was the deteriorating economic situation at home that had its roots in Iraq's previous war with Iran (and its accumulated debts) and its declining oil revenues because of overproduction among the other oil-exporting countries.[51] A declining political and economic situation can encourage the government to engage in aggressive military activities and to raise regional havoc.

Alternatively, sagging domestic support can prompt a government to adopt a foreign policy posture that, though perhaps not including overt sabre-rattling,

[50] Jack Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique" in Manus Midlarsky, ed., *Handbook of War Studies* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 259–88.

[51] Milton Viorst, "Report from Baghdad," *New Yorker*, 24 June 1991, 55–73; and Amatzia Baram, "The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: Decision-Making in Baghdad" in A. Baram and B. Rubin, eds., *Iraq's Road to War* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 6–9.

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might not necessarily encourage a more stable international environment. For instance, Egypt's deteriorating domestic situation hands the government an incentive to assert its leadership in regional politics. Such leadership is generally premised on identifying the salience of particular threats, most notably Israel, which demand a defiant foreign policy. This dynamic arguably led Egypt in early 1995 to make Israel's failure to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty a major issue and a possible pretext for delaying its own signature. Egypt's reasons have less to do with strategic calculations and more to do with domestic politics and its attempt to maintain a leadership position in Arab politics. This example, moreover, suggests how domestic considerations might undermine the search for a cooperative security arrangement.

Some states might be considered pivotal because of the relationship between their stability and regional stability.[52] Somewhat reminiscent of the domino theory, the argument is that some states are so key—defined by their population, resources, and stature in the region—that a revolution would have regional if not international repercussions. Egypt is one such example; Hosni Mubarak's overthrow by, say, radical Islamic forces might very well invite militant groups in other Arab states to follow suit. At the very least, it would cause other states in the region to recalculate their foreign policy stances to adjust to the new reality.

More recently, scholars and policy makers have made another connection between domestic order and international order: it is not just any domestic order that leads to a stable peace; rather, it is a liberal-democratic order. This "pacific thesis," the subject of much scholarly debate and assumed by many policy makers, posits that a community of democratic states represents the best guarantor of international order.[53] Not only is there no consensus on the existence of the democratic peace, there is considerable debate over its applicability to the Middle East.[54] Much of this debate concerns whether a community of Arab or Islamic democracies might generate a stable peace comparable to that among Western states

While I do not want to weigh in on the democratic thesis per se, I do want to suggest a possible relationship between domestic and international order: there must be a correspondence between the normative expectations that society has of the state and the normative expectations among the society of states. In other words, the more congruent are the norms and behavioral expectations generated by domestic and international actors for state behavior, the more stable will be the system. It seems important that rulers have a shared understanding and purpose, and that societal actors demand from the state a similar purpose and under-

[52] Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, "Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 75 (January/February 1996): 33–51.

[53] Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1151–69; and Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[54] David Garnham and Mark Tessler, *Democracy, War, and Peace in the Middle East* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995).

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standing. This raises one potentially interesting way for thinking about the connection between domestic and regional order in the Middle East. Do states and their societies agree on the broad principles that should orient the state's foreign policy activities? Are there overlapping or alternative orders that orient social action? In this respect, an enduring issue in Arab politics is the degree to which Arab nationalism, Islam, and sovereignty orient the state's actions in ways that are contradictory or reinforcing.

Consider the following narrative. At the outset of the Arab states system, the Arab regimes demonstrated an interest in juridical sovereignty, if only because of regime survival. Yet many societal actors exhorted their governments to shirk off this "gift" from the West and to consider trading Westphalia for Arabism (which also encouraged these governments to manipulate these alternatives for ulterior purposes). The contradictory expectations generated by domestic and interstate processes create the conditions for regional disorder. Yet, various domestic and regional practices led to the institutionalization of sovereignty and the emergence of a more "centrist" conception of Arab nationalism compatible with it, which suggests a correspondence between the roles and expectations demanded of the state by Arab states and their societies.[55]

While the Middle Eastern states have apparently gravitated toward sovereignty to organize their relations, to what extent do societal actors applaud that orientation and attending normative expectations? In other words, while state actors might have a vested interest in sovereignty, do domestic actors offer alternative normative expectations that undermine a regional order premised on sovereignty? There are two dynamics that suggests as much. First, there is reason to believe that the current romance of the "new realism" may not be fully legitimated by societal forces that continue to expect that the state's foreign policy reflect not simply the state's interests but also those of the community. For instance, there continues to be tremendous opposition in Jordan to its peace treaty with Israel; although the opposition was based on an amalgam of elements, the overall reaction was one of hostile resignation.[56]

This raises a more pressing issue for the contemporary moment: are Westphalia and Islam compatible? Much has been made of how Islam challenges the authority of many Arab states that previously leaned heavily on modernity and secular sovereignty to justify and inform their policies. Islam is readily and repeatedly identified as the real challenge to many Arab governments, and there is little doubt that most feel themselves on the defensive against political Islam. Although such movements have real implications for regime stability, they generally target the government's domestic policies and occasionally make its foreign

[55] Barnett, "Nationalism, Sovereignty, and Regional Order."

[56] Various interviews in Amman, Jordan, 30 August–10 September 1995. "Opposition Figures, Parties Cited on Treaty," *Shihan*, 22–28 October 1994. Cited in *FBIS-NES*, 27 October 1994, 30. "Opponents of Peace Accord Escalate Verbal Attacks," *Jordan Times*, 26 October 1994. Cited in *FBIS-NES*, 27 October 1994, 32.

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policy the source of concern (most notably its policies toward Israel). Does an "Islamic" foreign policy challenge and undermine the constitutive principle of modern international politics, namely sovereignty? Does Islam generate a set of constitutive norms that are inconsistent with sovereignty? To the extent that juridical sovereignty is based on modernist notions of legitimacy, including popular sovereignty and exclusivity, then Islam and Westphalia might very well generate contradictory norms and expectations for the Islamic state in the modern era.[57] Yet others contend that Islam and juridical sovereignty are highly compatible, that Islamic law can coexist with the modern states system. Albert Hourani concludes that it is difficult to find where an Islamic foreign policy emits practices that are substantially different from "statist" expectations, except with regard to Israel.[58] Because there is no "authentic" Islamic foreign policy, it will be difficult to make sweeping generalizations outside the crystallization of political practice.[59] The state's borders have always been permeated by transnational forces and have shaped the belief that the state's foreign policy should also be accountable to a wider community; there is little reason to suppose that such factors will soon disappear.

In general, there are two reasons to suggest that domestic instability might undermine regional stability. First, governments are more likely to engage in adventurous foreign policy actions during periods of domestic turmoil. Second, as long as the normative expectations demanded of the state by both society and the society of states are congruent, there is the promise of regional order. Conversely, where the society of states and their societies have different normative expectations of the state's foreign policy, then regional disorder is likely to persist. In any event, because the society of states is engaged in an ongoing dialogue over the norms that should govern behavior, and society can be understood as engaged in a continuing debate over its identity and constitutive norms, no regional order will ever be fully institutionalized, taken for granted, and impregnable to alternative visions. This is certainly the case in the Middle East.

CONCLUSION

The prospect of regional security in the Middle East is premised on the existence of three reinforcing pillars: the establishment of broad organizing principles for interstate behavior that foster regional order; the existence of cooperative security

[57] Bassam Tibi, "Religious Fundamentalism and Ethnicity in the Crisis of the Nation-State in the Middle East," Working Paper 5.4 (University of California, Berkeley: Center for German and European Studies, 1992).

[58] "Conclusion" in Adeed Daweesha, ed., *Islam in Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Also see James Piscatori, *Islam in a World of Nation-States* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986).

[59] Dale Eikelman and James Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996).

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arrangements that encourage strategic stability and mutual assurance; and the presence of a domestic order that supports or acquiesces to these interstate organizing principles and cooperative security arrangements. Thus far, the region has made substantial progress toward regional order, some progress toward regional stability, and little headway toward domestic stability and order.

Regional order will remain elusive without basic rules of the game and organizing principles to coordinate behavior and inform expectations. On this score there has been a dramatic development in regional politics. Over the last twenty years and particularly since the Gulf War, Middle Eastern states have converged on sovereignty as the basis of their relations. This development transformed not only inter-Arab politics but also the Arab-Israeli conflict. Because the emerging statist identities and interests of Arab states are less likely to differentiate Arab from non-Arab states, there is less reason to deny Israel sovereignty and a place in the future regional order. But as the debate over Middle Easternism suggests, there is no consensus over what that place is—particularly without movement on the Palestinian front.

Yet sovereignty is not enough. It can provide the broad ground rules for interstate interactions, but it permits wars, aggression, conflict, hostility, and so on. Regional stability, therefore, also is dependent on the states' security practices and dynamics. Although there have been some modest experiments and movements toward cooperative security, by and large the region exhibits greater confidence in competitive security arrangements. The region's leaders, notwithstanding the breakthrough in the Arab-Israeli conflict, seem caught in the past and unable to imagine a different future. Specifically, they have an "inclination to let others take the risk, to hedge one's bets, to seek outside patrons even while deploring outside interference, and a tendency to go along with less-than-successful past policies lest change bring even worse."[60] Such proclivities, unfortunately but naturally, encourage a competitive security posture.

There is something of a paradox here. While the Arab states have finally constructed some basic rules of the game among themselves, they are increasingly unable to do the same vis-à-vis their societies. Consequently, there lurks a cooperative security arrangement that does address what is readily identified by all the major players as the primary threat to the region—a concert of states that recognizes each other's juridical sovereignty and attempts to counter radical Islam.[61] The Sharm el-Sheikh conference in March 1994, which brought together regional and world leaders, can be read as evidence of either a global and regional intervention to rescue Shimon Peres's reelection prospects or of a multilateral effort to contain terrorism-cum-radical Islam. This suggests an emerging trend among

[60] Brown, "The Middle East after the Cold War and the Gulf War," 213.

[61] See, for instance, "Israel, Jordan to Cooperate Against Terror," *Yed'iot Aharonot*, 25 October 1994. Cited in FBIS-NES, 26 October 1994, 5. "Algeria Reportedly Offers to Cooperate Against Extremists," *Yed'iot Aharonot*, 31 January 1995. Cited in *FBIS-NES*, 1 February 1995, 1. "Arab Interior Ministers Meeting Reported," *FBIS-NES*, 6 January 1995, 2–3.

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Middle Eastern governments to exchange information and to coordinate policies to confront "terrorism"—simply put, radical Islam. Although such a compact might help to contain the militant and radical fringe, governments face a more daily and on-going challenge from their societies to their legitimacy that cannot be adequately addressed through such concerts.

The domestic instability that haunts most Middle Eastern states threatens to undermine the progress they have made toward a more stable regional order. The concern is that the heated dialogue over state-society relations can potentially undermine both the construction of relatively stable normative expectations among states and any chance for a cooperative security arrangement. There is an intimate and immediate relationship between domestic and international order; so long as there is little domestic peace, there is unlikely to be regional peace.

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Understanding the Language of Politics: A Study of Elites and Masses

RICHARD HERRERA

A common political language is a necessary condition for meaningful communication and for properly functioning citizen-elite relationships. The development of politically meaningful public opinion, on which representative government rests, is essential to the vitality of that relationship. As V. O. Key once noted, one of the verities of public opinion is that it "is the product of an interaction between political influentials and the mass of the people."[1] Herbert McClosky and John Zaller take this notion a step further, arguing that the social and political learning that takes place among the mass citizenry "requires that [they] be able to comprehend in some measure what is implicit in sophisticated political and economic discourse."[2] Warren Miller and Teresa Levitin make this point explicitly: "Public response to political leadership is not instantaneous. Although there is inadequate critical evidence with which to test the point, the speed of mass response may well be, in part, a function of how quickly citizens comprehend, accept, and utilize the same political language, language such as 'liberal,' 'conservative,' 'right,' or 'left' that is used by political leaders and by the political elite."[3]

Every day the political elite send messages to the public. These messages can be found on television, radio, or in newspapers and personal communication.

[1] See V.O. Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), 25; see also Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro, *The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992); and John R. Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1992) for discussions of elite leadership of mass opinion.

[2] Herbert McClosky and John Zaller, *The American Ethos* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1984).

[3] Warren E. Miller and Teresa E. Levitin, *Leadership and Change: Presidential Elections from 1952 to 1976* (Cambridge, MA: Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1976), 173. See Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, 268–74 for an elaboration on the direction of communication from elite to mass.

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While these messages appear in a variety of media, there are certain central concepts and terms that can be found in all of them. Some of the more critical terms for today's political world are "liberal" and "conservative."[4] As Miller and Levitin state, the words "liberal" and "conservative" are "among the most frequently used words of the political lexicon."[5] They are also terms, write McClosky and Zaller, "that arouse passionate feelings of support and opposition, so that universal agreement about their meaning is difficult to achieve."[6]

We know that the elites are better informed than the masses about politics. Political elites are also more sophisticated politically than the average voter. But one cannot assume that a gap in the levels of information means that the public is unable to understand the terminology of the elites. Nor do we know just how much political astuteness is required to achieve a rudimentary understanding of political communication. To the extent that a commonality of language is a prerequisite to an electorate attuned to politics and political debate, it is important to examine this first link in the political learning process of the citizenry.

Using survey data describing the views of the mass public and political elite, this study examines the extent to which their understandings of the terms "liberal" and "conservative" are shared. The results bring evidence to bear that can serve as one gauge of the degree to which the mass public can be expected to understand political debate among political elites and respond to political leadership.

Background

The degree to which elites are able to communicate with the mass citizenry is of utmost importance to political schooling for the mass public.[7] If one presumes that "mass opinion is not self-generating [but] a response to the cues, proposals, and the visions propagated by the political activists,"[8] the quality of mass-elite linkages should be reflected in the degree to which there is a shared understanding of the meanings of the terms used to conduct some of the interaction. Insofar as the tie between the public and the political elite is compromised by a failure to communicate political ideas, the ability of leaders to lead and the mass public to respond to that leadership is hindered. Ultimately, the lack of mutually accepted articulation of opinion between elites and masses might well lead to "the decay of democracies."[9]

[4] Fred N. Kerlinger, *Liberalism and Conservatism: The Nature and Structure of Social Attitudes* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1984), 13.

[5] Miller and Levitin, *Leadership and Change*, 173.

[6] McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*, 189. M. Kent Jennings, "Ideology among Mass Publics and Political Elites," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56 (Summer 1993): 440, echoes that sentiment, stating that "communications [from elite to mass] are uneasy and fraught with the possibility of misunderstanding, simplification, and specific demands and appeals."

[7] See Zaller, *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*, 268–74 for an elaboration on the direction of communication from elite to mass.

[8] Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy*, 557.

[9] Ibid., 558.

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Much has been made of the low levels of political sophistication held by the mass electorate.[10] That the mass citizenry is by and large ill-informed about politics has become common knowledge among students of public opinion and voting behavior. What is not known, however, is how much polish is required for persons to understand the information about politics that is abundant in society. Nor do we know what the consequences are of low levels of political acumen for those who are surrounded by political debate that relies on particular words and phrases as cues. Some studies suggest that low levels of sophistication do not render the public incapable of utilizing reason in making political choices.[11] This article delves into the ability of the citizenry, despite its political crudeness, to comprehend political discussion.

Political discourse in America centers largely around the use of the terms liberal and conservative as a sort of political shorthand. These ideological terms are used to describe a host of political issues and party platforms as well as candidates. For example, rather than describe in detail the stands members of Congress take on particular issues, those positions may be summarized with a "liberalism/conservatism" score. In addition to providing the parameters within which politics is discussed and debated, the meaning of these terms may provide the basis for a system of organized political thought or belief system.[12] Hence, scholars of public opinion emphasize the importance of a shared understanding of ideological terms by the mass public and the political elite, regardless of the differences in the political sophistication of elites and masses.

Given much literature on mass-elite linkages,[13] the expectations for the present discussion are simple. The extent of agreement between elites and masses on the understanding of the traditional terms of political debate will be modest, but will increase with the degree of political engagement of strata within the mass public.[14] "The liberal-conservative continuum is a rather high-order abstraction, and such abstractions are not typical analytical tools for the 'man in the street'."[15] That said, of the many versions of mass-elite differences, "persistent and varied

[10] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960); and Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York: Free Press, 1964).

[11] Samuel L. Popkin, *The Reasoning Voter* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991).

[12] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 207–214.

[13] See ibid.; James W. Prothro and C.W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics* 22 (February 1960): 276–94; Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review* 54 (June 1960): 406–27; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review* 58 (1964): 361–82; McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*; Warren E. Miller, *Without Consent* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1988).

[14] McClosky and Zaller, *The American Ethos*, 11.

[15] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," 215.

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participation is most heavily concentrated among the most sophisticated people,"[16] suggesting that as one becomes more engaged politically, one will utilize more complex analytical tools. Hence, the expectation is that terms such as liberal and conservative may become common parlance with high levels of citizen participation. The ability to understand those terms in the same abstract form that is their nature should increase as well.

Data

To proceed with an analysis of these matters, it is necessary to identify populations and substrata of the mass public and representations of the political elite. More importantly, data that include items that directly reflect meanings attached to ideological terminology are called for. In a study of the commonality of political language, open-ended items that allow respondents to express their interpretations of abstractions without constraint, and that allow the researcher to directly assess notions of ideology, should be sought. Most previous studies have examined mass-elite linkages using indirect methods of measurement. This is due in part to the absence of studies explicitly designed to measure the extent of shared understandings of political terminology.

The opportunity for direct measurement presents itself with data now available from the 1988 Convention Delegate Study (CDS) conducted by the Center for Political Studies (CPS) of the University of Michigan and the 1988 National Election Study. Anticipating mass-elite comparisons, the 1988 Convention Delegate Study represents a rare set of data about a political elite: it is a survey that put open-ended questions to a sample of elites concerning the meaning of ideological labels in precisely the same format as items put to the mass public in the American National Elections Studies (ANES) in 1988.[17] The data for the 1988 CDS were collected via self-administered questionnaires mailed to all delegates who attended the 1988 Democratic and Republican national conventions, as well as those delegates who were respondents in the 1980 and 1984 CPS Convention Delegate Studies.[18] The survey took place in the first three

[16] Ibid., 226.

[17] Warren E. Miller and M. Kent Jennings, *Parties in Transition: A Longitudinal Study of Party Elites and Party Supporters* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1986), 22.

[18] The differences in survey administration (that is, National Election Studies [NES] by personal interview; CDS by self-administered questionnaire) pose a potential problem by suggesting mode of data collection as an alternative explanation for any mass-elite differences found in the analysis. That problem, however, requires a closer look. If the nonresponses to mail questionnaires are driving observed differences between elite and mass, we would expect that differences between elites and masses would be exaggerated. Those elites who responded to the survey might be more motivated than those who did not. The elite respondents might be considered super-elites and as such be very different from the mass public. To the extent that mass-elite similarities are found, they may underestimate the true level of agreement. In order to broaden the representation of elites, this analysis includes delegates from previous conventions as well as those who attended the 1988 convention. However, separate analyses using only 1988 convention delegates reveal no differences from the data presented here. See Miller, *Without Consent*; and Jennings, "Ideology among Mass Publics and Political Elites."

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months of 1989. The overall response rate for the survey was 40 percent.[19] Validation studies comparing the CDS sample to other surveys of delegates to the 1988 conventions showed that the 1988 Convention Delegate Study fares quite well in the demographic characteristics of the sample.[20]

The questions put to both the mass public and the delegates were:

> People have different things in mind when they say that someone's political views are liberal or conservative. We'd like to know more about this. Let's start with liberal. What sorts of things do you have in mind when you say someone's political views are liberal?
>
> And, what do you have in mind when you say that someone's political views are conservative?

Three responses to the open-ended items were coded for the mass sample, as well as the convention delegates, using the same coding scheme as used in categorizing responses in the ANES.[21] The original coding schemes were then reorganized to produce six categories of answers: answers that utilized general philosophy, group references, economic policy, specific domestic policy, foreign policy, and candidate and/or party references.[22] The general philosophy category includes descriptions of liberal or conservative such as "accepting of change/favoring the status quo" and "advocating social welfare programs/pro-free enterprise." The group references category is used for descriptions of the concepts by groups associated with the labels. For example, descriptions of conservative as supporting "big business" would warrant the identification of those responses as group references. The economic policy responses were "spend-save" types of descriptions of the ideological labels; description of a liberal, for example, as one who "spends more freely." The domestic policy responses were those that dealt with specific issues such as favoring or opposing health insurance or nuclear power. Likewise, responses considered to be in the foreign policy category were those that described the terms liberal and conservative by war and peace or

[19] The response rates varied slightly depending on the political party of the delegate, with Republican delegates responding at higher rates. Though these response rates are not extremely high, they are comparable to other mail surveys in which the population is the political elite and to other recent, telephone surveys (for example, the 1988 NES U.S. Senate Study had a response rate of just above 40 percent). See John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, "Issue Conflict and Consensus: A Comparative Study of Democratic and Republican Delegates to the 1968 National Conventions," *Journal of Politics* 33 (February 1971): 72–76, for a summary of response rates in previous elite studies; and Thomas H. Roback, "Motivation for Activism Among Republican National Convention Delegates: Continuity and Change in 1972–76," *Journal of Politics* 42 (February 1980): 181–201.

[20] Direct comparisons to the *New York Times* poll of delegates to both conventions in 1988 showed no significant differences between the two samples across seven demographic variables for either party. See Michael Oreskes, "Delegates Conservative, Poll Shows," *New York Times*, 14 August 1988.

[21] Intercoder reliabilities for the delegate responses were as follows: 1st mention: 1.00; 2nd mention: 1.00; 3rd mention: .82. These reliabilities indicate 100 percent agreement on the first and second mentions. The level of agreement was retested, yielding again these high estimates of reliability.

[22] These categories are the standard NES master code categories.

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isolationism and internationalism. Finally, respondents who associated either label with a specific political party or politician had their response labeled as a candidate or party reference response.[23] For each of the two questions, six dummy variables were created that corresponded to the six coding categories; these twelve variables were coded "1" if the respondent used the category in any of his or her responses, and "0" otherwise.[24]

The Views of the Mass Public

The first step in this analysis is to document how the public thinks about the liberal and conservative labels. By doing so, we can provide the backdrop to the comparison between the public and elites. While the mass public's understandings of the terms liberal and conservative have been examined in previous studies using data from the 1970s and early 1980s, we need to update those studies.[25] Given the continued, extensive use of ideological terminology, there is potential for change in the manner in which the public thinks about those terms.

The initial inspection of the overall distributions of responses reveals a mass public that responds to both of the ideological terms largely by reference to general philosophic themes. Close to 50 percent of the mass public made responses falling into that category. (See columns 1 and 3 of Table 1.)[26] The frequencies in most of the other five categories are relatively small, although substantial minorities make reference to the economic and domestic policy areas. The only instance of a statistically significant difference in the use of meanings associated with each of the two terms is in the use of the domestic policy category. Respondents more often use domestic policy referents to define liberal (21 percent) but use them much less often (9 percent) to define conservative.

Although the masses do not appear altogether ignorant of the meanings of our two ideological terms, they are nonetheless notable for their frequent inability to give any answer at all. Well over a third of the mass sample did not offer any definitions of the labels, although both terms seem equally well understood. When the base for analysis is changed to include only those who responded to each item, the general pattern, of course, remains the same; for example, the proportion of responses falling into the general philosophy category rises to over 70 percent, and lesser usages increase proportionately. Because the general philosophy category encompasses a variety of "philosophical" responses, it is broken down further so that a more refined look at patterns of response may be

[23] See the appendix for the codes used for each of these categories.

[24] Additional breakdowns were made of the general philosophy category.

[25] Pamela Johnston Conover and Stanley Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self Identification," *American Journal of Political Science* 25 (November 1981): 617–45; and Kathleen Knight, "Ideology and Public Opinion," *Research in Micropolitics* 3 (1990): 59–82.

[26] The term aggregate salience is borrowed from Stanley Kelley Jr., *Interpreting Elections* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 61 and refers to the proportion of a given set of respondents who cite a given description of their understanding of the ideological terms.

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TABLE 1

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Labels
1988 Mass Sample

	Meaning of "Liberal"		*Meaning of "Conservative"*	
	MASS	*MASS RESPONDING*	*MASS*	*MASS RESPONDING*
	%	*%*	*%*	*%*
Category of Response	*(1)*	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*
General Philosophy	46	72	48	74
Group References	10	16	9	15
Economic Policy	15	23	20	30
Domestic Policy	21	32	9**	14**
Foreign Policy	4	6	8	13
Candidate/Party Figure	4	6	3	4
Percentage not Responding	37		36	
N =	1775	1128	1175	1138

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into that category.

The figures may total more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than one answer.

** difference significant at $p < .01$.

p values are difference in proportion test results.

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

TABLE 1b

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Labels within the General Philosophy Category
1988 Mass Sample

	Meaning of "Liberal"	*Meaning of "Conservative"*
	MASS RESPONDING	*MASS RESPONDING*
Category of Response	*%*	*%*
Change/Status Quo	34	43
Social Welfare/Free Enterprise	21	17
Compassionate/Uncaring	11	7
Independent of/Dependent on Government	12	8
N =	812	842

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into the general philosophy category.

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

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made. Within the general philosophy category, three quarters of respondents, both mass and elite, described conservative and liberal with the following categories:

- accepting of change/ favoring the status quo
- advocacy of social welfare programs/ pro-free enterprise
- compassionate toward/ uncaring of others
- promoting individual reliance on/ independence from government

As Table 1b indicates, the two terms evoke only slightly different responses. To most, the term conservative means maintenance of the status quo and, to a lesser degree, pro-free enterprise. While the term liberal most often elicits the mirror image of conservative—favoring change—it does so with less frequency than conservative. It also reminds many of compassion and dependence on government, more so than the opposite categories do of conservative. Overall, within this largest of the six categories it is also true that liberal and conservative evoke similar meanings. For the term liberal, the responses within the general philosophy category most often dealt with acceptance of change or advocacy of social welfare programs. For the meaning of conservative, the mirror image of the response was given: resistance to change and pro free enterprise.

Looking at the entire sample of respondents may cover up patterns within important subgroups. To explore this possibility, I stratified the data in two ways: to examine how the politically active compare to the inactive, and how self-identified liberals and conservatives view these terms.

As Table 2 illustrates, there are marked differences between voters and nonvoters.[27] The most obvious difference between the two groups of citizens is in the propensity to answer. Twice as many nonvoters as voters did not answer the questions. However, the apparent stark differences between voters and nonvoters in frequencies of categories response evaporate once we examine only those who make some response.

Among those citizens who do offer definitions of terms, there is little difference in voter and nonvoter use of abstract philosophic references.[28] In both cases, the percentage of respondents giving general, rather abstract philosophical answers is approximately 70 percent. Beyond this, about the only insight added by comparing responses among voters and nonvoters concerns the differential use of domestic policy descriptors to describe the two terms, liberal and conservative. Among voters there is now a 20 point difference in the use of domestic policy to characterize liberal (35 percent do so) and conservative (only 15 percent). Among nonvoters this difference is only 11 points (22 percent to 11 percent). Though the wide gulf in the proportions not responding at all to the general terms suggests caution, at this juncture it appears that among those choosing not to go

[27] I used validated vote here. I could and indeed did use other variables as measures of engagement. I chose to present these analyses, because they are representative of the distributions found when variables such as extent of political activity and education were used.

[28] The responses within the general philosophy in Table 2 are the same as those reported in Table 1b.

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TABLE 2

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Labels, 1988 Mass Voters and Nonvoters

	Meaning of "Liberal"		*Meaning of "Conservative"*	
Category of Response	*VOTERS* %	*NONVOTERS* %	*VOTERS* %	*NONVOTERS* %
General Philosophy	52 (72)	32** (71)	55 (76)	31** (69)
Group References	12 (17)	5** (11)	11 (16)	5** (11)
Economic Policy	17 (24)	9** (20)	23 (31)	13** (29)
Domestic Policy	25 (35)	10** (22)	11 (15)	5** (11)
Foreign Policy	5 (7)	2 (5)	10 (13)	4** (9)
Candidate/Party Figure	4 (5)	3 (7)	3 (4)	2 (5)
Percentage not Responding	28	56**	27	56**
N =	1235 (890)	538 (238)	1235 (903)	538 (235)

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into that category.

The figures may total more than 100 percent because some respondents *gave more than one answer.*

Figures in parentheses are the percentage of only those responding to the items.

** *difference significant at* $p < .01$.

p values are difference in proportion test results.

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

to the polls, persons who do offer a meaning or definition for the two abstractions share a common understanding of political terminology with those electorally active.[29]

Liberal and Conservative Views of Ideological Labels

The comparisons between self-described liberals and conservatives anticipate the ultimate interest in comparisons between mass and elite. The basic goal is to see whether interpretations of political terms are such that intergroup communication seems possible for very different groups among whom communication is needed

[29] Some may argue that, though they use the same categories of response, those responses may be inaccurate. That is, "liberal" may be defined as "conservative" and vice-versa. An analysis following that of Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics" and Norman R. Luttbeg and Michael M. Gant, "The Failure of Liberal/Conservative Ideology as a Cognitive Structure," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 49 (Spring 1984): 80–93, showed that the percentage of the mass public responding to the questions who answered them correctly was over 83 percent. See Richard Herrera, "The Understanding of Ideological Labels by Political Elites: A Research Note," *Western Political Quarterly* 45 (December 1992): 1021–1035. I also conducted the same analysis presented here using only those respondents who answered the questions correctly and found only minor differences within the general philosophy category, where more respondents used references to "change."

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TABLE 3

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Counterparts
1988 Mass Sample

	Meaning of "Liberal"			*Meaning of "Conservative"*		
Category of Response	*LIB %*	*MOD %*	*CON %*	*LIB %*	*MOD %*	*CON %*
General Philosophy	77	72	73	79	73	77
Group References	23	18	12**	22	17	12**
Economic Policy	13	20	32**	18	27	36**
Domestic Policy	29	28	38*	14	11	18
Foreign Policy	6	5	8	13	12	14
Candidate/Party Figure	6	3	6	4	4	4
Percentage not Responding	26	32	20	24	29	20
N =	230	263	463	223	275	463

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into that category.

The figures may total more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than one answer to the questions.

* difference between liberals and conservatives is significant at $p < .05$.

** difference between liberals and conservatives is significant at $p < .01$.

p values are difference in proportion test results.

Source: 1988 National Election Study.

to sustain political dialogue. Just as we are concerned with the ability of the political elite to communicate with the mass public, so too we are interested in the terms with which liberals and conservatives in that mass public can talk to or about each other. In other words, can ideologues in the general population communicate, or do they talk past each other? Table 3 presents the understanding of the terms liberal and conservative for members of the mass public who differ on ideological self-identification.[30]

While moderates look somewhat like nonvoters, among the ideologically engaged both self-proclaimed liberals and conservatives among the mass public apparently think about the ideological terms in very similar ways. First and foremost, both liberals and conservatives tend to use general philosophical definitions in anywhere from 73 to 79 percent of their responses. For both liberals

[30] The standard seven-point scale was used to measure ideological self-placement. The question allows persons to identify with an ideological position while also permitting the citizen to avoid doing so fairly easily with a filter question that asks the individual whether they have thought enough about the terms to place themselves. In this analysis, liberals are those who placed themselves as extremely liberal, liberal, or slightly liberal; moderates are those who chose moderate/middle of the road; and conservatives are those who chose extremely conservative, conservative, or slightly conservative. The analysis that follows utilizes only those who answered the items. As in the previous cases, there are considerable numbers of nonrespondents. See the appendix for an extended discussion of this topic.

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TABLE 3b

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Counterparts within the General Philosophy Category
1988 Mass Sample

	Meaning of "Liberal"			*Meaning of "Conservative"*		
Category of Response	*LIB* %	*MOD* %	*CON* %	*LIB* %	*MOD* %	*CON* %
Change/Status Quo	77	72	73	79	73	77
Social Welfare/Free Enterprise	23	18	30	22	17	25
Compassionate/Uncaring	13	20	7	18	27	4
Independent of/Dependent on Government	29	28	8	14	11	18
Percentage not Responding	26	32	20	24	29	20
N =	230	263	463	223	275	463

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into the general philosophy category.
Source: 1988 National Election Study.

and conservatives the aggregate salience for three of the remaining five categories of response is very similar (domestic policy, foreign policy, and candidate/party figures). Finally, both agree that liberal is defined by domestic policy more than is conservative, and that conservative is more often associated with foreign policy than is liberal.

However, despite the common usage on four of six categories of response, there are two areas of difference. Liberals and conservatives disagree in two different associations with the terms liberal and conservative. The main difference between the two groups appears in the use of group attachments and economic policies to define the ideological terms. Liberals are more likely than conservatives to use group references in defining the abstract labels, while conservatives are more likely to see the abstractions in terms of economic policy.

As was the case with the mass citizenry as a whole, there are small variations in responses within the general philosophy category. The figures in Table 3b show that conservatives define liberal and conservative mostly with references to change/status quo and social welfare/free enterprise, while self-described liberals and moderates use other categories more readily.[31] Liberals, for instance, think of "liberal" as compassionate toward others much more so than moderates or conservatives. When respondents defined "conservative," moderates and liberals mostly used status quo references, while conservatives used free enterprise references as well.

The mass public shows a propensity to do one of two things when confronted with a need to respond to the terms liberal and conservative. About a third of

[31] Conservatives also use references to morality when defining liberal and conservative.

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the citizenry does not or cannot respond. But, those who do provide a meaning tend to reflect a common aggregate salience for various definitions of the terms. Voters and nonvoters, liberals and conservatives seem to use the same frame of reference when they supply meaning to two of the core terms in political discourse. Also, compared to the findings of earlier studies, the mass public appears to understand the terms much as they have in the past.[32] This stability of understandings suggests that the public's cognizance of the terms is not influenced greatly by short-term forces.

The Views of the Political Elite and the Mass Public

In turning to mass-elite communication links, it is clear that the most notable difference between elites and the total sample of the mass public is in the propensity to supply meaning to the core concepts. (See Tables 4 and 5.) The political elite are much more willing to respond to the items than the least engaged of the masses. But their nonresponse was quite comparable, although of different origins and with different meaning from that of interested voters. Though these differences in propensity to respond cannot be dismissed from the larger concern with mass-elite communications linkages, the more telling comparisons may be between those elites and masses who offered their sense of one or another meaning attached to the conceptual abstractions. The appraisal of congruence between elite and mass understandings of political terminology, consequently, uses respondents to the items as the base for comparisons. An extended discussion of the nonresponse rates among the mass and elite samples can be found in the appendix.

In general, elites and masses appear to think about ideological labels in much the same fashion. (See Tables 4 and 5.) The largest percentage of responses to either item is in the general philosophy category. With one exception (the use of domestic policy to define the term conservative), there is a striking similarity in the response patterns by elites and masses.

Within the general philosophy category, however, there are some differences in the associations made with the ideological terms. (See Tables 4b and 5b.) Political elites use references to change and maintenance of the status quo much less often than do the mass, and they use references to social welfare and compassion, especially with regard to liberal, much more frequently. Elites also rarely

[32] Conover and Feldman, "The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self Identification"; and Knight, "Ideology and Public Opinion." Though my coding scheme differs slightly from that used by Conover and Feldman, many of the same patterns found in the 1976 data emerge in the 1988 data as well. For example, the "General Philosophy" group (which includes change and socialism/capitalism responses) and "Economic" and "Domestic policy" responses account for the bulk of the responses in 1976 and in 1988. For further discussion and analysis of similarities and differences between Conover and Feldman and the analysis of the citizenry in 1988, see Richard Herrera, "The Conceptualization of Ideological Labels by Elites and Masses," (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, DC, 1991).

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TABLE 4

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of "Liberal"
1988 Elite & Mass Samples

Category of Response	*ELITE* %	*MASS* %	*INTERESTED VOTERS* %	*UNINTERESTED NONVOTERS* %
General Philosophy	81	72	72	67
Group Reference	18	16	17	12
Economic Policy	26	23	25	18
Domestic Policy	38	32	35	18
Foreign Policy	11	6	6	6
Candidate/Party Figure	4	6	5	5
Percentage not Responding	28	37	25	67
N =	3450	1128	803	84

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into that category.

The figures may total more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than one answer to the questions.

Figures are for those who responded to the items. The "percentage not responding" is presented to highlight the differences.

Sources: 1988 National Election Study, 1988 Convention Delegate Study.

associate independence from or reliance on government with liberal and conservative. In general, there are many small, but few large differences between the political elites and the various subgroupings of the mass public. However, the overall similarities among the political elite, interested voters, and uninterested nonvoters within the mass public are by all odds the more impressive. Both mass and elite tend to utilize responses that fall into the change/status quo or social welfare/free enterprise category.

TABLE 4b

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of "Liberal"
within the General Philosophy Category
1988 Elite & 1988 Mass Samples

Category of Response	*ELITE* %	*MASS* %	*INTERESTED VOTERS* %	*UNINTERESTED NONVOTERS* %
Change/Status Quo	17	34	32	44
Social Welfare/Free Enterprise	38	21	24	13
Compassionate/Uncaring	27	11	11	11
Independent of/Dependent on Government	—	12	11	17
N =	2795	812	578	56

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into the general philosophy category.

Sources: 1988 National Election Study, 1988 Convention Delegate Study.

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TABLE 5

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of "Conservative"
1988 Elite & 1988 Mass Samples

Category of Response	ELITE %	MASS %	INTERESTED VOTERS %	UNINTERESTED NONVOTERS %
Genral Philosophy	85	74	76	67
Group References	17	15	15	12
Economic Policy	24	30	30	33
Domestic Policy	35	14	15	12
Foreign Policy	7	13	13	12
Candidate/Party Figure	5	4	4	6
Percentage not Responding	29	36	24	68
N =	3409	1138	815	81

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into that category.

The figures may total more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than one answer to the questions.

Figures for those who responded to the items. The "percentage not responding" is presented to highlight the differences.

Sources: 1988 National Election Study, 1988 Convention Delegate Study.

This important generalization holds as I move to a final comparison of the response patterns of self-placed liberals, moderates, and conservatives among the elite and the mass. (See Tables 6 and 6b.)[33] Earlier I noted there were two distinct differences in the ways in which liberals and conservatives in the mass public understood the ideological labels. That pattern is reproduced in detail among the elites. Among the elites, just as among rank and file citizens, liberals

TABLE 5b

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of "Conservative"
within the General Philosophy Category
1988 Elite & 1988 Mass Samples

Category of Response	ELITE %	MASS %	INTERESTED VOTERS %	UNINTERESTED NONVOTERS %
Change/Status Quo	19	43	39	61
Social Welfare/Free Enterprise	32	17	19	10
Compassionate/Uncaring	15	7	6	9
Independent of/Dependent on Government	—	8	8	7
N =	2898	842	619	54

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into the general philosophy category.

Sources: 1988 National Election Study, 1988 Convention Delegate Study.

[33] For the mass sample, the figures are for interested voters who are self-identified liberals, moderates, or conservatives.

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TABLE 6

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Counterparts
1988 Elite & 1988 Mass Samples

	Meaning of "Liberal"			*Meaning of "Conservative"*		
	LIB %	*MOD* %	*CON* %	*LIB* %	*MOD* %	*CON* %
Category of Response	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*
General Philosophy	85 (78)	78 (72)	82 (74)	81 (81)	80 (75)	86 (79)
Group References	25 (29)	18 (20)	11 (11)	28 (24)	22 (21)	8 (11)
Economic Policy	10 (14)	26 (19)	46 (34)	12 (17)	23 (24)	34 (36)
Domestic Policy	38 (34)	38 (28)	40 (40)	24 (14)	22 (9)	20 (20)
Foreign Policy	10 (6)	6 (4)	14 (8)	17 (16)	14 (11)	23 (15)
Candidate/Party Figure	4 (6)	5 (3)	3 (4)	4 (4)	6 (3)	3 (3)
N =	1315 (161)	629 (181)	1177 (352)	1352 (161)	619 (181)	1210 (352)

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into that category.

The figures may total more than 100 percent because some respondents gave more than one answer to the questions.

Figures in parentheses are from the mass public.

The figures for the mass are interested voters who identified as liberal, moderate or conservative.

Sources: 1988 National Election Study, 1988 Convention Delegate Study.

use group references to describe their understanding of both labels, while conservatives make use of group references only occasionally. In parallel fashion, both conservative elites and masses emphasize economic policy when describing the ideological terms while liberals do not.

Within the general philosophy category, differences between mass and elite among the groups of ideologues begin to emerge.[34] The most striking pattern is conservative elites' near-absent usage of change/status quo remarks when defining the ideological labels. At the mass level, conservatives make extensive use of that category as well as the advocacy of the social welfare programs/free enterprise category. Moderate elites also emphasize the social welfare/free enterprise dichotomy when defining the terms, while their counterparts in the electorate use change/status quo language much more heavily. Unlike conservatives and moderates, there is a closer match between liberals in the mass and elite. Both groups make heavy use of change to describe liberal and maintenance of the status quo to describe conservative. Overall, the greatest discontinuity among these groups lies with conservatives. Curiously, the understanding of ideological terminology among the conservatives in the mass electorate is more similar to liberal elites

[34] The three categories listed represent the top three response categories for both mass and elite samples.

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TABLE 6b

Aggregate Salience of Meanings of Ideological Counterparts within the General Philosophy Category 1988 Elite & 1988 Mass Samples

	Meaning of "Liberal"			*Meaning of "Conservative"*		
	LIB %	*MOD* %	*CON* %	*LIB* %	*MOD* %	*CON* %
Category of Response	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*	*E M*
Change/Status Quo	23 (39)	21 (48)	7 (35)	29 (48)	23 (58)	8 (44)
Social Welfare/ Free Enterprise	25 (20)	34 (26)	57 (39)	19 (19)	29 (14)	46 (34)
Compassionate/ Uncaring	37 (24)	28 (14)	14 (9)	24 (17)	19 (9)	5 (4)
N =	1118 (126)	491 (130)	965 (260)	1095 (130)	495 (136)	1041 (278)

Entries are the percentage of respondents whose answers fell into the general philosophy category.

Figures in parentheses are from the mass public.

The figures for the mass are interested voters who identified as liberal, moderate or conservative.

Sources: 1988 National Election Study, 1988 Convention Delegate Study.

than to conservative ones. This pattern suggests that conservative elites may not only talk past their liberal counterparts but also past less active conservatives.

At a broad level, the parallel images produced by placing the patterns for mass and elite liberals and conservatives side by side provide strong evidence that the linkage between the mass public and the political elite with regard to political terminology is quite remarkable. Not only do the mass and elite generally think about ideological labels in similar ways, important distinctions between self-placed liberals and conservatives remain intact at both levels. The levels of shared understandings of political labels among liberals and conservatives appear to break down when a more intricate inspection of the general philosophy category is made. The meanings attached to the labels differ most among conservative elites and all types of ideologues at the mass level.

Conclusion

This article has shown that there is considerable agreement between elites and masses (and subgroups among masses) in what I have called the language of politics. Although there are also differences among the masses, homogeneity of thought is the dominant pattern. The deviations, moreover, are not just anomalies; they suggest the type as well as the degree of slippage among citizens in meanings associated with ideological terms.

While the most problematic of the strata among ordinary citizens are the least engaged politically, even among interested voters there is a significant

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minority who do not respond to the abstract terms and who, therefore, may miss elements in elite discussions, debates, and attempts at political leadership. Thus, there is some potential for confusion and misunderstanding, which is particularly troublesome among the uninterested nonvoters. Given these conditions, it seems likely that elites might talk past some portion of the masses. And the significant minority of people for whom the terms are irrelevant should not be understated. The importance of communication, conversation, and discussion within the mass public is accentuated by the process of political learning hypothesized at the outset. In the case of a one-step flow of political communication from elite to mass, the masses are reasonably well equipped to receive messages from the elite couched in ideological terms. Even in a two-stage flow model of communication, which would argue for the necessity of connectors between mass and elite within the mass-middle level activists,[35] there is evidence that the politically attentive segment of the mass population may well be a suitable conduit for communication between elite and mass. The potency of these occasional activists, however, is strained by the quarter of them seemingly unable to follow and hence communicate political debate to the least active.

While most citizens can understand these terms, how subsets among the masses think about them differs in important ways. Liberals and conservatives, for instance, differ in the emphasis on the group bases of politics and in the stress placed upon economic policy, suggesting that to some degree these two groups talk past each other. Differences continue with the moderates, who are less responsive to ideological terminology than either liberals or conservatives. In addition, though there is agreement at a broad level, a closer look at those using philosophical responses reveals quite a bit of discontinuity among conservatives at the mass and elite levels. Therefore, there are no doubt loose couplings in the understanding of the core terms of political debate. But we should expect there to be differences between elite and mass.

These discontinuities should not, however, overshadow the remarkable congruence of mass and elite definitions of ideological terms. The bottom line is that our conclusions depend on what level of understanding we consider sufficient for the mass electorate to be able to follow political discourse. Past studies may have overemphasized constraint and sophistication as criteria for political engagement by the mass citizenry. Indeed, given those studies, the results presented here indicate a remarkably informed electorate. In sum, perhaps little is needed to obtain a rudimentary understanding of the language of politics. If that is the case, I have presented evidence that the building blocks for a politically informed electorate may already be in place.

The implications of the discovery of shared interpretations of ideological terms for political communication are important. Though the citizenry may not be as constrained ideologically as the upper echelon of political society, they

[35] Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution, Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989).

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nonetheless appear to be able to follow the discourse of politics, whether they choose to or not. The ability of the elite to lead does not appear hampered by semantic obstacles. Likewise, the ability of the citizenry to acquire political information may well be adequate to maintain a functioning democratic process, especially in light of the abundance of "free" information,[36] and the shorthand version of political information that the terms liberal and conservative may provide for the electorate.[37]

APPENDIX

Open-ended response codes and descriptions used for six-category breakdown: General Philosophy (010-199); Group References (200-399); Economic Policy (400-536); Domestic Policy (600-799); Foreign Policy (800-899); Party/Candidate Figure (902-903).

Nonresponse patterns among mass and elite. One topic of potential concern involves the nonresponse rate among the two samples. The differences disclosed in all the aggregate salience distributions of meaning assigned to the terms liberal and conservative are primarily differences in the propensity of citizens to respond to the request to supply such meanings. But what are we to make of the nonresponses? I have three opportunities in the NES data I am using to interpret the meaning of "No Response." First, the modal nonresponse to the interview questions reproduced on page 623 above, is "I don't know" or "Nothing." Second, there are nonresponses to the question eliciting one's ideological self-identification: typically, "I haven't thought enough about it to know [what I am]." Third, at yet another point in the interview, people are asked to rate liberals and conservatives on a so-called feeling thermometer. Here a nonresponse is, "Don't know enough to rate." When, in the course of an interview, the same individuals repeatedly respond "I don't know" when ideological terms or groups are referenced, we may infer that the terms carry no meaning for those people, that they really have not thought much about those terms, and really do not know what they mean. There is, in fact, substantial replication of the nonresponses. For example, well over three-fourths of the people who "had not given much thought" to the terms liberal and conservative (the self-placement item) also did not give substantive answers to the meaning of the term in open-ended format. These results are consistent with similar analyses conducted by Converse, who found that those at the lowest "stratum" of response were "entirely vague as to the meaning [of the liberal/conservative continuum]."

[36] Morris P. Fiorina, "Information and Rationality in Elections" in John A. Ferejohn and James H. Kuklinski, eds., *Information and Democratic Process* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 338.

[37] John A. Ferejohn, "Information and the Electoral Process," 11.

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For average citizens, then, failure to respond implies that the labels have no meaning or are irrelevant for them. Clearly, many respondents are out of their element when probed as to their understanding of ideological terminology. Communication and hence political learning couched in ideological terms of abstractions should probably not be expected to occur with much frequency for this group of people. Elite communication to them will be limited, because the abstract terms of politcal discourse are apparently devoid of meaning for them.

While it seems safe to infer that those among the mass who do not respond simply attach no meaning to the terms, the same cannot be said of the political elite. It is doubtful that many in the political elite can attach no meaning to the terms of political debate. When tests similar to the above are applied to the elite sample, the results were the opposite of those obtained with the mass public. Rarely was there any overlap of nonrespondents on comparable items. The failure of elites to respond to the root question probably reflects primarily an unwillingness to exert the effort needed to comply with the request (write out two definitions in long hand in the mail questionnaire) rather than an inability to ascribe meaning to the labels.*

* I would like to thank Peter Esaiasson, John Geer, Cheryl Herrera, Kent Jennings, Kim Kahn, Pat Kenney, and Kathleen Knight for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am particularly grateful to Warren Miller for his insights and suggestions. Lynn Vavreck, Patti Webb, and Tom Epperlein provided valuable assistance. Some data were made available by the Inter University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

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

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

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

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The Failure of Liberal Homeless Policy in the Koch and Dinkins Administration

J. PHILLIP THOMPSON

Social welfare policy has been critiqued from three distinct—though not mutually exclusive—perspectives. One critique, most prominently argued by Theodore Lowi, maintains that the major flaw in social welfare programs is that they are produced (or expanded) undemocratically—through the courts and by bureaucratic discretion.[1] Without increased public support for the welfare state, Lowi predicts that the liberal welfare state will destroy itself. "If a liberal state is to survive," he states, "it cannot do so without a clear, highly stabilized, and self-restrictive set of benefit categories, whether these are generous or severe."[2] Lowi's concern is with the political stability of the liberal state, not the specific content of welfare programs. His argument is that the citizen public should explicitly approve of the level of welfare expenditures, or trouble will result.

A second critique, argued by Charles Anderson, is that government policies are often arbitrary, unfair, and irrational.[3] Anderson maintains that social and economic systems are often too complex for sensible regulation through market systems with constitutionally protected individual rights. Anderson posits that the government should serve as a "community of inquiry," a type of think-tank, recruiting citizen-experts to organize rigorous review of government policies and to develop pragmatic approaches—regularly adjusted—serving the public interest. Citizen participation in a community of inquiry "of one's vocation" is to Anderson, "a fundamental act of citizenship as important, surely, as voting or partisan affiliation."[4] Anderson acknowledges that vocations have hierarchies not ame-

[1] Theodore J. Lowi, "The Welfare State: Ethical Foundations and Constitutional Remedies," *Political Science Quarterly* 101 (No. 2, 1986): 215.

[2] Ibid., 219.

[3] Charles W. Anderson, "Pragmatic Liberalism, The Rule of Law, and the Pluralist Regime" in Stephen J. Elkin and Karol Edward Soltan, eds., *A New Constitutionalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 104.

[4] Ibid., 115.

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nable to population participation, but he does not resolve this problem. For Anderson, the rational substance of public policy is key, not the approval process.

A third critique of social welfare policy, offered by David Johnston, is that although the United States is relatively prosperous, social welfare programs are inadequate for meeting the basic needs of the poor.[5] Many of the poor are too downtrodden to even participate in democracy. The dilemma is not only economic and physical, but psychological as well. In a society that allocates status and recognition to income, education, and race, those at the bottom are likely to be viewed negatively by society. Persons deprived of respect from others will tend to lack self-esteem and political efficacy. Their lack of participation in public discourse distorts our notion of the public good, because their wants and needs are minimized. Most significantly, however, Johnston maintains that status and recognition cannot be allocated by the state. Citizens must provide these goods for each other. Thus the problems of the poor cannot be resolved through social welfare policies alone; the poor also need increased status and recognition from an enlightened and humanist citizenry. Agency is a paradox in Johnston's argument. How can such humanist policies be brought about if the public sees no need for them? The poor are not strong advocates.

This study views the three theories described above through the lens of homeless policy in New York City. Through studying the growth and decline of liberal homeless policy, defined here as generous funding to house the homeless, we can assess whether its decline is due to an undemocratic policy-making process (Lowi), irrational policy content (Anderson), or weakness in homeless advocacy (Johnston). By understanding why liberal homeless policy failed, we can also suggest factors that might increase public support for more expansive liberal welfare policies.

The Case of New York City

Donna Kircheimer's early work on homeless policy in New York City made two major points.[6] She showed how a "policy community" of homeless advocates with social ties to each other, access to institutional resources, and legal and media skills were able to use the courts and media to counter the political might of then New York Mayor Edward I. Koch. Kircheimer described the policy community as representing the poor and minorities, as well as liberal reformers. Her finding seemed to validate pluralism and apparently refutes Johnston's hypothesis that the poor lack the status and recognition to be effective policy advocates.[7] Kircheimer pessimistically concluded, however, that the primary results of homeless advocacy were only incremental improvements to the social welfare

[5] See Charles Johnston, *The Idea of a Liberal Theory* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

[6] Donna Wilson Kircheimer, "Sheltering the Homeless in New York City: Expansion in an Era of Government Contraction," *Political Science Quarterly* 104 (Winter 1989–90): 607–623.

[7] Johnston, *Idea of a Liberal Theory*, 154–163.

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system—homeless shelters that "offered only bedrock protection necessary for survival and were therefore well within the historically acceptable functions of the partial U.S. welfare state."[8]

This article begins by detailing the complexity of the family homeless issue in New York. For simplicity of argument, the study focuses on homeless families, as opposed to homeless single adults. The article then addresses questions raised by Kircheimer, such as why homeless policy narrowly focused on shelters and why homeless advocacy did not challenge the fundamental limitations of the welfare state. A major part of the answer for Kircheimer lies in her description of the policy-making process as open and pluralist. To the contrary, this study finds that the process was essentially closed to all but policy elites and the courts. Kircheimer suggested that the homeless "policy community" represented the interests of minorities and of the poor. However, as will be shown later, minority poor communities strongly opposed homeless policies because they undermined local community improvement efforts and were perceived as unfair to other poor families. Rather than working with poor communities and local officials to better understand causes and potential remedies for family homelessness, homeless advocates relied on the courts to force reallocation of scarce housing resources to homeless families. The court-driven policy process led to the development of such poorly designed housing policies that they may have created new homelessness. The repeated creation of expensive, irrational, and ineffective homeless policies weakened public support for the homeless. After examining the development of New York's homeless policy, the conclusion takes up issues that explain the decline in support of liberal homeless programs in New York and how that decline can be reversed. The findings support the argument (Lowi) that the court-driven expansion of substantive rights for groups such as the homeless tends to politically self-destruct. Moreover, the findings suggest that had legal advocates for the homeless actually included minorities and the poor in the development of homeless policy, more rational and effective policies would have resulted (Anderson). In addition, a more participatory process and more rational policies would have probably increased the willingness of communities to accept and support homeless families (Johnston) and created possibilities for broader social welfare advocacy. The article suggests that support for social welfare programs, such as for the homeless, would be better served through a more self-limited role on the part of legal advocates and the courts.

What Causes Family Homelessness in New York City?

Many studies attribute homelessness to the lack of affordable housing.[9] This is clear on one level; homeless families clearly lack places of their own to live.

[8] Kircheimer, "Sheltering the Homeless."

[9] See, for example, Marybeth Shinn and Colleen Gillespie, "The Roles of Housing and Poverty in the Origins of Homelessness," *American Behavioral Scientist* 37 (February 1994): 505–521.

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Typically, housing could become unavailable for one or a combination of three reasons: the income of the poor could go down; the cost of housing could go up; or the demand for low-cost housing could exceed supply. A fourth reason, that housing seekers may be incapable of finding or maintaining housing independently, is seldom considered. Numerous studies demonstrate that the income of poor families has declined over the last twenty years, that the cost of housing has increased for poor households over the same period, and that in many cities there is a severe shortage of housing affordable to low-income families. This is usually enough to convince observers that family homelessness is a housing or income problem.

However, not all people lacking housing become homeless, and not all the homeless lack housing alternatives—although the alternative may be undesirable.[10] Most families lacking housing move in—double-up—with relatives or friends. Many, but not all, doubled-up families eventually become homeless. There are at least three types of homeless families: those who lost their apartment or house and became immediately homeless; those who lost their housing and moved in with a friend or relative; and those who never had owned or rented their own apartment and can no longer live with friends or relatives. The vast majority of homeless families (88 percent) are of the latter two types.[11] Researchers know relatively little about the doubled-up experience of homeless families.[12] This is a significant gap in knowledge. Because homeless families usually do not directly enter shelters after losing an apartment, the immediate causes of homelessness are not simply housing or the income of the homeless family. The economic status of the host family and the social interrelationship between host and recipient families are important variables. Only a fraction of doubled-up families become homeless at any given time, which suggests that doubling-up is more than short-term noise or a lag of underlying housing dynamics. The doubled-up variable confounds direct comparisons between the cost of housing, poverty, and the availability of low-income housing with homelessness.

The majority of homeless families consist of a young minority female with a very young child who receives public assistance.[13] Table 1 presents rents and

[10] This point is made repeatedly in Peter Rossi, "Troubling Families: Family Homelessness in America," *American Behavioral Scientist* 37 (January 1994): 342–395. See also Christopher Jencks, *The Homeless* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994): chap. 8.

[11] Ibid.

[12] See New York City Commission on the Homeless, *The Way Home: A New Direction in Social Policy* (New York: City of New York, 1992); and Michael E. Stone, *Shelter Poverty* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993) for discussion of this issue.

[13] The description of the homeless population is based on a survey conducted by the New York City Commission on the Homeless, *The Way Home: A New Direction in Social Policy*. For a description of homeless families nationally, see Lisa Mihaly, "Beyond the Numbers: Homeless Families with Children" in Julee H. Kryder-Coe, Lester Salamon, and Janice Molnar, eds., *Homeless Children and Youth* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992), 18–24.

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TABLE 1

Single Female Poor Headed Households

	1970	*1980*	*1990*
Rent	$106	$235	$337
Rent (1993 dollars)	$398	$493	$375
Rent burden	0.16	0.31	0.34
Median income	$8,000	$8,636	$11,490
Median income (1993 dollars)	$30,000	$16,253	$12,817
Total households	169,000	175,440	120,341

Source: Gross rent and family income figures are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Use Microdate Sample for New York City, 1970, 1980, and 1990. AFDC rent supplement tables were provided by the New York State Department of Social Services. Food Stamp allottment figures were provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary. Family income includes maximum rent supplements and cash value of food stamps.

incomes for single female-headed households with children living below the poverty line in 1970, 1980, and 1990.[14] The data show that family homelessness is not a result of an increase in the numbers of poor single women with children. The total number of such households declined at the same time the number of homeless families increased. There were 169,000 single, female-headed households in 1970, 175,440 in 1980, and only 120,000 in 1990. Family homelessness is also not the result of increased housing costs. Using constant 1993 dollars, the inflation-adjusted monthly cost of housing poor family households headed by single females in 1990 was $376.00, lower than in 1970 or 1980. Family homelessness also does not appear to be caused by the increase in the rent-to-income burden, although the income figures must be treated with caution. Figures on the local usage of food stamps and housing subsidies by eligible recipients were not available for the 1970s during the preparation of this article. The income figures assume 100 percent utilization of food stamps and housing subsidies for each decade. Income is overstated because not all eligible recipients actually receive benefits. Utilization of benefits, however, is generally thought to have increased in New York City since the 1970s.[15] If so, income figures are less inflated for later decades than for the 1970s. The dramatic increase in the relative cost of housing in the 1970s, from 16 percent of income in 1970 to 31 percent in 1980, was probably less severe than these figures indicate. If anything, the assumptions regarding income tend to discount lower rent burdens for the 1970s. This makes the fact that family homelessness emerged in large numbers only in the middle and late 1980s even more paradoxical. There was just a 3 percent

[14] Gross rent includes the cost of utilities and monthly contract rent. Gross income includes AFDC rent supplements and assumes all AFDC recipients receive the maximum allotment of food stamps for their family size. Not all AFDC recipients receive food stamps, however; some non-AFDC recipients are also eligible for food stamps.

[15] Telephone conversation between author and New York State Department of Social Services research department.

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TABLE 2

Single Female-Headed Families in Poverty
(Rent burdens from least poor to most poor quintile)

1970		1980		1990	
Quintile	*Rent Burden*	*Quintile*	*Rent Burden*	*Quintile*	*Rent Burden*
20	11%	20	20%	20	18%
40	14%	40	27%	40	27%
60	19%	60	33%	60	36%
80	25%	80	44%	80	50%

Source: Gross rent and family income figures are from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, Public Use Microdata Sample for New York City, 1970, 1980, 1990. AFDC rent supplement tables were provided by the New York State Department of Social Services. Food Stamp allottment figures were provided by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, Office of the Secretary. Family income includes maximum rent supplements and cash value of food stamps.

increase in the rent-to-income burden in that decade. Apparently, family homelessness was not directly associated with significant changes in housing affordability.

Median statistics could conceal sharpening poverty at the low end of the income spectrum. Table 2 presents the rent/income index for single female-headed poverty households broken down in quintiles.

The data show that the bottom fifth of the poor population paid on average more than 50 percent of their income for rent in 1990. In 1980, the bottom quintile paid 44 percent of their income for rent, and in 1970 they paid 25 percent. While 50 percent of income is an enormous rent burden for poor families, the 6 percentage point increase in the 1980s does not adequately explain the rise in homelessness at that time.

Relative stability in rent costs since 1980, one might argue, is not an indication of housing availability. Housing may be affordable, but unavailable. Were the number of low-cost apartments in New York City declining, it might account for some family homelessness regardless of official housing vacancy statistics (due to doubling up). However, surveys indicate a steadily rising number of apartments available to low-income families in the 1980s, at the time when family homelessness escalated.[16] Table 3 shows vacancy rates for apartments in 1970, 1981, and 1991. The data show that in 1970, vacancy rates for apartments did not rise above 3 percent until rents exceeded $300/month—or 45 percent of median income for single female headed families. In 1981, vacancy rates did not exceed 3 percent for apartments costing less than $1,000, which was 140 percent of the median income for poor single female-headed families. In 1991, there was more than a 3 percent vacancy rate for apartments in the $500 range, at 52 percent of median income for single female-headed families. The data show

[16]See Michael A. Stegman, *New York City Housing and Vacancy Report* (New York: New York City Department of Housing Preservation and Development, 1991), 69.

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TABLE 3

Vacancy Rates for Rental Apartments

1970		*1981*		*1991*	
Rent	*Vacancy Rate*	*Rent*	*Vacancy Rate*	*Rent*	*Vacancy Rate*
LT $40	2.2	LT $100	0.87	LT $300	1.15
$40–$59	2.4	$100–$124	0.87	$300–$399	1.74
$60–$69	2.2	$125–$149	0.99	$400–$499	2.74
$70–$79	2.3	$150–$174	2.25	$500–$599	3.14
$80–$89	2.2	$175–$199	1.95	$600–$799	5.35
$90–$99	1.8	$200–$249	1.88	$800–$999	8.07
$100–$119	1.9	$250–$299	2.08	$1000–$1499	7.18
$120–$149	1.7	$300–$399	2.17	$1500 +	12.48
$150–$174	1.3	$400–$499	1.57		
$175–$199	1.7	$500–$749	1.58		
$200–$299	1.9	$750–$999	2.97		
$300 +	3.4	$1000 +	2.74		

Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Special Tabulations for New York City from 1970 Census of Population and Housing. Data for 1981 and 1991 from U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1981 and 1991 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey.

a severe shortage of housing available to low-income families. However, the housing shortage did not begin in the 1980s. In fact, there was more housing within financial reach of low-income families in the late 1980s and early 1990s than in the late 1970s. Again, housing availability does not seem to be the immediate cause of family homelessness in New York City.

Survey data do show a steady increase in the number of poor families doubled-up. In 1970, there were 2,400 households with doubled-up families living in poverty. In 1980, there were 12,000. By 1990, the number rose to 36,000.[17] The large growth in doubled-up families in the 1980s only partially correlates with the appearance of family homelessness in the late 1980s. The number of doubled-up families in poverty has been on the increase since the 1970s, but family homelessness came later. Like homelessness, the increased doubling-up does not directly correspond to the cost of housing or housing availability. Doubling-up merits empirical study in its own right. The author knows of no such studies to date.

If increased family homelessness cannot be explained by indicators related to housing itself, perhaps other income pressures have made housing unaffordable. Income data in Table 1 shows a dramatic decline in the family income of single-female families since 1970. In constant 1990 dollars, the maximum subsidized income of such families has declined by more than half since 1970, from $30,000 to $12,817. The increasing impoverishment of single women with children in

[17] Data on subfamilies are taken from the 1970, 1980, and 1990 U.S. Census Public Use Microdata Sample tapes for New York City.

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large part reflects that Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits have not kept pace with inflation. While housing costs have risen slower than inflation, other costs—such as clothing—have not. Single women with children in poverty have less money not only for housing but less for other essentials. They are increasingly and severely impoverished. The dramatic decline in the income of these families, however, occurred in the 1970s, well before the rise of family homelessness in the 1980s. Although their income continued to decline in the 1980s, relative to the cost of living, income decline alone does not immediately account for the increase in family homelessness.

Income and housing variables for New York provide an insufficient explanation for the causes of homelessness. This does not mean that poverty and lack of affordable housing do not cause homelessness. It could mean that some of the important housing indicators, such as the housing vacancy rate, may not be relevant for assessing housing availability for homeless families. Vacant units may be located in violent drug-dealing locations, or they may be geographically distant from family support networks needed by low-income families. It certainly suggests that the mechanisms by which housing availability and poverty lead to homelessness are underspecified. Some of the most important effects of poverty and lack of housing, such as the effects of doubling-up on host and recipient families, are seldom explored in housing studies. For example, characteristics associated with homelessness such as depression, stress, substance abuse, child-abuse and battery, may be the result of doubling-up, but not losing an apartment per se. If so, social service assistance for both host and recipient families is a more immediate need than an apartment.

In addition, it may not be a coincidence that most homeless families are headed by young women whose lives were likely traumatized in their formative years during sharp economic changes in the late 1970s and early 1980s.[18] According to the mayor's Commission on the Homeless, "A large proportion of family shelter residents experienced serious economic and social problems in their households when they were growing up: 53% were in a household that received public assistance; 19% were physically or sexually abused; 10% had spent time in foster care; and 18% grew up with someone who abused drugs or alcohol."[19] A significant amount of doubling-up may be due to the inability of many young single female-headed families to function independently.[20] Rather than an immediate money or housing problem, family homelessness could be the long-term result of a deeply disoriented generation of women now reaching child-bearing age who seek safe and stable lives for their children. Peter Rossi reached a similar conclusion from a different angle of inquiry. He questioned

[18] See NYC Commission on the Homeless, *The Way Home*, 67.

[19] Ibid.

[20] In his examination of studies on family shelters nationally, Peter Rossi noted, "the growing conviction is that without help many of the homeless families would not be able to last for long in conventional housing without additional episodes of homelessness." See "Troubling Families," 369.

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why the number of families in shelters, which is how family homelessness is measured, tends to expand or contract according to the availability of shelter space. If families were completely without housing alternatives, this should not happen.

Rossi concluded that mothers will put up with unbearable housing arrangements rather than expose their children to the risks of the streets. "Shelters provide a way out, providing shelter for a limited time while mothers try to make other housing arrangements."[21] This raises the interesting possibility that family homelessness is more directly related to child-rearing and shelter policy than housing.

In any case, family homelessness is the result of a cumulative and multidynamic social process. Loss of income and lack of affordable housing probably triggered family and social breakdown starting twenty years ago, and the cumulative effects of that breakdown on homeless (and nonhomeless) families are just as significant as lack of an apartment. Homeless families and the communities they come from have deep and complicated problems that cannot be simply reduced to housing or money. The need for local government to incorporate social research into the policy-making process on this complex issue, the point emphasized by Anderson, is conspicuous.

New York City's Response to Homeless Families

The city's response to family homelessness was largely shaped by the homeless advocates. Two aspects of the advocates' approach had long-term negative consequences for homeless policy. First, the advocates were policy elites who relied on their legal skills and media ties, rather than community support, to address the problems of the homeless. In 1979, Robert Hayes, a young Wall Street lawyer searching for ways to help panhandlers, found an obscure passage in the New York State Constitution calling for "the aid, care and support of the needy."[22] That year, a landmark lawsuit, *Callahan v. Carey*, was brought on behalf of homeless men. The lawsuit successfully argued that the New York State Constitution guaranteed the right to shelter. In 1981, New York City entered into a consent decree that initiated the current expansive shelter system for men, women, and families.[23] In ten years the size of the family shelter system tripled to nearly 5,500 families.[24] In fiscal year (FY) 1992 the annual cost was $36,694 per family, or more than $200 million.[25]

Advocates for the homeless had minimal interaction with institutions and leaders of the African-American and Hispanic communities from which the vast

[21] Ibid., 378.

[22] Celia Dugger, "A Roof for All, Made of Rulings and Red Tape," *New York Times*, 4 July 1993.

[23] See the City of New York, "Reshaping New York City's Policies and Programs for Homeless Individuals and Families," May 1992, 4.

[24] City of New York, *The Mayor's Management Report*, February 1993, 330.

[25] Dugger, "A Roof for All, Made of Rulings and Red Tape."

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majority of the homeless originated.[26] In fact, homeless programs drained local resources in poor communities and were in part responsible for a community movement to limit the number of shelter-type facilities developed in poor communities. The movement led to the city's adoption of a "fair share" provision in the 1990 charter that sought to prevent the city from loading up shelters in poor neighborhoods. *New York Newsday* reported that:

> With 130 shelters, prisons, drug clinics and other such projects, Harlem is awash in the types of thing no other community wants. "You've heard of the NIMBY argument 'not in my back yard?' Ours is the AIMBY argument, 'already in my back yard,'" said Regina Smith, Chairwoman of Harlem PRIDE (People Resisting Injustice, Destabilization and Exploitation). Neighborhoods like Harlem are exactly what people had in mind when pushing the 'fair share'—rules the mayor must craft under the new city charter to prevent the dumping of unpopular projects in just a few neighborhoods.[27]

> "They didn't do planning at all," charges Marta Rivera, family-service director of Casita Maria, a settlement house serving Hunt's Point and now under contract with the city to help some of the new families. "Our schools are overcrowded. The emergency rooms? Forget about it. These people were dumped in these buildings with no social services 'Here's your key, you got your apartment, good-bye.'"[28]

Responding to community outrage over homeless policy, Bronx Borough President Fernando Ferrer articulated a view echoed by other African-American and Hispanic elected officials. "The homeless are not the enemy, the city's misguided actions on the problem are what we must fight."[29] Far from representing poor minority communities, the policies fostered by homeless advocates were targets of their anger.

Homeless advocates fostered an erroneous conception of the homeless problem as strictly a housing problem. A former board member of the Coalition for the Homeless told the *New York Times*, "There was a discussion that went on among us all. Do you market it as a problem of shelter, or do you tell people about alcoholism, drug addiction, mental illness, concerns about child abuse?"[30] Thinking that the public would not readily support families with multiple social problems, advocates decided to market homelessness as a simple problem of housing. This conception of the cause of homelessness played a large part in the development of homeless policy by the city and the court. The advocates negated a broader and more rational understanding of homelessness and missed an oppor-

[26] Mary Brosnahan, director of the New York Coalition for the Homeless, interview by author, 1 December 1993, New York City.

[27] Eve Heyn, "Making NYC a Good Neighbor: City Reviews Draft Rules for Citing Facilities Fairly" *New York Newsday*, 14 November 1990.

[28] Rita Giordano, "Mixed Blessing: Housing Plans Have Ups, Downs in Hunts Point," *New York Newsday*, 24 May 1993.

[29] Derek Alger, "Fight Over Homeless: Beep Charges HRA Violates City Charter Review Rules," *New York Newsday*, 25 January 1993.

[30] Dugger, "A Roof for All, Made of Rulings and Red Tape."

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tunity to coalesce with the movement for increased community planning described earlier. The problem here was not the public's reluctance to support the homeless or recognize their needs, a concern voiced by Johnston, but the reluctance of homeless advocates to prepare the public for the difficulty and complexity of fighting homelessness. An alternative advocacy path was available to homeless advocates: they could have educated the public about homelessness rather than marketed partial truths; they could have developed political coalitions with community activists and local officials to demand increased resources to combat poverty; and they could have worked with local community groups to develop policies for homeless prevention and reintegration in poor communities. By increasing awareness, broadening political support, planning in a rational community-sensitive context, and thereby creating good will for the reception of homeless families in neighborhoods where they were placed, such an advocacy approach might have minimized the political, planning, and social acceptance issues raised by Lowi, Anderson, and Johnston.

The Koch administration accepted the advocates' definition of homelessness as a housing problem, but Mayor Koch had a different solution. Aware of the mounting numbers of double-up poor families, Koch believed that ceding to advocates' demands for small shelters and housing would encourage these families to enter the shelter system.[31] His administration deliberately attempted to make shelters less hospitable than housing options in the private market, using run-down hotel rooms to house homeless families. By 1983, the city began to open congregate shelters in gymnasiums to accommodate the increased flow of homeless families. Congregate shelters contained little more than beds and were notorious for their lack of security, absence of privacy, and substandard conditions. If families were entering the shelter system simply in search of better housing, Koch's strategy should have stanched the flow. However, the problems of family homelessness were and still are more complex than housing alone. Despite rancid conditions, the stream of homeless families into the shelter system steadily increased to the point where families were forced to sleep in city welfare offices while they awaited shelter placement.

Homeless advocates, although despising squalid congregate shelter conditions, decided to push for expansion of shelter space as a way of embarrassing the Koch administration into providing permanent housing for families entering the shelter system.[32] Legal advocates for the homeless argued in court that forcing families to sleep in welfare offices violated the city's obligation to provide shelter for the needy. Despite public criticism, the Koch administration responded by expanding the use of congregate shelters to house homeless families.

The advocates' strategy worked. Media coverage of shelter conditions prompted federal and state authorities, who paid three-fourths of the costs of emergency shelters, to cut off funds unless better accommodations were found

[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.

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for homeless families. David Dinkins, then the Manhattan borough president, released a stinging critique of the "inhumane" homeless policy of the Koch administration entitled *A Shelter Is Not A Home*.[33]

Under policy pressure, the Koch administration began to move hundreds of families from shelters into permanent housing. Hoping to stem the flow of homeless families seeking housing, families were required to stay eighteen months in dingy shelters before receiving permanent housing. The eighteen-month policy continued to be based on the theory that homeless families were primarily coming into shelters to improve their housing options.

This policy had very little success in reducing the number of homeless families entering the shelter system. The Department of Housing and Urban Development's (HUD) study of homelessness in New York and Philadelphia revealed that in both cities, approximately 1 percent of the population used shelters annually, despite New York having twice the number of shelter beds available per capita.[34] The study concluded with the suggestion that the expressed need for shelter over time is "relatively independent of shelter bed availability and other shelter policies."[35]

HUD's findings suggest that the Koch administration's eighteen-month deterrent approach, based on the misguided assumption that homeless families were simply shopping for housing, only reduced the recycling of families through shelters. Over time, the same number of families were likely to enter the system regardless of how long they stayed. In short, long and expensive shelter stays were probably a waste of money and not a deterrent. This was not because housing options were so poor in the private market that shelters seemed better, but because families were not entering the shelters just for housing. If housing alone predicted family homelessness, then Philadelphia, with its lower rental cost and higher vacancy rate of affordable housing, would have experienced significantly less homelessness.

By 1986, arguments over whether shelter conditions would stop families from entering the system were largely mooted by the court. The city was forced to improve conditions in shelters and hotels by order of the New York State Court of Appeals.[36] In response the city began to expand its use of apartment-style shelters, called Tier II shelters; Tier 1 shelters refer to congregate style living arrangements. The city also committed to develop more permanent housing for homeless families.

[33] See the Taskforce on Housing for Homeless Families, Office of the Manhattan Borough President, *A Shelter Is Not A Home* (New York: Manhattan Borough President's Office, 1987).

[34] Dennis P. Culhane et al., *Public Shelter Admission Rates in Philadelphia and New York City: The Implications of Turnover for Sheltered Population Counts* (Washington, DC: Fannie Mae, 1993), 12.

[35] Ibid., 22.

[36] Interview with Bert Naus, deputy general counsel for the New York Department for the Homeless, 17 November 1993.

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In sum, homeless advocates knew that homelessness was more complicated than housing alone, but they decided to fight for a quick victory on shelters. They later used court-mandated shelters as a wedge to force the city to produce permanent housing for homeless families. The Koch administration deliberately created a shelter system designed to deter families from shopping for better housing. Because homeless families were not just housing shoppers, however, Koch's shelter policy failed to stop the in-flow of homeless families. The courts in effect ordered an end to the deterrent shelter policy. The Koch administration was then forced to create an expansive permanent housing program for the homeless. The advocates won, or so it seemed.

The Dinkins Plan Empties Hotels, Then Backfires

Dinkins's election was a turning point on homeless policy. When the Dinkins administration entered office in 1990, it was staunchly critical of the city's shelter system. Although it shared the Koch administration's view of family homelessness as a housing problem, Dinkins's staff were critical of Koch's conclusion that families entering the shelter system were using the system as a shortcut to permanent housing. Dinkins administration officials believed that homeless families only sought shelter when no other housing options existed. They sided with the public posture of homeless advocates that family homelessness would be solved through housing.

By this point, bickering between the Koch administration, the courts, and homeless advocates had narrowed the discussion of homelessness to "literal" homelessness—those seeking immediate shelter or already in shelters—and the city's shelter capacity on a given night. Underscoring Anderson's critique of the irrationality of the policy-making process, the entire "war of position" in the courts between the advocates and the city bureaucrats took place in the absence of serious social investigation of the causes of homelessness and the effect of shelter policies on low-income communities and on homeless families themselves. City bureaucrats scrambled to provide enough shelter beds to meet the ebbs and flows of homeless intake by providing housing outlets for the shelter population. The system became driven by the numbers to the exclusion of larger policy issues related to homelessness.

The Dinkins administration, believing in the "morality" of the homeless, maintained that doubled-up families would not take advantage of the system—called "gaming" or "shopping" the system—simply to find better quality housing. They boldly proposed immediately to provide a large number of permanent housing units to homeless families in shelters and hotels, thereby lowering exorbitant shelter costs and using the savings to provide additional permanent housing for homeless families. In this way, they reasoned, shelters could be eliminated over time.

In the spring and summer of 1990 the Dinkins administration nearly emptied the welfare hotels by placing homeless families directly into permanent housing

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and voiding the usual nine-month (reduced from an eighteen-month) waiting requirement. By July 1990, the hotel population decreased to 147 families, a reduction of more than 3,000 from the peak number in 1986 and a reduction of 796 from when Dinkins took office.[37] News that permanent housing was available without a prolonged stay in hotels apparently spread to parts of the city's doubled-up family population. A surge of 120 families per month, up to 650 from 530, began entering the shelter system soon after the change in hotel policy. This quickly created a capacity crisis in the shelters.

The increase in families entering shelters made Koch appear to be correct about homeless families being simply housing shoppers gaming the system. Dinkins officials began to publicly question both the values of the homeless and their own liberalism. "You don't want to believe badly of people's [the homeless] motives," said Dinkins' homeless policy director, "that's at the heart of Dinkins's politics, too. He's a true liberal."[38] A widely read study was published by the *City Journal* concluding that family homelessness in New York City was generated largely by the city's own generous shelter and housing provisions.[39] The study agreed with Koch's argument that providing permanent housing for homeless families would eventually lead to universal housing for "all poor families." "Such a commitment should be debated on its own merits, and the debate not clouded by the emotional specter of homelessness."[40]

The contrary results of the Dinkins homeless policy caused confusion and disorientation among homeless policy makers. To understand what went wrong, both the policy and the *City Journal* critique must be analyzed. The *City Journal* study, conducted by economist Randell Filer, compared housing and demographic data from twenty cities. Filer found that New York City had a comparatively high homeless population; that homelessness could not be explained by the relative cost or availability of low-cost housing in New York City; and that the cause of higher homelessness in New York must be its shelter and housing policies. These conclusions were based on a count of the number of homeless families in New York City from a 1984 Housing and Urban Development (HUD) survey, which Filer described as "highly accurate."[41] To the contrary, the 1984 HUD survey was highly inaccurate, because it was based in part on the best guesses of local "experts" on the number of homeless in their city.[42] The more systematic longitudinal approach of Dennis Culhane et al. demonstrated that New York

[37] City of New York, *Mayor's Management Report*, 1993, 344.

[38] Celia Dugger, "Setbacks and Surprises Temper a Mayor's Hopes to House All," *New York Times*, 5 July 1994.

[39] Randell Filer, "The Real Causes of Family Homelessness," *NY: The City Journal* (Autumn 1990): 40.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid., 41.

[42] Numerous researchers have discounted HUD's 1984 estimates of the homeless population. See Culhane et al., *Public Shelter Admission Rates in Philadelphia and New York City* for a brief overview of the problems in the 1984 methodology.

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City's homeless policies may encourage homeless families to stay in the shelter system *longer* than in other cities, but does not necessarily encourage more homeless families to enter the system.[43] In short, more careful studies undermined Koch's gaming thesis; New York City did not have a higher homeless rate than other cities.

What explains the 120 additional families that entered the shelter system when it appeared that an immediate route to permanent housing was being established through shelters? The 120 additional entrants, out of a total of 650 entrants per month, probably were gaming the system to find permanent housing. It is not surprising that given the publicity surrounding Dinkins's emptying of the shelters that some doubled-up families would take advantage of the situation to obtain housing. The surprise is that in a city with 80,000 single women with children on a twelve-year waiting list for public housing—a number identical to the size of the city's episodically homeless population—shelter entries rose by *only* 120 families per month during the permanent housing bonanza."[44] For whatever reasons, the city's doubled-up poor population showed enormous restraint.

Unfortunately, neither the Dinkins administration nor its critics made a distinction between doubled-up families that were simply gaming the system for better housing and those truly homeless families having more complicated problems. Homeless advocates consistently portrayed, and the city consistently understood, family homelessness as a simple housing problem. When some true housing shoppers inevitably showed up, the city had no concept of how to distinguish them from more deeply troubled homeless families. Homeless families as a whole were blamed for the gaming by a small number of the city's doubled-up poor population.

Significantly, the primary political concern of the Dinkins administration was not the overall increase in the number of shelter entrants per se, but the city's ability to provide shelter on demand on any given night. Even if housing shoppers had increased nightly shelter intake by only 5 percent, that would have exceeded city capacity and forced the city to house families overnight in empty welfare offices in violation of court orders. The court had threatened to put Mayor Dinkins and his top aides in jail if they continued to house families in this way. The issue at stake was the public credibility of the mayor. The attention attached to housing gamers and the values of the homeless was misplaced and magnified out of proportion to the number of additional families entering the system.

The administration's mistakes were compounded by the introduction of the Alternative Pathways Program (APP). Realizing that doubled-up families were

[43] Ibid.

[44] The public housing waiting list figure of 80,000 single female-headed families was provided by William Steinmann, director of research for the New York City Housing Authority. The estimate of the episodically homeless family population is taken from *Public Shelter Admission Rates in Philadelphia and New York City*, 20, which reported 76,000 episodically homeless families in New York City.

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entering shelters to find permanent housing, the Dinkins administration decided to offer an incentive for doubled-up families to remain housed with family or friends. The incentive was an annual set-aside of 961 apartments for lottery for doubled-up homeless families; this allowed lucky winners direct route to permanent housing without a wait in shelters or hotels. It was hoped that the provision of an alternative and more direct access to permanent housing would slow the entrance of homeless families into the shelter system.

APP appeared to lure housing shoppers out of the shelters. After its announcement, the number of families entering the shelter system began to fall. However, the reduced reliance on hotels, combined with the conversion to APP of permanent housing units previously awarded to homeless shelter families, quickly created a capacity crisis in the shelter system. The backlog of families in shelters again forced the city to leave homeless women and children in welfare offices. The reaction of homeless advocates and the courts to the APP further complicated the situation. Homeless advocates, particularly the Coalition for the Homeless, viewed the set-aside of beds for doubled-up families simply as a reduction of permanent housing units available for homeless families already in shelters. They interpreted APP as collective punishment for homeless families now considered to be gaming the shelter system. Homeless advocates convinced the court that use of municipal offices for overnight housing of homeless families was a clear violation of the city's consent decree. They also argued that the city's ability to empty the hotels once by providing more housing for the homeless proved that the city could produce more housing for the homeless if it so desired. The court ordered the city to immediately end the use of welfare offices as emergency shelter for homeless families.[45] The city then ended APP to provide more housing units to families in shelters, thereby making shelter space available for families sleeping in welfare offices.

The failure of APP was a turning point for the Dinkins administration. The administration felt that it had been misled by homeless advocates to believe that housing could solve homelessness. The process of making policy under court mandates encouraged by homeless advocates received little public criticism, somewhat contrary to Lowi's concern about public approval of welfare policies. But it was increasingly frustrating for the Dinkins administration. After APP, the administration moved to set stricter family eligibility standards for shelters and permanent housing. Dinkins's homeless coordinator resigned in frustration, telling the press that the city's liberalism had been misguided. The *New York Times* wrote that the Dinkins administration's path from "idealism to unsentimental pragmatism" was a "clash between the city's traditional liberalism and its unforgiving fiscal realities."[46] In fact, it was more than that; the failure of APP was a major political embarrassment for Dinkins. The administration had risked and

[45] Ben Naus interview.

[46] Celia Dugger, "Setbacks and Surprises Temper a Mayor's Hopes to House All."

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lost its management credibility on the belief that no doubled-up families would game the system.

The accepted wisdom of treating the homeless problem as a simple housing problem caused two administrations to misdiagnose both the origins and the solutions to family homelessness, at great political costs to both. However, the broader impact of city homeless policy and its political effects cannot be fully appreciated without a grasp of the more general housing issues in New York.

Permanent Housing

Given budget constraints, an antitax mood among taxpayers, and their myopic focus on providing apartments for families in shelters, city officials decided that building new permanent housing for the homeless was too costly. Instead, they increasingly reallocated existing government-assisted housing resources to the homeless. This policy, supported by homeless advocates, alienated the nonhomeless poor and jeopardized the maintenance of the city's low-income housing stock.

New York City has a long tradition of producing housing that serves a broad strata of low and moderate-income New Yorkers. The city also pioneered mixed-income housing, which is not necessarily a mixture of families across the income spectrum. It may also mean a mix of working and nonworking families. Unlike other cities, public housing officials in New York for decades have consciously maintained a one-third mix of working poor families in their developments. While crime, drugs, and high vacancy rates prompted many cities to tear down their public housing developments, New York City's remained relatively stable and fully occupied. The city's own housing production efforts, developed through the Department of Housing Preservation and Development (HPD), have also attempted to adhere to a mixed-income model.

The city has placed nearly all homeless families in one of three types of permanent housing: city-owned housing taken from owners for nonpayment of taxes, known as "in rem" housing for the legal process during disclosure; federally financed public housing; and private rental housing subsidized by federally financed Section 8 vouchers and certificates. In 1990, for example, HPD produced more than 2,000 apartments for homeless families. The New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA), with whom Koch negotiated an agreement to house 2,000 homeless families annually in 1988, continued to set aside 2,000 vacant units of public housing (25 percent of their annual turnover) for homeless families.

The cost of providing shelters and permanent housing for homeless families was enormous, growing from $10 million in the early 1980s to $500 million in 1992.[47] Facing billion-dollar budget deficits, the city reallocated permanent housing resources targeted to nonhomeless families to the homeless as a way of preventing the development of costly additional shelters. As the numbers of homeless families in shelters increased, city housing production became driven

[47] Dugger, "A Roof for All, Made of Rulings and Red Tape."

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TABLE 4

Apartments Allocated to Homeless Families and Individuals, (HPD)

	1990	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*
For homeless	4012	4173	3643	3131
Total produced	19,309	22,798	18,280	15,049
Percent for homeless	21%	18%	20%	21%
Units Allocated to Homeless Families in NYCHA				
	1990	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*
Homeless	2418	1779	1686	1564
Total vacancies	8044	8347	8676	8190
Percent for homeless	30%	21%	19%	19%
Section 8 Placements/Homeless Families				
	1990	*1991*	*1992*	*1993*
For homeless	735	863	1422	2711
Total available	7762	9568	10,767	4422
Percent	9%	9%	13%	61%

Source: New York City, Mayor's Management Reports, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993.

by the need to move families from shelters into permanent housing. Little consideration was given to the political and practical implications of narrowing low-income housing availability to homeless families; nor was homelessness put in the context of the destabilization of poor communities from which the homeless emanated and returned. The city's single-minded focus on moving families from shelters thus precluded consideration of the broader impact of moving troubled homeless families into buildings already experiencing a loss of working families and a build-up of service-needy, young, and welfare-dependent families. This led to housing practices that antagonized working poor communities and intensified deterioration of the city's existing low-income housing stock.

The priority given to homeless families in shelters over other poor families, including many doubled-up and episodically homeless families, caused an immediate problem. Local communities protested that it was unfair to use newly renovated housing units exclusively to shelter the homeless. The city had created a relatively fast and certain path to permanent housing for homeless families in shelters, while other needy families had to take their chances in competitive lotteries for city-renovated apartments. Communities also protested that homeless families were being concentrated—dumped—without services into already troubled neighborhoods. Many argued reasonably that the city should do more in the communities to prevent homelessness in the first place.[48]

The city responded by placing limits on the percentage of housing units allocated to homeless families in HPD's various programs. Table 4 shows that after 1991, HPD effectively limited homeless family placements to 20 percent

[48] Ibid.

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of their vacant housing stock. While no evaluations were conducted to measure the impact of the 20 percent policy, it abated public criticism of homeless placements.

Residents of public housing also had a negative response to the city's homeless housing policy. In 1990, public housing residents publicly protested that too many public housing vacancies were being used for city-referred homeless from shelters. They argued that public housing was already crowded with doubled-up families and young mothers with poorly supervised children. The continual loading up of young mothers with children without services and improved maintenance, they maintained, was leading to increased hardship in public housing. The residents won a promise of $1 million per year in services and a set-aside of 800 units per year for doubled-up families in public housing. However, the city quickly reneged on its promise.

Homeless allocations to public housing provoked deep splits in the Dinkins administration. After years of experience in housing homeless families, NYCHA realized that the needs of the homeless went far beyond housing. By 1992, NYCHA had absorbed 8,000 homeless families from shelters without any additional financial assistance for needed services. Sally Hernandez-Pinero, the head of NYCHA and a former deputy mayor under Dinkins, therefore threatened to block further shelter placements in NYCHA. Table 4 shows that NYCHA reduced intake of homeless families from 30 percent of vacancies in 1990 to roughly 20 percent after 1990. Speaking out against the policy, Hernandez-Pinero said:

> I am deeply concerned that we do not dump large numbers of low-income people in public housing in a way that would destabilize the developments and make them impossible to manage. . . . We are taking families that have not been prepared to be responsible tenants. They have tremendous social service needs. We're not doing them any good and we're not doing the tenants any good. . . . We told them [the mayor] that public housing is a short-term solution and they will pay a very big price in the long-term. They'll destroy the lives of 600,000 other people [NYCHA tenants].[49]

Like HPD, NYCHA reduced the number of units of public housing allocated to homeless families from 25 to 20 percent.

The third source of permanent housing for homeless families was the Section 8 program, financed through HUD and administered through NYCHA. Section 8 provides rental vouchers or certificates to families earning less than 50 percent of the metropolitan area median income. When, to appease tenants, NYCHA reduced the number of publicly owned units going to homeless families, it increased the number of Section 8 certificates allocated to homeless families. However, the Section 8 program produced its own contradictions. Because of the less than 2 percent vacancy rates for low-income housing in New York City, the use of Section 8 subsidies for formerly doubled-up families provided an incentive for landlords to evict lower-rent-paying, nonsubsidized poor families. By merely reshuffling the occupants of low-income housing, rather than adding

[49] Sally Hernandez-Pinero quoted in the *New York Times*, 19 July 1993.

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new affordable housing stock, Section 8 placements themselves probably inadvertently contributed to increased homelessness and increased financial costs.

Technically, homeless advocates were probably correct in saying that the city could place all shelter dwellers in city and public housing and perhaps eliminate the need for shelters. Indeed, this is where homeless policy has been going. The result is that affordable housing opportunities for the nonhomeless poor have decreased, but their overcrowding and probable deterioration into homelessness has increased. Hernandez-Pinero was also correct: city homeless placements without needed services are increasing the deterioration of city and NYCHA housing stock and could lead to the destruction of many needed affordable housing units.

Homeless advocates apparently believed that using the courts to mandate housing for the homeless would increase pressures on other poor people to demand more housing for themselves, thereby broadening the homeless struggle to a unified struggle of the poor for housing. That strategy backfired. The poor did not unite. Poor communities were preoccupied fighting the effects of destructive homeless policies and did not mount campaigns for additional housing. Homelessness became a major issue in Rudolph Giuliani's successful campaign against David Dinkins, whom he criticized as being too soft on the homeless. Giuliani threatened to move homeless families out of shelters after ninety days, deny homeless families access to permanent housing, and seek to have the city's obligation to shelter homeless families overturned.[50] Dinkins, abandoning his liberal defense of the homeless, said that he too planned to adopt harsher homeless policies.[51] Except from homeless advocates, Giuliani's harsh rhetoric did not produce a single outcry in the city. Since his election, Giuliani has adopted a Koch-like view of the homeless. "The mayor contends many of the people who show up looking for shelter each night are merely trying to get into public housing."[52]

Conclusion

Liberal homeless policy failed for two reasons. First, homeless advocates pursued an elite court and media-centered strategy that politically isolated the homeless. Second, the ineffectiveness, adverse side effects, and apparent monetary waste of homeless policies antagonized the public. The voting public had demonstrated substantial willingness to support homeless programs, even at great expense and without having voted for it. Outright rejection of liberal homeless policies emerged only after years of highly publicized failed efforts to reform the court-driven bureaucratic process. The creation of an expensive, ineffectual homeless

[50] Celia Dugger, "Giuliani to Call for Curtailing Services for Some Homeless," *New York Times*, 17 September 1993.

[51] Ibid.

[52] *Christian Science Monitor*, 3 September 1996.

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system fostered by policy elites, bureaucrats, and the courts lent credibility to a conservative critique of liberal welfare policies. Homeless advocates appeared as the quintessential special interest groups unconcerned about the impact of their advocacy on other groups, even on the nonhomeless poor. The courts and bureaucrats spent billions of taxpayers' money on homeless housing without slowing the rate of family homelessness. Public reaction against homeless programs was, therefore, in many respects rational and pragmatic. Dinkins's turn away from liberal homeless policies was not based on hostility to the homeless or a conservative shift opposing social welfare spending in general. It was a reaction against a failed policy and a failed policy-making process.

Lowi, Anderson, and Johnston's critiques of social welfare policies are compatible elements for an improved policy-making process. Lowi's critique of expanding social welfare programs through legal advocacy was confirmed: As the homeless programs expanded, political support for them declined. A greater public role in deciding public policy, Lowi emphasized, would have called attention to the potential impact of homeless policies on other groups. While this may have led to competing claims for assistance, such as from working poor families, it also could have encouraged homeless advocates to establish political alliances with such groups. This might have created more stable political support for aiding homeless families.

Anderson's appraisal of irrationality in the policy-making process was also supported. However, irrationality and lack of broad political participation are related. Broader participation of other needy groups in policy formation could have increased the rationality of homeless policies. Rather than displacing working poor families, for example, a more rational policy might have directed support to working families hosting doubled-up families—as was demanded by such families living in public housing.

Increasing political participation in policy making does not ensure that the public will be considerate of the needs of the poor, which is Johnston's emphasis. Without elite advocacy and legal protection for the homeless, they would have received less attention in New York. On the other hand, unless elite advocacy and court intervention is limited, it may isolate the poor both politically and socially. The courts did not bring rationality to the homeless policy-making process; the advocates did not negotiate with the working poor and other groups most affected by court-mandated homeless policies. The public was less supportive of the homeless after homeless policy implementation than before. Homeless policy was thus a failure. The ultimate goal of homeless advocacy and court intervention, following Johnston, must be to increase social recognition and voluntary public support for the homeless to the point where they can be effective advocates for themselves. To accomplish this task, legal advocates and the courts must be ever mindful of the impact that mandated policies have on other groups whose political and social support the homeless must ultimately secure. While legal advocacy is essential to protect the weak against the strong, it can only offer modest protection. It must be self-limited to be effective in the long run.

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Aiding the homeless and expanding the social welfare state is more a matter of building political coalitions by linking the needs of the homeless to those of other groups and designing rational policies that do not encourage opposition by squandering public resources.

In sum, Lowi's argument that increased public participation in policy making would stabilize the welfare state can be extended. Increased participation could lead to greater rationality and more support for social welfare programs, and promote social acceptance of the individuals they support. Increasing the social recognition and status of the poor is necessary for increasing their political efficacy and their impact on policy. Thus increasing public participation is more than a strategy for stabilizing the welfare state; it is a means for its progressive transformation.

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The Struggle for a National Identity in Post-Soviet Russia

GLENN CHAFETZ

Though the West welcomed Boris Yeltsin's reelection as president of Russia, Russia's cooperation with, let alone integration into, the West cannot be taken for granted. Yeltsin faces poor health, a parliament still dominated by communists and other opponents of democracy, and a war of secession in Chechnya. Moreover, Yeltsin's own behavior has been erratic. In particular he has shown a willingness to compromise with nationalist and less-than-liberal politicians, including his former national security aid, Alexander Lebed.

Given Russia's power and importance, this article addresses the sources of Russia's recent and future conduct. It approaches this task by answering two questions. First, how do Russian political leaders perceive the still new international order in which they find themselves? This question is important, because by knowing the theories of international politics that different leaders hold and their relative influence in policy we can predict (albeit imperfectly) how states will behave in the future. Second, what are the sources of those theories? The origin of the current Russian foreign-policy elite's theories of international relations is intriguing, not only because it can contribute to our understanding of theory formation and development, but because it holds implications for our understanding of international relations in general. Identification of the source or sources of policy makers' thinking about foreign affairs at the very least guides observers interested in explaining and predicting state behavior.[1] More ambi-

[1] It is not the purpose of this article to explain the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in its entirety. For a sample of other analyses of Russian foreign policy and its aspects see Celeste Wallender, ed., *The Sources of Russian Foreign Policy After the Cold War* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1996); Jonathan Valdez, "The Near Abroad, the West, and National Identity in Russian Foreign Policy" in Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha, eds., *The Making of Foreign Policy in Russia and the New States of Eurasia* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1995): vol. 4, 84–109; S. Neil MacFarlane, "Russia, the West, and European Security," *Survival* 35 (Autumn 1993): 3–25; and Jan S. Adams, "Legislature Asserts Its Role in Russian Foreign Policy," *RFE/RL Research Report* 2 (22 January 1993): 32–36.

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tiously, policy makers from other states may be able to use the information to socialize other states into desirable patterns of behavior.[2]

I answer the first question by arguing that the divided Russian foreign policy establishment—those leaders capable of shaping Moscow's foreign policy—hold three distinct theories about the nature of the international environment.[3] A liberal group views world politics as interdependent and highly institutionalized.[4] A second group, containing both communists like Gennadi Zyuganov and anticommunist Russian chauvinists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, sees international politics as a Hobbesian war of all against all.[5] A third group takes a middle perspective.[6]

My answer to the second question comes from role theory supplemented by work showing the influence of domestic political calculations on leaders' foreign policy perceptions and behaviors.[7] I argue that each of the three theories of international relations held by the different political factions rests on a different view of Russia's international role specifically and its identity generally. The individuals in each group conceive of Russia's identity in ways that are consistent with their own ideological values and psychological belief systems.[8] The different

[2] On socializing other states, see G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44 (Summer 1990): 284–315.

[3] I am indebted to the readers listed at the end of this article for convincing me that the two-sided debate I described in an earlier draft proved too simplistic.

[4] The closest Western articulation of the theory to which Yeltsin, Kozyrev, and their followers adhere is neoliberal institutionalism. See Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989).

[5] The most notable proponent of a theory that traces the source of conflict to both the structure of the international system and the character of liberal states, as both wings of this group do, is Joseph Stalin. See Allen Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 18–25.

[6] This group can best be described as "soft realist" in that they believe that the nation state system is competitive but also recognize the importance of institutions and norms in international politics. See Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," *Review of International Studies* 17 (March 1991): 227–28. For a survey of realism, see Michael Joseph Smith, *Realist Thought From Weber to Kissinger* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987).

[7] See Richard Ned Lebow, *Between Peace and War* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991). On role and identity, see Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, *Social Identity Theory: Constructive and Critical Advances* (London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf, 1990); Michael Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder: The Case of the Arab States System," *International Studies Quarterly* 37 (September 1993): 271–296; K. J. Holsti, "National Role Conception in the Study of Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (September 1970): 233–309; Chih-yu Shih, "A Cognitive Approach to International Organization: Perspective and Application," *Behavioral Science* 34 (July 1989): 176–98; Stephen G. Walker, *Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987); and Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 42 (Spring 1992): 391–425. For a similar argument in rational choice terms, see Russell Hardin, *One For All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995).

[8] See Robert Putnam, *Beliefs of Politicians* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973); and Jervis, "Perceiving and Coping with Threat" in Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janet Gross Stein, *Psychology and Deterrence* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 19, 22. On threats

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concepts of identity in turn spring from the domestic political needs of each group. As liberal commentator Konstantin Eggert noted, "the problem of Russia's relations with the outside world [and thus what the outside world is like] has turned into a question of how Russia sees itself."[9] By examining the political, psychological, and ideological sources of each group's domestic political preferences, we can understand why they hold particular identities and in turn adopt theories and formulate policies. In short, how individuals and groups interpret reality depends on "the roles they think they can, do, and should play in relation to that reality."[10] Therefore, because the construction of a liberal democratic political and economic system benefits Boris Yeltsin and his allies, they see the world and, more importantly, want to see the world in a way that conforms to their domestic political preference. Similarly, both the authoritarians and the statists view world politics and Russia's international role in ways that conform to their preferred domestic outcomes.

In the first section of this article I explain my theoretical framework. In the second section, I review the most salient conceptual innovations of the "new thinking" about international relations introduced by Mikhail Gorbachev. I return to the Gorbachev period because the theoretical and policy innovations introduced under his watch played an important role in the development of the three current views of international relations. Next I analyze the domestic political struggle in the context of competing conceptions of Russia's identity and how that struggle translates into three competing world views. I pay particular attention to the importance each group of elites gives to ideology, power, and the role of international norms and institutions in world politics. Finally, I conclude by examining the implications of the debate for Russian foreign policy and the future of world politics.

Identity, Role, and Change in the International System

Role theory begins with the proposition that states are "actors" that behave consistently with specific roles with which they identify. James Rosenau defines a role as the "attitudinal and behavioral expectations that those who relate to its occupant have of the occupant and the expectations that the occupant has of himself or herself" in given situations.[11] Roles are compound phenomena, created by the

to identity, see Terrel Northrup, "The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict" in Louis Kreisberg et al., eds., *Intractable Conflicts and Their Transformation* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1989), 55–82. On resistance to change, see Timur Kuran, "The Tenacious Past: Theories of Personal and Collective Conservatism," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 10 (September 1988): 143–71.

[9] Konstantin Eggert, "Rossiya v Roli 'Evraziyskogo Zhandarma'?" *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6.

[10] John S. Dryzek and Jeffrey Berejikian, "Reconstructive Democratic Theory," *American Political Science Review* 87 (March 1993): 50.

[11] James Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 220.

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combination of an actor's subjective understandings of what its behavior should be (role conceptions), society's demands (role expectations), and the particular context in which the role is being acted out.

A role's main function is to provide actors with a stable sense of identity. Without them, they cannot order their environments and consequently find social behavior intolerably difficult to understand and manage. Individuals who lack clearly defined roles may cease social function altogether.[12] The same process is expected to occur within states, albeit with less dramatic consequences.

Roles are neither deterministic nor infinitely elastic. If they were deterministic, we could predict behavior nearly perfectly. If they were infinitely elastic, not even the simplest social predictions would be possible. They are best understood as categories of behavior (like teacher, customer, mourner, or leader of the free world) that states, like individuals, rely on to simplify and guide themselves through a complex world. Actors usually have multiple roles that vary in overall importance (centrality) and according to the situation (salience).

Though some may question the applicability of role theory to international relations, it can be applied to states as well as other collectivities for two reasons. First, because identities and role conceptions are social phenomena, they can be shared, even among most of the individuals within a state.[13] Second, even when role conceptions are not shared, the individuals who make foreign policy in the name of states do so on the basis of their ideas about the roles of their states in the world and about which will be acceptable to their constituents.[14] With varying degrees of success and contingent on the political structure of the state in question, policy makers can rely on and socialize others with these conceptions as guiding principles that become policy.

The specific roles that states develop depend on three conditions: material factors, interpretations of reality, and specific social situations. The material factors are relatively immutable domestic attributes that shape how states view themselves and their relationships with other states. These include economic strength, population size, and geography.[15] Tiny states with weak economies are not likely to interpret their roles as global or regional hegemons. Large, powerful states are less likely to see themselves in subordinate roles in international institutions and other social settings than will small states.

[12] Northrup, "The Dynamic of Identity in Personal and Social Conflict," 53–82; Patricia W. Linville, "Self-Complexity and Affective Extremity: Don't Put All Your Eggs in One Cognitive Basket," *Social Cognition* 3 (Spring 1985): 94–120; and Linville, "Self-Complexity as a Cognitive Buffer Against Related Depression and Illness," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 52 (April 1987): 663–676.

[13] See Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder"; and Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization* 49 (Spring 1995): 229–252.

[14] Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42 (Summer 1988): 427–460.

[15] I do, of course, recognize that even territory, population, wealth, and ethnicity can and do change. The point is that these elements are more resistant to change than values, beliefs, and attitudes.

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In contrast, the social elements permit a greater degree of malleability and change in national role conceptions. These elements include ethnicity, race, the traditions and values by which states govern themselves, interpretations of past and current experiences the nation has with other countries, and the social and economic pressures that the nation perceives both from its citizens and from other countries. Though some observers may regard race and ethnicity as objective factors of social identification, such attributes have no meaning as social categories without the experiences of war, trade, alliance, colonialism, slavery, or discrimination; they are thus subject to interpretation.

Given that each actor has multiple role identities, which role is active at a particular time is a function of the social setting. For individuals, certain behaviors that are appropriate at home are out of place elsewhere; similarly, states occupy different roles within different international institutions and geographic spaces. The salience of any given role conception depends on the accessibility and fit of the identity to a social setting and the centrality and value of a given role to the actor's self-concept.[16] A role's centrality depends in part on how many roles an actor occupies, and its value depends on how rewarding it has been in the past.[17] The social settings may be area or even issue specific. Germany, for example, acts as a leader in European economic affairs while deferring to the United States and others in European and global military-strategic matters.

The role identities of states can change as a result of interaction with other states or internal upheaval. Positive interactions result in a change toward friendship or alliance. Negative interactions cause states to see themselves as adversaries. Social interaction is especially likely to produce change when the centrality or salience of given role conceptions is unclear or when a given state's national role conceptions fail to conform to international expectations of the state's role. In such cases, internal debate, conflict, or indecision may result in gradual changes in role and role conception.[18]

Changes tend to occur gradually, because an infinitely malleable role conception would make the world appear random and beyond control. Accordingly, any alterations in identity, whether as a result of structural international disruptions or internal revolutions, are difficult and traumatic. The main reason for the resistance to change is that during the period of time in which states develop their roles, they also develop myths and institutions to protect them.[19] Therefore, even when major structural changes occur in the society that the states inhabit, many of the states "cannot completely discard and transform the myths and institutions left

[16] Susan T. Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor, *Social Cognition* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), 2nd ed., 142–179.

[17] Linville, "Self-Complexity and Affective Extremity."

[18] Barnett, "Institutions, Roles, and Disorder."

[19] James G. Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 107 (Summer 1992): 271–301. See also Alexander L. George, "Domestic Constraints on Regime Change in U.S. Foreign Policy: The Need for Policy Legitimacy" in Ole R. Holsti, Randolph R. Silverman, and Alexander L. George, eds., *Change in the International System* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 233–62.

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over from their previous position."[20] There are two reasons for this. First, individuals and organizations alike seek to maintain consistency within their role schemas. Thus they often ignore or manipulate the information in order to make it fit their role conceptions.[21] Second, even when elites do want to change, domestic forces may constrain them.[22] Elite rhetoric about the international environment strongly influences mass beliefs, which may then resist attempts at change.[23] In addition, policy makers also prefer to avoid the expected transaction costs of breaking commitments to foreign allies.[24] Any alteration in foreign political commitments may also entail alienating domestic constituencies that may have powerful interests in maintaining the status quo in relations with allies and adversaries. These interests may be historical, cultural, ethnic, ideological, or commercial.[25] Both dynamics are more salient in democracies than in authoritarian states, because the executive is more responsive to political pressure in the former.

The end of the cold war profoundly altered the international social order and consequently caused the actors in the society to examine their roles and interests in the new world.[26] Both Russia's novelty as an actor in the international environment and the new environment created by the Soviet disintegration forced Russia's leaders to confront the problem of its role. At this point, there is still no consensus within Russia on what the most salient role identity should be. This dissensus began, however, in the last years of the Soviet Union. Only by understanding the struggle to redefine the USSR in the Gorbachev era can we understand the varying importance of specific role identities to different political factions in Russia today.

[20] Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," 274.

[21] See Yaacov Y. I. Vertzberger, *The World in Their Minds: Information Processing, Cognition, and Perception in Foreign Policy Decisionmaking* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 137–140; Alexander L. George, *Presidential Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), 61–66.

[22] See Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," 271–301; and Wendt, "Anarchy," 411.

[23] For demonstrations of the impact on policy of this kind of rhetoric, see B. Thomas Trout, "Rhetoric Revisited: Political Legitimation and the Cold War," *International Studies Quarterly* 19 (September 1975): 251–84; and Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," 271–301. On the constraints exercised by mass beliefs, see Peffley and Hurwitz, "Attitude Constraint," 871–90; Hurwitz and Peffley, "How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes Structured?" 1099–1120; and Hurwitz and Peffley, "The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes," *Journal of Politics* 52 (February 1990): 3–28.

[24] See Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," 271–301; Wendt, "Anarchy," 411; and Thomas W. Milburn and Daniel J. Christie, "Rewarding in International Politics," *Political Psychology* 10 (December 1989): 625–645.

[25] On interest groups in foreign policy making, see Jerel A. Rosati, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1993), 229–48, 358–470; and Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State* (New York: Basic Books, 1986).

[26] On the challenge of systemic changes to national identity and role, see Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," 274. The idea of the international system as a society comes from Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977).

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Before Russia: Identity Conflicts in the Gorbachev Era

Although Russia is new as a distinct political community, it did not spring into the world like Athena from Zeus's head; the Soviet legacy influences how the competing political groups in Russia view their predicament. Before the Gorbachev era, Soviet leaders identified their country's interests negatively with those of the West.[27] As the power of the USSR grew relative to the West and as nuclear weapons radically increased the danger of a central clash with the United States, the Soviet role as a status quo power began to compete with the Bolshevik revolutionary identity for dominance in the Soviet self-conception.[28] A combination of domestic and systemic factors—a decline in the legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the persistence of the arms race, and the failure of Soviet policies in Afghanistan and Eastern Europe—convinced Mikhail Gorbachev that he needed to resolve the tension between revolutionary and status-quo aspects of the Soviet identity in favor of the latter.[29] More specifically, as Gorbachev and his allies realized the difficulty involved in successful domestic reform, they drew on the internal popularity of their foreign policy to assure the political viability of the domestic program.[30] Thus, Gorbachev came to identify his personal political fortunes with a foreign policy that integrated the USSR into the Western community of states.[31]

Because he wanted to identify the Soviet Union more closely with the Western status quo than against it, Gorbachev, more than previous Soviet leaders, emphasized the importance of two factors in the theory of international relations that led to an understanding of a less conflictual international environment: economic interdependence and the danger of nuclear war. The greater attention to these factors diminished the relative importance to Soviet theory of two other determinants that had dominated Soviet theory from Stalin's time until *perestroika*: the influence of the class character of states on their international behavior and the

[27] On negative identification, see Wendt, "Anarchy," 400.

[28] For good histories of Soviet foreign policy, see Adam Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence*, 2nd ed. (New York: Praeger, 1974); and Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, *Soviet Policy Since World War II*, 3rd ed. (New York: Pergamon, 1988).

[29] On the sources of Soviet foreign policy during Gorbachev's tenure, see Glenn Chafetz, *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine: Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993); Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, "Soviet Reform and the End of the Cold War: Explaining Large-Scale Historical Change," *Review of International Studies* 17 (March 1991): 225–250; and "The International Sources of Soviet Change," *International Security* 16 (Winter 1991/92): 74–118. Tensions between the Soviet Union's revolutionary identity and its desire to be viewed as a "normal" great power existed long before Gorbachev. See, for example, Stanley Hoffman, *Janus and Minerva: Essays in the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), chap. 11.

[30] See for this argument Chafetz, *Gorbachev, Reform, and the Brezhnev Doctrine*, chap. 4.

[31] For an example of Gorbachev's articulation of this goal, see, "Doklad M. S. Gorbacheva na Plenume Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS 5 Fevrala 1990 Goda," *Izvestia*, 6 February 1990, 1–2.

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distribution of power among those states.[32] During the Gorbachev period, many more Soviet theorists began to argue that previous analyses of international relations dogmatically overemphasized the role of class. To characterize world politics more accurately, the Soviet thinkers suggested, more attention should be devoted to national, political, ethical, economic, religious, and other factors.[33] Gorbachev himself took up this argument at the celebration of the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution in November 1987 and at the Nineteenth Party Conference in June 1988, stressing the importance in international relations of nationalism, and nuclear and economic interdependence.[34]

Following this deemphasis on the role of class, Gorbachev could and did contend that Western states interacted according to a set of rules and norms based on common values that the Soviet Union itself was prepared to embrace: "The new political thinking has enabled us to appreciate more fully how vitally important to contemporary international relations are the moral values that have over the centuries been evolved by nations, and generalized and spelled out by humanity's great minds."[35] Gorbachev suggested that the failure to abide by these moral values contributed to the Soviet Union's political and economic crises.[36] Consequently, he proclaimed his belief in and support for international norms that the Soviets had consistently violated, noting that "sovereignty and independence, equal rights and noninterference are becoming universally recognized rules of international relations."[37]

[32] On the role of interdependence, see for example Eduard A. Shevardnadze, "Nauchno-Prakticheskaya Konferentsiia MID SSSR," *Vestnik MID SSSR*, no. 15, 15 August 1988, 33; Gennadiy Belyakov, "Vzaimozavisimost' Gosudarstv Mirovogo 'Soobshestva," Nauchnyy Kommunizm," no. 6, 1988, 102-106; and El'giz Pozdnyakov and Irina Shadrina, "O Gumanizatsii i Demokratizatsii Mezhdunarodnykh Otnosheniy," *Mirovaia Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya* [*MEiMO*], no. 4, 1989, 19. On the importance of avoiding nuclear war, see again Shevardnadze, "Nauchno-Prakticheskaya Konferentsiia," 33–34; Shevardnadze, *Izvestia*, 24 October 1989, 3; and Georgiy Shakhnazarov, "Vostok-Zapad: k Voprosu o Deideologizatsii Mezhgosudarstvenykh Otnosheniy," *Kommunist*, no. 3, 1989, 69. The factors themselves were not new, but the emphasis was. For works on Soviet international relations theory, see Lynch, *The Soviet Study of International Relations*; and Margot Light, *The Soviet Theory of International Relations* (Brighton, England: Wheatsheaf Books, 1988).

[33] See Georgiy Mirski, "K Voprosu o Puti i Orientatsii Razvivayushchikhsya Stran" [*MEiMO*] no. 5, 1987, 70–80; Pavel Avakov, "Novoe Myshlenie i Problema Izucheniya Razvivayushchikhsya Stran," [*MEiMO*] no. 11, 1987, 48–62; and Oleg Bogomolov, "Mir Sotsializma na Puti Perestroiki," *Kommunist*, no. 16, 1987, 92–102.

[34] M. S. Gorbachev, *Izvestia*, 5 November 1987, 1; and "On Progress in Implementing the Decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress and the Tasks of Promoting Perestroika, Report at the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU," 28 June 1988, in Documents and Materials of the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU, *Soviet Life* (Special Supplementary Issue), 32.

[35] Ibid.; "A norm," according to Robert Axelrod, "exists in a given social setting to the extent that individuals usually act in a certain way and are often punished when not seen to be acting in this way." Robert Axelrod, "An Evolutionary Approach to Norms," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986): 1097.

[36] "Doklad M. S. Gorbacheva," *Izvestia*, 6 February 1990, 1.

[37] Gorbachev, "19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU," 34.

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To justify behavior with reference to norms created by states that previous Soviet regimes had dedicated themselves to overthrow, Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in September 1989 observed that the "de-ideologization" of international relations created a harmony of interests among democratic states, thus implying that the Soviet Union belonged in that category. This first observation led him to conclude further that "tolerance is a norm of civilized political conduct."[38] Gorbachev claimed that these international norms rendered "power politics in all their forms and manifestations" historically obsolescent.[39] He echoed this theme in his speech before the Council of Europe in July 1989, arguing: "In today's interdependent world, geopolitical notions born of another era are just as useless in real politics as the laws of classical mechanism are in quantum theory."[40]

It was nothing new for Soviet leaders to argue that the values held by the constituent units of the international system determined the system's dynamics. This was the reasoning behind Lenin's theory of imperialism and Andrei Zhdanov's theory of "two-camps." It was new, however, for Soviet leaders to accept the other camp's values and to admit that the Soviet Union had been mistaken in wanting to overthrow the order predicated on those values. Yet, that was precisely what Gorbachev and Shevardnadze suggested. Gorbachev denied any contradiction between Marxist values and the newly emphasized common moral values, though he nonetheless claimed that common human values preceded class considerations in Soviet calculations of interest: "[W]e have sought a deeper understanding of the interrelationship between working-class interests and those of humanity as a whole, an idea built into Marxism at the outset. This led us to the conclusion that common human values have a priority in our age, this being the core of the new political thinking."[41] As an example of the new priority, in a speech to a conference of the Foreign Ministry in June 1988, Shevardnadze affirmed the demise of the class struggle in the Soviet understanding of peaceful coexistence: "We justifiably refuse to see in it a specific form of the class struggle. Coexistence founded on such fundamental and universal principles as nonaggression, respect for sovereignty, noninterference in internal affairs, etc., cannot be identified with class struggle."[42]

Though Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and the other proponents of new thinking conceded the persistence of violent international conflict, they abandoned almost

[38] "Sud'by Mira Neotdelimy ot Sudeb Nashey Perestroiki: Vystuplenie Glavy Sovestkoy Delegatsii E. A. Shevardnadze na 44-y Sessii General'noy Assembley OON," *Pravda*, 27 September 1989, 5.

[39] Gorbachev, "19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU," 32.

[40] "Obshcheevropeyskiy Protsess Idet Vpered," *Pravda*, 7 July 1989, 1–2. See also Vladimir Lukin's similar comment in a dialog with Aleksandr Bovin, "Perestroika Mezdunarodnykh Otnosheniy—puti i Podkhody," *MEiMO*, no. 1, 1989, 61.

[41] Ibid., 32; and "Vystupleniya M. S. Gorbacheva v Organizatsiy Ob'edinennykh Natsiy," *Izvestia*, 8 December 1988, 1.

[42] Shevardnadze, "Nauchno-Prakticheskaya Konferentisiia MID SSSR," 32, 34; and Vadim Medvedev, "Sovremennaya Kontseptsia Sotsializma," *Pravda*, 5 October 1988, 4.

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all other components of the Stalinist realism of their predecessors in favor of an idealism that approached utopianism.[43] Short of a doctrine of restraint and some vague affirmation of support for the UN peacekeeping capabilities, neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze suggested a mechanism on which the international community could rely to maintain order.[44]

The nonrevolutionary identity was not as salient to every politician in the Soviet Union as it was to Gorbachev and his allies. Consequently, many in the Communist party refused to accept the Gorbachev-Shevardnadze attempt to move Moscow away from revolution to integration.[45] The revolutionary identity failed to disappear, because it was embedded too deeply in the Soviet political structure and in the psyches of individual politicians whose careers depended on the persistence of the revolutionary myth.[46] Opponents of new thinking continued to adhere to the theories that Gorbachev had rejected. Their concept of the Soviet role in the world was rooted in a negative identification of the West and things Western.

Accordingly, in terms of their theories of international relations, *perestroika's* opponents held to the belief in the permanent, class-driven hostility between the capitalist and socialist camps, and they argued that states required relative advantages in power in an essentially anarchical environment. In short, Gorbachev's communist political adversaries attacked him for his antisocialist values and what they believed to be his dangerously naive assumptions about the prospects of international cooperation. Yegor Ligachev, for example, argued that it was ideologically unacceptable to deemphasize the role of class confrontation in international relations and in the doctrine of peaceful coexistence in particular.[47] The orthodox communists conceived international relations in the same way as did previous Soviet leaders: as a zero-sum confrontation between East and West.[48] To identify positively with the West was to call into question the ideological legitimacy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.[49]

[43] See, for example, "Doklad M. S. Gorbacheva," *Izvestia*, 6 February 1990, 1 and "19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU," 36; Shevardnadze, "Nauchno-Prakticheskaya Konferentsiia," 33. It should be noted that many reformers adhered to theories of international relations that combined Gorbachev's deemphasis on class and his opponents' realism. See Pozdnyakov and Shadrina, "O Gumanizatsii i Demokratizatsii," 26; and Bovin, "Perestroika Mezdunarodnykh Otnosheniy," *MEiMO*, no. 1, 1989, 61.

[44] "Doklad M. S. Gorbacheva," *Izvestia*, 6 February 1990, 1; and "Vystupleniya M. S. Gorbacheva," *Izvestia*, 8 December 1988, 2.

[45] For a manifesto of opposition to *perestroika* and new thinking, see, for example, the Nina Andreyeva letter in *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 13 March 1988, 2.

[46] On embedded roles and identities, see Richter, "Perpetuating the Cold War," 271–301; and Wendt, "Anarchy," 411.

[47] See Yegor Ligachev's comments in, "Za Delo—Bez Raskachki," *Pravda*, 6 August 1988, 2.

[48] Yegor K. Ligachev on Moscow Television Service in Russian, 2023 GMT, 20 June 1990, in FBIS-SOV-90-120, 21 June 1990, 90. See also Aleksandr Melnikov, first secretary of the Kemerovo Oblast Party Committee, on Moscow Television Service in Russian, 2042 GMT, 20 June 1990, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-SOV-90-121, 22 June 1990, 97.

[49] See Glenn Chafetz, "Soviet Ideological Revision and the Collapse of Communism in Eastern Europe," *International Relations* 11 (August 1992): 151–169.

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Gorbachev's domestic reforms and foreign policies did indeed undermine the legitimacy of the party's rule and, by extension, the very idea of the Soviet Union itself. Though Gorbachev hardly desired or expected the results his communist critics feared, his policies catalyzed the emergence of opposition movements that organized themselves according to both liberal-democratic and nationalist principles. By mid-1989, at least four different conceptions of the Soviet Union's identity competed for dominance. First, reform communists, led by Mikhail Gorbachev, pursued an ill-defined domestic policy combining principles of both socialism and capitalism. Internationally, they envisioned integration into the Western economic and political system. Second, the liberal democrats, represented most prominently by Boris Yeltsin, shared Gorbachev's vision of the Soviet Union's international role but advocated a speedy transition to a market economy and full democracy domestically. Third, orthodox communists continued to identify the Soviet Union as a Marxist-Leninist state and, therefore, could not abide either liberal democracy domestically or accommodation with the West. Finally, nationalist separatists throughout the Soviet republics, though primarily in the Baltic states, refused to accept even the idea of a Soviet identity.[50] The dissensus tore the Soviet Union part.[51] The legacy of that dissensus remains in the current Russian conflict over its identity and role in the world.

Russia's Identity Crisis and the Current Foreign Policy Drift

Not surprisingly, the same political and ideological cleavages that tortured the Soviet Union's final two years continue to paralyze Russia's attempts to find its way today.[52] The political struggle among the three major factions over whether Russia is to be a liberal state, and if so, how liberal, lies at the heart of the debate over Russia's identity. Therefore, in order to understand why each group views the world in the way it does, we must first understand their respective domestic political agendas and how they fit into the Russian political landscape.

The Domestic Political Struggle

Any description of Russia's political battle lines is bound to oversimplify, because there is very little good polling data, and that which is measured changes quite rapidly.[53] Moreover, individuals shift on their positions for tactical political gain.

[50] See Paul Goble, "Ethnic Politics in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 38 (July-August 1989): 4.

[51] See, for example, Valentin Falin, "The Collapse of Eastern Europe: Moscow's View," *New Perspectives Quarterly* 7 (Spring 1990): 22.

[52] The ideological nature of this division is noted by Aleksei Vasilyev, deputy director of the Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute, "Rossiya i Musul'manskiy Mir," *Izvestia*, 10 March 1992, 6; and Andrei Kozyrev in an interview with Vladimir Abarinov and Vitaly Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev: 'Soyuz Ostavil Rossii Polkhoe Vneshnepoliticheskoe Nasledstvo'" *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 1 April 1992, 3.

[53] On the unreliability of polling in Russia, see Michael Specter, "Russia Pollsters are Seldom Right," *New York Times*, 15 May 1996.

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Yeltsin in particular has been extremely adept at these tactical shifts.[54] Nevertheless, a recognizable pattern of political divisions and alliances has emerged, which manifests itself as a split among three major groups.[55] The first group is the liberals. Their theories have been articulated by Yeltsin, whose liberal credentials have been eroded by erratic commitment to the principles he espoused in 1991; Grigory Yavlinsky, an American-educated economist who heads Yabloko, one of the three major liberal factions; and Yeltsin's former foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev.

The liberals identify Russia with modern, democratic states. Politically, this identification has led them to pursue unrestricted political participation for all adults, equality of opportunity, the rule of law, and respect for minority rights. Economically, with some variation they envision a relatively rapid transition to a market economy. Consistent with this vision, they believe that the free market, rather than the state, should determine which industries prosper and which die.[56]

Those politicians who consistently oppose the liberals can be broken further into two other groups: the statists and the authoritarians. The authoritarians include both communists and authoritarian chauvinists. For this reason, their opponents often refer to them as the "red-brown" faction or some similar variant.[57] The communists are led by Gennadi Zyuganov. The most prominent of the national chauvinists is Alexander Zhirinovsky. Alexander Lebed may once have been a nationalist, but the fact that he joined Yeltsin's cabinet and that he describes himself as a "semi-democrat" makes it easier to classify him as a statist.[58] Of the two groups, the communists have shown greater electoral strength, partly because they are better organized, partly because of nostalgia, and partly because Zhirinovsky's colorful and embarrassing public antics have tainted the national chauvinist cause.

The authoritarians are united by an antipathy to all things liberal and Western. Thus they reject both the political and economic elements of the liberal agenda.

[54] I discuss the question of determining sincerity below.

[55] The categorization that follows is derived from these sources: Georgiy Ivanov-Smolensky, "Chto Takoe Partinaya Zhizn Segodnya," *Izvestia*, 20 April 1992, 2; Yelena Pestrukhina, "Patrioty Nashli Predatelei Natsii," *Megalopolis Express*, 17 June 1992, 3; Anna Poretskaya, "'Grazhdanskii Soyuz': Vzglyady Raznye, Zato Odinakovye Interesy," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 July 1992, 2; Aleksandr Krotkov, "Aleksandr Rutskoi: Nadeyus na Koalitsionnoe Pravitilstvo," *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 11 November 1992, 1; "Prezident Rossii Vidit Vykhod iz Krizisa V Provedenii Obshchenarodnogo Referenduma," *Izvestia*, 10 December 1992, 1; Celestine Bohlen, "Anti-Reform Posse Seems to be Gaining on Yelstin," *New York Times*, 22 October 1992; Bohlen, "Russian Parliament Calls for Economic Shift," *New York Times*, 28 November 1992; Serge Schmemann, "Russia, History, and the Struggle Not to Repeat It," *New York Times*, 29 November 1992.

[56] See, for example, Boris Yeltsin, "Na Meste Bednoy Rossii Bez Bogatykh Postroit Bogatuyu Rossiyu Bez Bednykh," *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 17 November 1992, 1–2; Sergei Chugaev, "Ye. Gaidar Predstavil Deputatam Pravitelstvennuyu Programmu," *Izvestia*, 6 October 1992, 1; Celestine Bohlen, "Russian Economist Takes on Critics," *New York Times*, 3 December 1992.

[57] Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3; and Andrei Kozyrev, "Na Chey Storone Rossiya v Yugoslavskam Konflikte?" *Izvestia*, 8 June 1992, 1.

[58] See Barbara Crosette, "Globally, Majority Rules," *New York Times*, 4 August 1996.

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The biggest vote getter, the Communist party, ran on a platform of renationalizing most of the privatized segments of the economy, including banking, spending heavily on the military-industrial complex, instituting price controls on consumer goods, increasing exports of military goods, limiting imports, and terminating Russia's relationship with international monetary and trade institutions.[59] Politically, the many factions that make up the hard-line National Salvation Front, including Russian Unity, Russia, Civic Society, Communists of Russia, and Fatherland, disagree on a range of issues, including whether to resuscitate the Soviet Union or to attempt a resurrection of the Russian Empire.[60] The authoritarians do, however, agree on the need for "discipline," on the need for a strong authoritarian government, on their antipathy to capitalism, and on their contempt for the Western model of democracy.

The statist conception of Russian identity is most easily characterized by being not quite democratic and not quite authoritarian. The former foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, called their ideological identity "semibureaucratic, semicapitalist, and semimafia."[61] On the one hand, the statists say they accept liberal democracy: universal adult political participation, equality of opportunity, rule of law, the respect for human rights, and private property. On the other, they regard as unwise and not practicable the liberal antipathy to all legal, political, and economic legacies of the Soviet Union and the Russian empire. In particular, they prefer a slower transition to the market, a much more statist economy, and a more historically slavophilic conception of Russia's identity than do the liberals.[62]

The most prominent of the statists is Alexander Lebed, who earned 15 percent of the vote in the June 1996 presidential election and then joined Yeltsin's cabinet. Some of the statists have allied under the umbrella of Civic Union.[63] The statists derive much of their support from the large-scale industrialists who depend on state subsidies for their continued existence. By promising a slower, less painful transition to a market economy, the statists seek the support of the many workers who would be left without jobs as a result of liberal economic plans. The level of support for the statist program is difficult to measure, because a prominent

[59] See the Communist election platform, "Ot Razrusheniya—K Sozidaniyu. Put' Rossii v XXI Vek," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 28 May 1996, 3–4; and "Kommunisticheskiy Manifest-96," *Kommersant*, 13 April 1996, 3.

[60] See Georgiy Ivanov-Smolensky, "Chto Takoe Partinaya Zhizn Segodnya," *Izvestia*, 20 April 1992, 2; Yelena Pestrukhina, "Patrioty Nashli Predateley Natsii," *Megalopolis Express*, 17 June 1992, 3; Serge Schmemann, "Russia, History, and the Struggle Not to Repeat It," *New York Times*, 29 November 1992; Alessandra Stanley, "Russian Communist Aims for Broad Appeal," *New York Times*, 18 March 1996.

[61] Andrei Kozyrev, "Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii: MID Predlagaet i Otstaivaet," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 13 December 1992, 2.

[62] For a treatment of the Russian identity crisis in terms of the Slavophile-Westernizer debate, see Sergei Chugrov, "Rossiya Mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadam," *MEiMO*, no. 7, 1992, 76–85.

[63] See Anna Poretskaya, "'Grazhdanskii Soyuz': Vzglyady Raznye, Zato Odinakovye Interesy," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 22 July 1992, 2.

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advocate of the statist program, Viktor Chernomyrdin, formerly head of the Soviet gas industry, has been co-opted by Yeltsin and is serving as prime minister. In addition, the statist program has been poorly defined and subject to disappearing in the polarizing contests between the liberals and the communists.

The Effects of Domestic Preferences on Contending Theories

Each group's domestic political agenda would benefit from radically different roles for Russia in the international environment. Thus, not surprisingly, the constituents of the different groups tend to see the world in ways that confirm their preferred conceptions of Russia's identity. When the *New York Times* published a draft of the United States Department of Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Years 1994-1999, *Pravda*, an organ of the post-communist opposition, carried a story entitled "American Rockets Remain Targeted on Russia." The reporter claimed that the Pentagon document proved that Washington maintained hegemonic designs on the world.[64] The author failed to mention that the guidance was a draft and that it had been revised. The day before the *Pravda* story, *Izvestia*, a newspaper that generally supports the liberal agenda, carried a story on the same subject that focused on the Pentagon's revision of the first draft.[65] The author cited the revisions as proof that the international environment had become less conflictual, but did not try to explain the forces that led to the creation of the original draft.[66]

The theories about world politics that follow from the three groups' different conceptions of Russia's identity conform roughly to Hedley Bull's contention that international relations follow predominantly Kantian, Grotian, or Hobbesian patterns.[67] The liberal conception of foreign affairs fits into the Kantian or cooperative category.

Before discussing the substance of these beliefs, it is useful to note that, given the tactical shifts that politicians must and do make, it is often difficult to know what they sincerely believe. The bulk of Yeltsin's statements, as well as his actions, however, indicate a liberal bent. Further, shifts from this stance can be correlated with the perceptions of increases in the popular receptivity of his

[64] Vladislav Drobkov, "Americanskie Rakety Budut Po-Prezhnomu Natseleny Na Rossiyu," *Pravda*, 26 May 1992, 1.

[65] In general, *Pravda* and *Sovetskaya Rossiya* usually followed pro-communist and chauvinist, anti-Western lines; *Izvestia* generally supports the liberals; *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, the newspaper of the conservative-dominated Supreme Soviet, usually publishes articles supporting the positions of the conservatives; and *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* offers a broader, less predictable range of perspectives.

[66] Aleksandr Shalnev, "Pentagon Ispravlyaetsya," *Izvestia*, 25 May 1992, 4.

[67] See Bull, *Anarchical Society*, 24–27, 41, 54. Wendt posits a similar continuum describing "cooperative," "individualistic," and "competitive" security relations. See Wendt, "Anarchy," 400.

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opponents' message.[68] Though the communists and authoritarians have also mitigated their messages at times, they have been more consistent.[69]

The Liberals. Yeltsin and his followers believe that a natural harmony of relations, and even solidarity, characterizes relations among liberal democratic states. Moreover, they are convinced that a high degree of compliance with norms and rules governs the international behavior of most states. Finally, they place great faith in the ability of diplomacy, especially involving international organizations and institutions, to resolve the conflicts that do arise between states, and to enforce international order.[70] As a result, Yeltsin sees no military threat to Russia.[71]

The liberal view of Russia as a modern, liberal state and part of the civilized society of similar states—a member of the club—serves the liberals' domestic agenda, and more narrowly, their personal careers.[72] Politically, the belief in a relatively benign international environment invalidates the authoritarian claims—all too common in Russian and Soviet history— that a centralized, concentrated political power is a prerequisite for national security.[73] In a speech at the Russian Foreign Ministry, Yeltsin said that the prime responsibility of Russia's foreign policy was "to ensure favorable foreign conditions for the success of the political and economic reforms that have been started."[74] As Andrei Kozyrev explained,

[68] Sergei Yushinkov, who was chairman of the state Duma's defense committee and a Yeltsin loyalist, argued in an interview with the author on 11 April 1994 that the liberals had to pursue a more nationalist foreign policy for tactical reasons. He believed that the criticisms of Kozyrev and foreign policy generally were an important reason for the authoritarians' electoral success in 1993. Ironically, there were no data to indicate that Yeltsin's world view was the source of popular support for his opposition. Moreover, foreign policy was not an issue in the 1996 presidential election campaign. On the absence of foreign policy as an issue in the election, see Yuri Davydov, "Prorubit li Rossiia Okno v NATO?" *Segodnya*, 23 February 1996, 9.

[69] See Michael R. Gordon, "Yeltsin's Communist Rival Tries to Moderate His Message," *New York Times*, 21 May 1996. Ultranationalist Vladimir Zhironovsky also had great difficulty moderating their messages.

[70] For specific Western articulations of the theories the Russian liberals hold, see Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80 (December 1986):1151-69; and Thomas M. Franck, *The Power of Legitimacy among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

[71] Boris Yeltsin, "Svoboda i Demokratiya: Glavnoe Uslovie Progressa i Protsvetlaniya," *Rossiskaya Gazeta*, 26 February 1996, 2.

[72] Andrei Kozyrev actually described his preferred role for Russia in the world in those terms. See "Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 13 December 1992, 2.

[73] Paradoxically, Yeltsin argued that he tried to concentrate power in order to preserve democracy when he threatened to suspend the parliament in March 1993. On the relationship between Soviet authoritarianism and the invention and exploitation of international tensions, see Yevgeny Primakov, Vladlen Martynov, and Herman Diligenskiy, "Nekotorikh Problemy Novogo Myshleniya," *MEiMO*, no. 6, 1989, 6. The exploitation and even creation of international tensions to justify domestic authoritarianism is also an established theme of political science: see, for example, Barrington Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966), 413-444.

[74] Pavel Shinkarenko, "Chto Skazal Yeltsin Rossiiskim Diplomatam," *Rossiiskiye Vesti*, 29 October 1992, 1.

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"International standards in the area of human rights coincide with Russia's domestic interests and the tasks involved in its democratic transformation."[75] He suggested that if the policy of cooperation with other democratic states were to be undermined, domestic reform in Russia could be similarly undermined.[76] Because they intend to rely on political participation for authority, the liberals are not as dependent on nationalism as more authoritarian governments would be. Economically, nationalism, which often leads to negative identification with the interests of other states, would impede the liberal economic plan of integrating Russia into the world capitalist economy—a stated liberal desire.[77] Consistent with the desire not to inflame nationalist passions, the liberals would like to avoid unilateral applications of force for resolving the conflicts on Russia's periphery, particularly with regard to the treatment of the Russian Diaspora. They would rather rely on multilateral international institutional solutions to the problem.[78] Finally, the liberal domestic agenda calls for large cuts in state subsidies to failing industries. Many of the large inefficient industries produce defense-related equipment. It is only consistent for the liberal Russian government to argue that the world is relatively friendly at the same time that it is trying to cut subsidies to defense industries.

The Statists. The statist emphasis on Russia's spiritual and historical uniqueness and their belief that Russia must not too closely imitate the Western model of economic development has led them to a distinctly less cooperative view of international politics than that embraced by the liberals. The statist view can be said to fall into the Grotian pattern of international relations in that the statists believe that states define their interests individualistically, but nevertheless cooperate in institutions because they recognize some common interests and wish to lower the transaction costs of their relations.[79] The ambivalence of the statists' domestic program leads to a similarly ambivalent theory of international relations in which both the foreign policies of China and Japan are cited as models.[80] As

[75] Maksim Yusin, "Moskva Predlagaet Zashchishchat' Demokratiyu s Pomoshch'u Politicheskikh Sil OON," *Izvestia*, 14 February 1992, 5.

[76] Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3.

[77] See, for example, point 12 in the "Basic Content of the Draft Conception of the Russian Federation's Foreign Policy," "Osnovnoe Soderzhanie Proekta Kontseptsii Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii" in Andrei Kozyrev, "Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 13 December 1992, 2.

[78] See Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3; Paul A. Goble, "The Russians Aren't Going," *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992; and Frank J. Prial, "Yeltsin Asks UN to Help Russians in the Baltics," *New York Times*, 8 November 1992.

[79] On the role of international institutions in lowering transaction costs, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

[80] Yevgeny Ambartsumov, "Rekomendatsii (Po Itogam Zakrytykh Slushaniy Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del Rossii A. V. Kozyreva na Komitete po Mezhdunarodnym Delam o Vneshnepoliticheskoy Kontseptsii MID RF, 30 Yunya 1992 goda)," cited in Eggert, "Rossiya v Roli 'Evraziyskogo Zhandarma'?" *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6; Chugaev, "Ye. Gaidar Predstavil Deputatam Pravitelstvennuyu Programmu," *Izvestia*, 6 October 1992, 1; and Chugrov, "Rossiya Mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadam," *MEiMO*, no. 7, 1992, 76–85.

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Kozyrev said, the statist position manifests itself as both a "semiconfrontation with, and semi-ingratiation toward the West."[81]

The statists believe that international anarchy among nationally distinct states, rather than international community among states sharing common values, most accurately defines the international system. They believe that power, particularly military power, is the most important means for achieving national goals in that system. They further believe that self-help, leading to a balance of power, is the only mechanism capable of promoting international stability and order. Thus Russia's role must be to balance power, not join the democratic bandwagon.

Yevgeny Primakov's comments in an interview illustrate: "First, during the transition from a bipolar to a multipolar world, Russia must play the role of counterbalance to the negative trends that are displaying themselves in international affairs. During this transition period, not all the power centers that make up this multipolarity have emerged yet. And some are trying to achieve dominance in this situation."[82] In this view, therefore, international institutions cannot protect ethnic Russians from discrimination in the former Soviet republics. Only self-help, primarily through the use of military force, can protect the Russian Diaspora.[83]

One branch of statists also derives their theory of international relations from their domestic political agenda and similarly respects consistency between the two. First, they emphasize the historical and spiritual uniqueness of Russia. They do not define this uniqueness except to say that Russia is different from Europe and the United States because of its religion, its history, its geopolitical position, and its underdevelopment. Thus, Moscow should lean neither to the developed democratic states as the liberals suggest, nor to the developing undemocratic states, as the authoritarians prefer. Instead, Moscow should act as a bridge between East and West, and North and South. As former presidential counselor Sergei Stankevich asserted, "It is obviously just as senseless and unproductive to try at the end of the twentieth century to revive the idea of Russia's reorientation to the East and opposition to Europeanization (in the extreme forms of that opposition), as it is to pull an Atlantic dinner jacket with a bow tie quickly over Russia's broad shoulders."[84]

Second, the statist economic plan, like its communist counterpart, requires that the state continue to subsidize most of the old inefficient industries of the Soviet Union and to regulate prices and wages. There are three reasons for this. The statists are concerned about the mass unemployment and attendant social dislocation and instability that large-scale industrial failures bring. They are

[81] Andrei Kozyrev, "Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 13 December 1992, 2.

[82] "Rossiya Ishchet Novoe Mesto v Mire," *Izvestia*, 6 March 1996, 3; see also Maksim Yusin, "Deputatam Obeshchana Velikaya Derzhava," *Izvestia*, 10 February 1996, 3.

[83] See, for example, Sergei Stankevich, "Rossiya Uzhe Sdelala Antiimperskii Vybor," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 6 November 1992, 2.

[84] See Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava v Poiskakh Sebya," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 March 1992, 4; see also the views of Aleksandr Rutskoi in Petro, "The Rising Star of Russia's Vice President," 113–16.

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similarly concerned that liberating prices before completing the privatization of the economy creates inflation and leads to exorbitant profits for a relatively few entrepreneurs.[85] Moreover, the statists do not find economic integration with the West to be as beneficial to Russia's interests as do the liberals.[86] Finally, by tapping into continued popular confusion and resentment over the transition to the market, the statists draw a distinction between themselves and the liberals and thus position themselves to benefit politically from the liberal failure. To some degree they have.

The important implication of all this in terms of international relations relates again to political and psychological consistency. Economically, because the statists are in no hurry to make the transition to the market and because they embrace a more protectionist plan for Russia's economic development, they do not require access to the West as a market for Russian goods. Indeed, the statists argue that the most likely customers for Russian manufactures are Russia itself, Russia's formerly Soviet neighbors, and those states in the Third World that, like Russia, cannot often afford higher quality and higher priced Western merchandise. Because the statists do not need the West as much as the liberals do, they are less likely to see the West in a consistently friendly light. Moreover, because the world arms market cannot possibly absorb all of Russia's military production and because the statists identify their political fortunes with the continued Russian industrial production, they will come under increasing pressure to justify military production. The obvious way to do so is to point to external threats. They find these threats in the expansion of NATO and the treatment of the Russian Diaspora in the former Soviet states.

The Authoritarians. The authoritarians' antipathy to liberalism defines their Russian identity and colors their view of international relations as a struggle against the encroaching domination of the world by the United States and its allies. They share a common belief with the statists in the primacy of an anarchical struggle for power as the motive force in international politics. In contrast to the statists, the authoritarians like to stress the anarchical character of world politics, in part because the belief in an unalterably hostile international environment serves the anti-liberal desire to end the experiment with the market and democracy in Russia.[87] The exploitation of external threats to justify the internal centralization of power and elimination of dissent has a long and successful history in Russia and the Soviet Union.[88] One anti-liberal commentator complained that those who urged alliance with the West and entry into NATO did so in the

[85] See Aleksandr Rutskoi's comments in Krotkov, "Aleksandr Rutskoi: Nadeyus na Koalitsionnoe Pravitilstvo," *Rabochaya Tribuna*, 11 November 1992, 1.

[86] See, for example, Nikolai Andreyev and Sergei Chugaev, "Sedmoi Sezd Nachal Rabotu i Otkazalsya Obsuzhdat Vopros ob Otstavke Prezidenta," *Izvestia*, 1 December 1992, 1; and Andreyev and Chugaev, "VII Sezd: Naprazhenie Narastaet Ustoit li Pravitelstvo?" *Izvestia*, 3 December 1992, 1.

[87] See "Ot Razrusheniya—K Sozidaniyu. Put' Rossii v XXI Vek," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 28 May 1996, 3–4.

[88] See Primakov, Martynov, and Diligenskiy, "Novogo Myshleniya," 6.

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interest of consolidating democracy, implying that such reasoning held little or no legitimacy.[89] The authoritarians' use of anti-Semitism, racism, and xenophobia domestically conforms to their desire for a new Russian imperialism based on pan-Slavism, racism, and fear of the West. They attack the Russian liberals for their misinterpretation of Russia's national interest, their lack of nationalist feeling, their naive and romantic inability to understand the realities of power, their blind alliance with the West, and their misplaced faith in Western-dominated international law and institutions.[90]

Foreign Policy Implications

All three groups refuse to accept Russia's decline in the international order, and all agree that Russia must again achieve the status of great power, but each camp defines the term "great power" differently. The liberals believe that Russia can regain its greatness only by working within and from the institutions of the international democratic order. Russia can exert the greatest influence on the developed, democratic states as well as the less developed states if it becomes a full member of the Group of Seven (G-7), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), NATO, and the United Nations Security Council.

The authoritarians do not accept democracy domestically and thus reject harmony with any democratic states internationally. Their view of Russia as a great power, therefore, hinges on its ability to oppose the interests and ambitions of the United States and its allies. The authoritarians believe international institutions to be tools of the West and therefore ineffective means for pursuing Russia's interests. They believe, for example, that the IMF is a tool for transforming Russia into a raw materials colony of the United States and that the nonproliferation regime is designed to preserve U.S. military superiority and market share in the arms and space industries.[91] The statist conception of Russia's great power status depends neither on its integration with nor its opposition to the West. As Andranik Migranyan explained this view, "Russia must acknowledge once again the axiom, long understood but forgotten through the light-mindedness of Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and Kozyrev, that a state does not posses permanent allies and friends, only interests."[92]

[89] See B. Zanegin, "Nuzhno li Nam Vstupat' v NATO," *Pravda*, 18 January 1992, 4.

[90] See, for example, Yuri Glukhov, "Lyubov bez Vzaimnosti," *Pravda*, 26 May 1992, 3; and "Kroty Istorii Royut Vslepuyu," *Pravda*, 24 February 1992, 1, 3; Eduard Volodin, "'Potentsialniy Soyuznik' ne Dremlet," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 24 March 1992, 3; and Yevgeny Fadeyev, "Udar Pod Dykh!" *Pravda*, 2 June 1992, 3. Their theory conforms perfectly to the world described by Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future." See the reaction to the nationalism of his opponents, where Foreign Minister Kozyrev called this philosophy "brownish pseudonational-patriotism" and "pseudopatriotic mythology," in Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3; and Kozyrev, "Na Chey Storone Rossiya v Yugoslavskam Konflikte?" *Izvestia*, 8 June 1992, 1.

[91] Interviews with author, 10–11 April 1994. See also "Dokument: Sotrudniki Spetzinstituta Predlagayut Rossii Protovostoyat' NATO i SShA," *Segodnya*, 20 October 1995, 3.

[92] Andranik Migranyan, "Vneshnaya Politika Rossii," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 March 1995, 1–2.

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Primakov argues that because Russia is a great power, the world must recognize Moscow as the dominant state in the space of the former Soviet Union and a necessary partner for political, economic, and military activity in Eurasia.[93] The variance in definitions among the three groups both reflects and is reflected by the different emphasis they place on four interrelated motivating factors in state behavior: international democratic solidarity, the effectiveness of international institutions and organizations, the power of nationalism, and the role and uses of force in diplomacy.

Ideology and power. At the heart of the debate lies the principle of international democratic solidarity. Like Immanuel Kant, Woodrow Wilson, and other Western scholars and leaders, the Russian liberals believe that democratic states "are," as Foreign Minister Kozyrev said, "drawn to other democratic states and see them as friends and potential allies."[94] Yeltsin and Kozyrev both provided insights into the source of these beliefs. Yeltsin implied that governments that respect the human rights of their own citizens do not threaten other states that do the same.[95] Democratic states, then, have little reason to perceive threats from other democratic states, and Russia, therefore, has as little to fear from the United States as do Canada and Germany. Recall that Kozyrev argued that democratic harmony acquired special significance for Russia, because democratic norms facilitated the liberals' agenda, and a conflict-prone international environment would undermine that agenda.[96] Kozyrev failed to clarify precisely where he saw the danger. He could have meant that a return to confrontation with other democratic states would pose a danger, because international threats encourage the centralization of domestic power; or he may have implied that a cut-off in Western aid and trade would lead to decreased economic performance and the delegitimation of Yeltsin's democratic regime. He made clear, however, that successful domestic reform in Russia depends on cooperation with the West, and that continued cooperation with the West depends on convincing the Russian public of the validity of the liberal theory of international relations.

The statists contended, however, that even a democratic Russia should not identify *all* of its political interests with Western Europe and the United States.[97]

[93] "Rossiya Ishchet Novoe Mesto v Mire," *Izvestia*, 6 March 1996, 3.

[94] See Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3; Yelizaveta Leontyeva, "Kogda My Ushli ot Messianstvo," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 21 January 1992, 5; Nikolai Burbyga, "Boris Yeltsin: U Rossii Net Kakoy-to Osoboy Taynoy Politiki v Yadernakh Voprosakh," *Izvestia*, 22 February 1992, 1, 3; "Vizit Borisa Yeltsina v Velikobritaniyu," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 11 November 1992, 1; Yelena Shchedrunova, "Partner, a v Perspective—Soyuznik," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 November 1992, 1; Kozyrev, "Vneshnyaya Politika Rossii," *Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 13 December 1992, 2. For Western arguments on relations among democratic states, see Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993).

[95] Nikolai Burbyga, "Boris Yeltsin," *Izvestia*, 22 February 1992, 1, 3.

[96] See Maksim Yusin, "Moskva Predlagaet Zashchishchat' Demokratiyu s Pomoshch'u Politicheskikh Sil OON," *Izvestia*, 14 February 1992, 5; Pavel Shinkarenko, "Chto Skazal Yeltsin Rossiiskim Diplomatam," *Rossiiskiye Vesti*, 29 October 1992, 1; and Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3.

[97] See Stankevich, "Derzhava," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 March 1992, 4; "Yavlenie Derzhavy," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 23 June 1992, 1; Andranik Migranyan, "Podlinnye i Mnimye Orientiry vo Vneshney Politike," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 4 August 1992, 7; Yevgeny Ambartsumov, "Rekomendatsii

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They pointed to Moldova and the Baltic states as evidence that shared democratic systems and international institutions, dominated by democratic states or not, cannot effectively protect Russian interests or maintain stability in Eurasia. Sergei Stankevich argued that the violence against Russians in Bendary, Moldova on 22 June 1992 resulted from the "excessively amiable . . . illusions" about foreign affairs held by the liberals who run the Russian Foreign Ministry.[98] Other officials have made similar claims about the inability of the liberals to understand the role and need of military power in defending the Russian Diaspora.[99] Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the parliament's foreign affairs committee and former ambassador to the United States, claimed that the expansion of NATO was dangerous, not because of any hostile intent but because, "Any advance by a very powerful military force toward our very weak borders and our very weak army is at present bad for us."[100] This classic balance-of-power formulation of threat differs from the ideological conceptions of both the authoritarians and the liberals.

The authoritarians share with the statists a stronger belief in the role of power than the liberals hold. Unlike the statists, however, the authoritarians also believe that the liberal, democratic character of the leading Western states threatens Russia's identity and interests.[101] They see Russia as part of the group of states including Iran and Libya that opposes the West.[102] The communists hope for a restoration of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy priorities.[103] The national chauvinists reject communism and the idea of a Soviet restoration but yearn for a restored Russian empire based on authoritarian rule of some kind.

Evidence for the authoritarian antipathy to liberalism and its international implications abounds. One author, for example, complained that the liberals denied "the essence of our national and social uniqueness and of the lasting place

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(Po Itogam Zakrytykh Slushaniy Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del Rossii A. V. Kozyreva na Komitete po Mezhdunarodnym Delam o Vneshnepoliticheskoy Kontseptsii MID RF, 30 Yunya 1992 goda)," cited in Konstantin Eggert, "Rossiya v Roli 'Evraziyskogo Zhandarma'?" *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6. For a similar argument, see Andrei Ostalsky, "Yadernaya Ukraina—Eto eschche ne Konets Sveta," *Izvestia*, 27 March 1992, 7; and Vasilyev, "Rossiya i Musul'manskiy Mir," *Izvestia*, 10 March 1992, 6.

[98] Sergei Stankevich, "Yavlenie Derzhavy," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 23 June 1992, 1. See also Stankevich, "Rossiya Uzhe Sdelala Antiimperskii Vybor," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 6 November 1992, 2.

[99] See Sergei Agafanov, "Tokio ne Udovletvoren Raz'yasneniyami Moskvy," *Izvestia*, 26 May 1992, 5; Sergei Mitin, "Mircha Snegur: Kto Mne Garantiruet Chto Rossiyskie Tanki ne Voydut v Kishinev?" *Izvestia*, 9 June 1992, 2; and Ivan Yelistratov and Sergei Chugaev, "Rossiyskiy Parlement Mozhet Rassmotret' Vopros o Prisoedinenii Yuzhnoy Osetii k Rossii," *Izvestia*, 15 June 1992, 1.

[100] Mikhail Karpov with Vladimir Lukin, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 14 March 1995, 1–2.

[101] For a summary of the many variations of this view, see Sergei Chugrov, "Rossiya Mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadam," *MEiMO*, no. 7, 1992, 76–85. For the statist view that this is not necessarily so, see Maksim Yusin, "Deputatam Obeshchana Velikaya Derzhava," *Izvestia*, 10 February 1996, 3.

[102] "Dokument: Sotrudniki Spetzinstituta Predlagayut Rossii Protovostoyat' NATO i SShA," *Segodnya*, 20 October 1995, 3.

[103] See the comments of Gennadi Zyuganov in Vladimir Nadein, "Tovarishch Zyuganov Obeshchaet Obespechit Amerikanskim Investoram Luchshie Usloviya Chem Nyneshnie," *Izvestia*, 3 February 1996, 3.

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in history of our 1000-year-old country."[104] Other commentators recalled with fondness the imperial past of Russia in protesting the leadership's foreign policies. Aleksandr Chudakov complained, for example, that the liberal leadership forgot the historical pan-Slavic mission of Russia when it voted for United Nations sanctions in response to Serbian behavior toward Croatia and Bosnia.[105]

The authoritarians' Bolshevik and pre-Bolshevik conceptions of Russia's identity led them to reject completely the idea that shared democratic values create some common interests. One commentator in *Sovetskaya Rossiya* complained that the leadership's concept of foreign affairs would result in a repeat of 22 June 1941 (the German invasion of the Soviet Union), implying that Russia was allowing itself to be exploited by its enemies.[106] Another said, "It is not the pompous nonsense of the 'new political thinking' such as a 'balance of interests' that lies at the foundation of relations between states, but the correlation of real forces."[107] Vladimir Razuvayev wrote in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* that Kozyrev's conception of the world was a myth, and Yuri Glukhov protested in *Pravda* that Russian leaders based their foreign policy on a "romantic" and inaccurate conception of world politics.[108] Other representatives of the authoritarians feared that the United States wanted to make Russia into an economic colony, though they did not define what they meant by colony.[109] Another argued that although the United States was democratic, the Los Angeles riots in the wake of the Rodney King verdict in May 1992 showed America to be a grossly unjust and unfair place.[110] The author implied that the social stratification and resulting injustice in the United States threatened a Russia that would adopt Western values. This chauvinist, reactionary attack on the cruel and alien nature of Western liberalism's focus on the individual at the expense of the collective recalled debates between Westernizers and Slavophiles that go back to the time of Tsar Peter the Great.[111]

The statists neither reject close cooperation with the United States and the West nor condemn the Western political system. Instead, they envision Russia fulfilling a unique role based on its geography and history. Geopolitical calcula-

[104] B. Zanegin, "Nuzhno li Nam Vstupat' v NATO," *Pravda*, 18 January 1992, 4. Also see Bogomolov, "Menenie Obozrevatelya," *Pravda*, 2 June 1992, 3; and Fadeyev, "Udar Pod Dykh!" *Pravda*, 2 June 1992, 3.

[105] Aleksandr Chudakov, "Yugoslavskiy Izlom," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 21 March 1992, 3.

[106] Eduard Volodin, "Potentsialniy Soyuznik' ne Dremlet," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 24 March 1992, 3.

[107] Zanegin, "Nuzhno li Nam Vstupat' v NATO," *Pravda*, 18 January 1992, 4.

[108] Glukhov, "Kroty Istorii Royut Vslepuyu," *Pravda*, 24 February 1992, 1, 3; and Vladimir Razuvayev, "O Knutakh i Pryanikakh: Spornye Rassuzhdeniya o Rossiysoy Vneshney Politike," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 5 March 1992, 4. See also Boris Rodionov, "Sanktsii OON Protiv Yugoslavii ne Uchit Interesov Rossii," *Izvestia*, 4 June 1992, 6.

[109] Vladimir Bolshakov, "Parizheskaya Palitra Andreya Kozyreva," *Pravda*, 17 November 1992, 3; and Zanegin, "Nuzhno li Nam Vstupat' v NATO," *Pravda*, 18 January 1992, 4.

[110] Yuri Subbotin, "Predckazuemiy Vzryv," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 6 May 1992, 3.

[111] See Yuri Chugrov, "Rossiya Mezhdu Vostokom i Zapadam," 76–85. See also Vera Tolz, "Russia: Westernizers Continue to Challenge National Patriots," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1, no. 49 (11 December 1992):1–9.

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tion, rather than ideological or cultural compatibility, determines the extent of cooperation between states. The statists favored the establishment and protection of democracy within Russia but doubted the power of democracy to contribute to stability and security internationally.[112] Sergei Goncharov argued that the application of the principles of "universally recognized human rights" threatened international stability and thus Russia's interests. He cited China's birth-control policy and Algeria's cancellation of parliamentary elections as examples of undemocratic phenomena that promoted international stability. The former preserves economic and political stability in China, which Russia requires because of the long border that they share. The latter also benefits Russia because of the threat that Islamic fundamentalism poses to ethnic Russians living in central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan.[113] Aleksei Vasilyev, deputy director of the Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute, advanced a similar geopolitical concern as a reason for his caution. He and others argued that Russia occupies a vulnerable geographical position, and as such, any policy of excessive attention to the democratic states of the West risked alienating the Islamic states to Russia's east and south and placing Russia on the front line of an anti-Western alliance.[114]

The importance of geopolitics led the statists to conclude that Russia was obligated to maintain the stability at the center of Eurasia through the exercise of its military and other kinds of power.[115] The chairman of the Joint Committee on International Affairs and Foreign Economic Relations, Yevgeny Ambartsumov, rejected Soviet era imperialism as inconsistent with Russian foreign policy, particularly its interests held commonly with the G-7. He did, however, argue that the Russian Federation should assert and win approval from the international community for a role as hegemon in Eurasia.[116]

Ambartsumov's comments confirm four statist assumptions about the world. First, they show that, unlike the liberals, the statists assume the world to be organized according to the principle of a balance of power that strong states maintain through the division of the world into spheres of interest. Powerful states use and threaten military force to maintain their spheres of interest. Second, the first belief implies that the statists do not put faith in international institutions to maintain world order. Third, despite a lack of faith in the effectiveness of

[112] Yergeny Ambartsumov, "Rekomendatsii," *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6.

[113] Sergei Goncharov, "Osobye Interesy Rossii," *Izvestia*, 25 February 1992, 6.

[114] Aleksei Vasilyev, "Rossiya i Musul'manskiy Mir," *Izvestia*, 10 March 1992, 6; see also Ivanov-Smolensky's interview with Sergei Karaganov, "Iskat' Razumnye Resheniya Dolzhno ne Tol'ko Pravitelstvo," *Izvestia*, 24 June 1992, 2; and Sergei Goncharov, "Osobye Ineresy Rossii," *Izvestia*, 25 February 1992, 6.

[115] See "Rossiya Ishchet Novoe Mesto v Mire," *Izvestia*, 6 March 1996, 3; Maksim Yusin, "Deputatam Obeshchana Velikaya Derzhava," *Izvestia*, 10 February 1996, 3; Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava," *Nezvisimaya Gazeta*, 28 March 1992, 4; "Yavlenie Derzhavy," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 23 June 1992, 1; Konstantin Eggert, "Rossiya v Roli 'Evraziyskogo Zhandarma'?" *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6; and Aleksei Vasilyev, "Rossiya i Musul'manskiy Mir," *Izvestia*, 10 March 1992, 6.

[116] Yevgeny Ambartsumov, "Rekomendatsii," *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6.

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international institutions, the statists believe that the states that dominate those institutions desire order in Eurasia, even at the cost of just and equitable solutions to disputes among Russia and its neighbors. This can be the only reason for an assumption that the G-7 would be willing to pay for Russian hegemony. Fourth, as noted in the third point and earlier above, the statists assume some common interests with the West, particularly outside the space of the former Soviet Union.

It is not clear on what the common interests are founded, but it is possible that Ambartsumov means order: first, because he assumes the West accepts the need for Russian hegemony in the former space of the USSR, and second, because he uses China as a model for Russia's relations with the West. Ambartsumov holds the standard statist view that relative power governs relations among states. His choice of China as a model, therefore, makes sense, because it follows that the less than ideal relations between China and the G-7 countries derive from the tension between a common desire for order and competition for power. By contrast, Ambartsumov's selection of the Chinese model confused the liberal commentator, Konstantin Eggert, who reported on Ambartsumov's document, because Eggert views ideology rather than power as the primary mover in international relations and the source of difficulties in the Sino-Western relationship. Eggert stressed, "One should not forget that the ideological motivations of China's foreign policy are fundamentally different (or at least should be different) from the motives of the Russian leadership."[117] The liberal Russian leaders are not, however, blind to the role of power or of nationalism to incite conflict. They understand that nationalism and ethnic rivalries remain vexing sources of conflict in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, yet they believe that their effects can be mitigated by democratic protections internally and by international institutions and norms externally.

Norms, institutions and the role of military force. Yeltsin and his advisers are acutely sensitive to the dangers presented by the domestic perception that the government is failing to protect the Russians living abroad as a result of the disintegration of the Soviet Union.[118] The leadership's determination to protect the Russian Diaspora, however, did not extend to the use of Russian troops, because it feared the damage that the unilateral exercise of military force could do to the still fragile liberal Russian identity. Abroad, Russian action could provoke more harm than help to the foreign Russians. Moreover, such action could erase Moscow's increasing reputation of compliance with Western norms and laws and detract from the liberal desire to integrate into the Western international community. This has already happened to some extent as a result of the internal secessionist war in Chechnya. At home, the outbreak of a military conflict consequent to any external use of Russian troops would justify authoritarian and statist claims of a hostile international environment. The successful political

[117] Konstantin Eggert, "Rossiya v Roli 'Evraziyskogo Zhandarma'?" *Izvestia*, 7 August 1992, 6.
[118] See Paul Goble, "The Russians Aren't Going," *Washington Post*, 19 July 1992.

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exploitation of such claims could lead the statists and possibly the authoritarians to power in Russia, and thus threaten Russian democracy and economic reform.

Yeltsin and Kozyrev and their subordinates almost always mention or refer to international norms when discussing the conflicts on the territory of the former Soviet Union and throughout the world. Even Sergei Stankevich, who said that Russia would not tolerate discrimination against Russians within the Commonwealth (CIS), added that Russia would seek to codify protections in "international documents at different levels."[119] Kozyrev explicitly ruled out the use of Russian troops, saying, "We of course stand for the defense of the Russian population everywhere outside Russia's borders, but by methods acceptable within the framework of today's sense of justice."[120] He offered further that Russia would use force if necessary, but added ambiguously, "we will not send groups of armed men," because "a violation of international law would backfire against the [local] Russians."[121] In response to a reporter's question on the topic, Yeltsin said: "We have not worked out an exact position. We believe that we have to avoid interfering in the internal affairs of other states. But now I am persuaded that we must nevertheless seek more active ways of influencing the situation. . . . Of course, I have been and will continue to oppose the violent use of troops."[122]

Responding to criticism that blind adherence to international norms was impractical, Kozyrev said that relations with states that do not accept Russian values, like China, will necessarily be strained, but he added that both states were pragmatic enough to surmount ideological differences.[123] On the place of international institutions in world politics, Russian leaders expressed ambitious goals and attitudes consistent with their views on international norms. In discussing his views on the Yugoslav conflict, with its obvious ramifications for Russia and the other CIS states, Kozyrev said that Russia wanted to act in accordance with UN and the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe's (OSCE) principles in order to gain the "necessary confidence and respect of its neighbors and of the rest of the world, like a normal great power."[124] Before the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in February 1992, Kozyrev suggested that international police forces should be trained to intervene in states that violated human rights, but he later amended his speech to include only economic sanctions.[125] On 6 November 1992, Yeltsin showed that he preferred institutional over unilateral solutions to Russia's problems when he appealed to the UN to "take all measures"

[119] Sergei Stankevich, "Derzhava v Poiskakh Sebya," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 28 March 1992, 4.

[120] Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3.

[121] Ibid.

[122] D. Muratov, Yuri Sorokin, and V. Fronin, "Boris Yeltsin: 'Ya ne Skryvayu Trudnostey i Khochu Chtoby Narod Eto Ponimal,'" *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, 27 May 1992, 2.

[123] Maksim Yusin, "Polosa Ispytaniy," *Izvestia*, 24 March 1992, 6.

[124] Andrei Kozyrev, "Na Chey Storone Rossiya," *Izvestia*, 8 June 1992, 1, 4.

[125] Yusin, "Moskva Predlagaet Zashchishchat' Demokratiyu s Pomoshch'u Politiskikh Sil OON," *Izvestia*, 14 February 1992, 5.

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to help end the perceived discrimination against the Russian Diaspora.[126] Yeltsin at the end of 1991 sent a message to the first meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, the NATO advisory body consisting of NATO's members and the recently liberated East European states, suggesting that NATO consider Russia's admission as a long-term goal. Yeltsin said he envisaged "a new security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok."[127]

Yeltsin's suggestion that Russia join NATO and NATO's plans to expand have both triggered an unabated explosion of vitriol from the anti-liberal authoritarians. B. Zanegin warned that as a result of an alliance, Russia would be drawn into fratricidal wars against those who share its true interests (presumably Iraq, Serbia, and other challengers to the preferred order of the West).[128] In *Pravda*, Yuri Glukhov agreed, arguing that because the United States maintained its faith in the "cult of strength," Russia should do the same. He complained that the United States and NATO were taking advantage of Russia's military weakness and loss of allies in the Third World to increase "their fighting ability." Finally, he argued that compliance with international law and participation in the UN served the interests of the West, but not Russia.[129] Because of the Yeltsin leadership's misconceived world view, according to the reactionary opposition, Russia has abandoned its true national interest, however vaguely defined, and it suffers and will continue to suffer consequences.[130] Pavel Bogomolov warned that the Russian rejection of its national interests would lead to the widespread persecution of the Russians abroad.[131] Statist commentaries on the prospects of Russia's alliance with the West have also stressed some negative implications for Russia's relations with Islamic and nondemocratic neighbors, but this commentary was more analytical and measured than the reactionary hysterics. The statists noted that Russia, because of its geographical position, might bear the brunt of Islamic or Chinese displeasure with Western policies if Russia became closely identified with the West.[132] Not surprisingly, the liberals suggest that opposition to their

[126] Prial, "Yeltsin Asks UN to Help Russians in the Baltics," *New York Times*, 8 November 1992, 11.

[127] Yuri Kovalenko, "Obrashchenie Rossii zastalo NATO Vrasplokh," *Izvestia*, 23 December 1991, 6. See also Yelizaveta Leontyeva, "Kogda My Ushli to Messianstvo," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 21 January 1992, 5; and Nikolai Pavlov, "Zabytaya Germaniya," *Izvestia*, 18 March 1992, 5.

[128] B. Zanegin, "Nuzhno li Nam Vstupat' v NATO," *Pravda*, 18 January 1992, 4.

[129] Glukhov, "Kroty Istorii," *Pravda*, 24 February 1992, 1, 3; see also Volodin, "'Potentsialniy Soyuznik' ne Dremlet," *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, 24 March 1992, 3.

[130] Ibid. For a discussion of the confused ideology of the reactionaries, see Igor Torbakov, "The 'Statists' and the Ideology of Russian Imperial Nationalism," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 1, no. 49 (11 December 1992): 10–16. The argument about an objective national interest recalls Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1967).

[131] Pavel Bogomolov, "Menenie Obozrevatelya," *Pravda*, 2 June 1992, 3.

[132] See, for example, Vasilyev, "Rossiya i Musul'manskiy Mir," *Izvestia*, 10 March 1992, 6; Ivanov-Smolensky's interview with Sergei Karaganov, "Iskat' Razumnye Resheniya Dolzhno ne Tol'ko Pravitelstvo," *Izvestia*, 24 June 1992, 2; and Sergei Goncharov, "Osobye Interesy Rossii," *Izvestia*, 25 February 1992, 6.

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concept of international relations sprang from opposition to democracy rather than from a stronger argument.[133]

Implications for the Future

Russia's internal identity crisis combines with the state of flux in international relations created by the end of the cold war to produce for Moscow an opportunity to define not only its place in the world but the shape of that world. Given the current international status quo, the policies of Russia itself can, particularly in Europe, determine which of the competing Russian conceptions of world politics proves to be most accurate. Russia's foreign policy, in turn, will depend on the results of its current domestic political struggle. The political struggle can produce two broad scenarios in international politics. The first scenario involves the triumph of liberal democracy in Russia. Even accounting for the dilution of preferred outcomes through compromise, if Yeltsin's version of liberalism survives in Russia, he and his successors will probably continue to cooperate actively with the West; they will continue to resist using force to protect Russians abroad; they will continue to look to international institutions to solve problems, and they will continue to comply with international norms on arms control, the environment, and human rights. With the exception of China, all the major world powers (defined as those with a combination of enough political, military, and economic power to alter the status quo for a significant period of time—the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and Japan) will share the same norms and values and hold a great stake in maintaining the international status quo.[134] Thus, Boris Yeltsin's "new security system from Vancouver to Vladivostok" will become a reality, and his de facto liberal-institutionalist vision will be validated.[135]

In the second scenario, if the statists or a coalition of statists and authoritarians win executive power, Russia will slow down the transition to a market economy. The slower transition will keep the state involved in economic planning and will therefore reduce Russia's need to integrate into the market-oriented, Western international economic and political structures like the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), the IMF, and the NATO Cooperation Council. The decision to postpone integration will reduce Russia's dependence on the West and deprive the West of leverage against possible Russian violations of international norms. Moscow under the statists, for example, is far more likely to intervene unilaterally against its neighbors to protect the Russian Diaspora than it would

[133] See, for example, Abarinov and Tretyakov, "Andrei Kozyrev," 3; and Burbyga, "Boris Yeltsin," *Izvestia*, 22 February 1992, 1, 3.

[134] For conditions for great power cooperation in the area of security, see Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes" in Stephen D. Krasner, *International Regimes* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 177; Karl Deutsch et al., *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1969).

[135] Yuri Kovalenko, "Obrashchenie Rossii," *Izvestia*, 23 December 1991, 6.

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be under the leadership of the liberals. Furthermore, statist leaders will be far less likely to support Western positions in international institutions like the OSCE and the UN on conflicts in Bosnia, the former Soviet Union, and the Middle East. If the statists accept the claims of some of the authoritarians that support for anti-Western regimes would benefit Russia, Moscow and the West will find themselves on the opposite sides of regional conflicts.[136] A Russian foreign policy guided by a statist conception of international relations will thus significantly reduce the effectiveness and importance of international institutions and prove itself accurate.

The Russian people will create the identity that they find most rewarding, and while this task is primarily Russian, outsiders can shape the process to a small degree. It follows that the West will benefit most from the success of the liberals. By rewarding steps toward the construction of a liberal Russian identity, the United States and its allies can strengthen the liberals' position in their struggle. If the West does nothing, it risks losing the best opportunity in history for making the world over in its image.*

[136] See "Dokument: Sotrudniki Spetzinstituta Predlagayut Rossii Protovostoyat' NATO i SShA," *Segodnya*, 20 October 1995, 3; Nadein, "Tovarishch Zyuganov Obeshchaet Obespechit Ameriknskim Investoram Luchshie Usloviya Chem Nyneshnie," *Izvestia*, 3 February 1996, 3; Migranyan, "Podlinnye i Mnimye Orientiry vo Vneshney Politike," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 4 August 1992, 7; and Zanegin, "Nuzhno li Nam Vstupat' v NATO," *Pravda*, 18 January 1992, 4.

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Breaking the News: A Review Essay

DORIS A. GRABER

Why has James Fallows's book created quite a stir?[1] It has been widely reviewed in the daily press and fueled heated table and after-dinner discussions in East coast political circles. Yet a careful reading of *Breaking the News* does not turn up intellectual dynamite. Fallows blasts the media's shortcomings, to be sure, but he does not say anything genuinely new that the large flock of media critics has not mentioned before. So why the fuss?

The answer, it seems to me, lies in the author's identity as a media insider and in the identities of many of his named targets who are stars in the media galaxy. Who is James Fallows? He is the Harvard-educated editor of *U.S. News and World Report*, a regular commentator on National Public Radio's "Morning Edition," and a prize-winning author. In other words, he has all of the credentials of a distinguished "insider," just the kind of person who becomes a Judas when he criticizes colleagues from his inner circle. Fallows's named targets include prominent members of the Washington press corps—Cokie and Steven Roberts, George Will, Robert Novak, and Sam Donaldson are examples.

Had Fallows attacked these paragons of the news profession for flaws in their manner of reporting, the book would have aroused far less attention. But he attacked them also in terms of their ethics, chiding them for venality. That charge is bad enough in itself, but directed at reporters whose stories about the venality of politicians are a big part of their stock-in-trade, it cuts deeply. Venality

[1] James Fallows, *Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1996).

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charges undermine credibility. By what right can reporters criticize public officials for greed when they themselves collect huge speaking fees from talks at gatherings of top level business executives? How can they question the professional integrity of politicians who have accepted large contributions from donors, when their own ability to report fairly has seemingly been compromised by accepting five-figure payments for brief public appearances? And how can they claim that their activities should be beyond public scrutiny while insisting that politicians must disclose all they have done privately and publicly, leaving no questions or insinuations unanswered?

The Case against Journalists

What evidence does Fallows present to support his claim that journalists and their mode of reporting the news are undermining American democracy? The book begins with a scathing, sometimes unduly harsh critique of professional newspeople, particularly television and radio performers. They stand accused of having transformed themselves into "buckrakers," perverting their time-honored role of muckrakers of the dens of political iniquity. Print journalists, envious of the celebrity status of television reporters and fearing to be eclipsed by infotainment news, have begun to copy the television style. No longer do all types of journalists spend substantial blocks of time tracking down important information and analyzing it carefully. Instead, they touch lightly on problems, however serious, substituting glib, cynical remarks for careful analysis. All the while, they spend uncounted hours on lucrative lecture circuits. Elite journalists have become arrogant, superficial, hypocritical, and condescending. The public, which often disagrees with their sneering treatment of the political world, hates them for it.

Journalism standards have slipped because many journalists have become lazy or distracted by their quests for personal glory. They would rather report routine stories that happen on their beats, can be culled painlessly from wire service reports, or can be gathered in easily accessible places, preferably at predictable, convenient times. Routine reporting procedures are the path of least resistance and far easier than digging for original stories. They also save money and time, because efforts to produce original news outside the established beats and routines have much higher failure rates. When it comes to political news, reporters would rather speculate about politicians' motives, which requires little work, than buckle down to analyze complex policy proposals and the conflicting viewpoints that have been expressed about them.

Fallows argues that the self-aggrandizing, unprofessional behavior that has become so common among elite journalists destroys the public's trust in the media as well as government and therefore undermines democracy. People have come to see the media as hampering the solution of public problems, rather than acting as a constructive force. Many journalists concur with the public's appraisal. They are aware that the erosion of their standards and values has produced a major

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crisis for news professionals who realize that they are doing incalculable damage. Considering that Fallows credits the news profession with vast political influence—an appraisal that many scholars will deem exaggerated—speedy reforms are imperative.

Fallows vents some of his strongest expressions of anger against televised political talk shows, calling them exercises in "competitive glibness," where reporters undermine respect for political leaders by attacking their arguments and by posturing as the ultimate fountains of wisdom, while politicians are dunces by comparison. When talk shows use a light touch, as in the McLaughlin Group broadcasts on Public Television, shows are little more than public clowning, which sheds little light on major serious issues. Predictions abound; when they turn out to be wrong with depressing frequency, nobody seems to care. What matters to the sponsors is that such shows attract respectable numbers of viewers because they are entertaining. But the laughter rings hollow to people concerned about the health of the political process.

Major Flaws in News Reporting

Scrutiny of news professionals in *Breaking the News* is followed by scrutiny of a lengthy list of the sins of reporting for which the current crop of journalists has been criticized repeatedly by media critics. Horse-race election coverage, sensationalism, voyeurism, fragmented news—all illustrated by trenchant examples—are taken to the woodshed. Fallows charges that journalists view politicians and their activities through distorting lenses of cynicism most of the time. Whatever politicians do, the motivations are always selfish, particularly when elections loom. Even worse, the motivations frequently are crooked or at the least ethically questionable. Major issues are not given the analysis they need and deserve; rather, journalists use them merely as examples of more or less exciting political jousting matches that demonstrate how well politicians are able to manipulate public life for their own benefit. For instance, the health care reform debate became a yardstick for assessing Bill Clinton's clout and popularity. In the decadent journalism of the 1990s, news pages have become nearly indistinguishable in style from sports pages. Who is ahead and who is behind in carrying the policy ball to victory or defeat has become the key concern.

In a section on "What the Media Should Do for Us," Fallows outlines several maxims of good journalism that he and other media critics deem to have been unduly neglected. The first, which he calls "perspective," is the rule that stories should help the reader or viewer to judge whether the reported situation has long-range importance and possibly urgency, or whether it is a passing blip on the screen of history that can be safely ignored and will soon be forgotten by everyone. Measured by that standard, most of the "scandals" reported by the media deserve short shrift. A second admonition is that the media should place

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events within their historical perspective. Most happenings have roots in the past that illuminate what is going on and suggest what can be expected to occur. When the media ignore the historical context, they mislead their audiences. For example, it was wrong to pass judgment on the success of the entire Clinton presidency after a few months of his first term, because the record shows that a president's first year in office is often quite unrepresentative of the remainder of his term. It was equally deluding to ignore Russian-Chechen tensions prior to the most recent outbreaks of hostilities in reporting the nature of the conflict. Considering the lack of adequate historical groundings, it is no wonder that Americans, including political leaders, are surprised so often by events that seem unexpected when they should have been anticipated.

A third area where better reporting is needed is the comparison of situations in terms of their similarities and differences. Such comparisons allow people to notice patterns and important connections in evolving situations. The brief snippets of news presented on television and radio create impressions of an unpredictable world where things happen without rhyme or reason and without ripples that extend the impact of the particular event to the surrounding social fabric. Lastly, Fallows urges journalists to give audiences information that is useful for their personal and civic lives. News stories should give people the tools to be politically effective, rather than make them feel that events move relentlessly toward a hidden target totally beyond their ken and control.

Sloppy journalism, Fallows argues, produces policy disasters. One of his prime examples is the 1994 health care reform debate. Fallows charges that the press provided confusing, hyped coverage and that this coverage destroyed the ability of the Clinton administration to resolve some of the serious health care problems faced by millions of Americans. In this, as in many of his other charges, Fallows lumps the entire press into one basket, without pointing to major diversities in coverage. Besides the numerous worthless and often harmful health care stories that deserve condemnation, there were many others that managed to make sense out of the welter of conflicting health care proposals and explained their likely impact on various population groups.

Fallows also errs in painting the press as an almost solitary villain. He fails to acknowledge that there usually are many other accomplices who contribute to policy failures. Examples in the health care reform case are Hillary Clinton, who insisted on undue secrecy in developing health care plans, and the health care insurance folks, who funded poison-arrow advertisements to destroy the Clinton proposals. Similarly, Fallows does not adequately identify the important mitigating circumstances that should be considered in passing judgment on the quality of media coverage of the health care reform debate and similar events. Of course, such an acknowledgment would rob Fallows's charges of much of their dramatic impact, and like the journalists whom he criticizes for imbalanced coverage, Fallows seems loath to sacrifice story impact to the canons of fairness and balance. He does point out in other parts of the book that the complexities

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of the current world have made it extraordinarily difficult for generalists to report on situations where appraisals require the scientific or technical expertise of specialists.

It should also be noted that the focus on the politics of health care reform that Fallows berates was essential to understanding the public debate on the health care issue. Without knowing the political motivations of the major players in the health care field, it was impossible to fathom which proposals were viable and which were stillborn. Nonetheless, Fallows is right for contending that substantive issues were often insufficiently covered.

Public Journalism as Remedy

The book concludes with a discussion of some of the virtues of public journalism, which Fallows praises for its attempts to reconnect citizens with their government by supplying them with information that helps them to participate in areas of politics in which they have expressed concern. Fallows sees public journalism as a promising remedy for some of the ills he has detailed in his book. A lot of media folk are enthusiastic about this movement and hail it as in line with what have always been the goals of good journalism—namely, to provide citizens with the kind of news that equips them to be effective citizens. But others, as Fallows points out, see public journalism as an abdication of journalistic control over news content and a dangerous lowering of the walls that should divide political actors from a watchdog press. Critics of public journalism ask whether news about presidential elections in Russia or war crimes trials in the Hague should be glossed over, just because the readers of the local newspaper have expressed disinterest in these events. They contend that a journalism fueled by citizen demands is likely to be a journalism that narrowly contemplates local political navels while ignoring the rest of the world. They fear the journalists will become politicians' buddies whenever they believe in the same causes, so that the pit bulls of the press turn into docile pets. These are important questions to be raised. Fallows does not slight them in *Breaking the News*; in fact, his case in favor of this kind of journalism is quite measured despite his liking for the movement.

At a talk that Fallows gave at Harvard University shortly after publication of the book, he told the audience that his motivation for writing *Breaking the News* was his fervent desire to save his beloved profession from self-destructive behavior. He did not expect his peers to take such criticism kindly. Media folk have always been very prickly when the criticism that they dish out so liberally is leveled against them.

Nonetheless, journalists seem to take some criticisms to heart, as shown, for example, in more analytical presidential election coverage in recent years in the wake of unfavorable public commentary about press performance. There is hope, therefore, that Fallows's critique may bear some fruit. Although his criticisms and recommendations are not novel, he and his book have been unusually visible.

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His charges and reform proposals are therefore more potent than the challenges posed by less well positioned authors. If the media folk whose names are mentioned in this book will lead the reform parade, a rise in the ethical tide and in media performance standards will likely lift all boats, including those in the country's journalistic backwaters.

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Two Very Different Senators: A Review Essay

BILL GREEN

Two very different senators, Bill Bradley, Democrat from New Jersey, and Alfonse D'Amato, Republican from New York, have written their political autobiographies.[1]

Bradley's initial, successful run for the U.S. Senate in 1978 was his first effort to win elective office, though he earlier considered a race for the U.S. House of Representatives (Bradley, p. 30). National name-recognition from his career as a professional basketball player and his intellectual credentials as a former Rhodes scholar made him from the outset of his Senate career a potential presidential candidate. He decided not to run for reelection in 1996, a decision not explained in the book's brief "Afterword" (pp. 425–26).

In contrast, D'Amato rose through the ranks of New York's Nassau County Republication organization, one of the few, strong local party organizations left in the state, to become supervisor of the town of Hempstead (D'Amato, pp. 66–67). Supervisor was not the bucolic office one might assume from the designation "town"; Hempstead had a population in 1980 of more than 800,000, and the position of "town" supervisor was in most respects equivalent to that of mayor. Defeating incumbent Jacob K. Javits in the Republican Senate primary in 1980, D'Amato went on to be elected in a three-way race against Democrat Elizabeth Holtzman and Javits, who remained on the Liberty party line; He was elected twice more to the U.S. Senate, where he currently serves. Though he has been outspoken on national and international issues, such as his effort in 1990 to prod

[1] Bill Bradley, *Time Present, Time Past* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) and Alfonse D'Amato, *Power, Pasta, and Politics: The World According to Senator Al D'Amato* (New York: Hyperion, 1996).

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President George Bush into giving greater support to Lithuania's attempt to declare independence from the Soviet Union (at a time when Bush was doing his best to prop up Gorbachev) (D'Amato pp. 182–85), D'Amato has been known mostly for his activities within and on behalf of New York State (at least until this year, when as chair of the Senate Banking Committee he led its Whitewater investigation). In 1990 a disastrous gubernatorial campaign almost reduced the Republican party in New York State to minor party status. Had the Conservative party's gubernatorial candidate run second in that race, as he almost did, the Conservative party would have been entitled to the number-two spot on the ballot for the next four years and, in an enormous patronage coup, would have replaced all the Republicans on all county boards of election. (These commissioners are split between the two top parties.) D'Amato installed an aide as state chairman, handpicked state senator George Pataki as the 1994 Republican candidate, and won the governorship of New York for the Republican party for the first time in twenty years. (Full disclosure requires that I point out that I was one of the potential Republican gubernatorial candidates over whom the D'Amato steamroller rolled (D'Amato p. 272). Still, I would be the first to acknowledge that D'Amato accomplished what he set out to do for the New York GOP.

Whether intended or not, the theme that came through to me from Bradley's book is the overwhelming demands our current American political system places on those who are considering a run for the presidency. Various needs force the potential presidential candidate onto the road: the need to gather chits from candidates who need help in their fundraising efforts or see a senatorial appearance as lending credibility to their campaigns and an opportunity to get coverage in their local media; the need to build up relationships with local politicians, who may be delegates to future national conventions; and the need to make contact with those who can serve as fundraisers for a future presidential campaign while supporting one's Senate, gubernatorial, or House reelection campaign (and such campaigns increasingly raise money on a national basis). As Bradley notes in his preface, "By 1994 I had campaigned in forty-six states" (p. xi).

Much of his book consists of thoughts provoked by those travels. Thus his efforts on behalf of a congressional candidate from Wisconsin of part Native-American origins leads into the chapter, "The Original Americans," and an appearance at a fundraising luncheon in Kalispell, Montana, on behalf of a woman's gubernatorial campaign leads to a discussion of the role of women in settling the American West.

Now by educating those involved, much good comes from such travels. I can recall, for example, a trip I took to Albuquerque in 1984 to aid the New Mexico Republicans for Choice in their platform battle at a Republican state convention and to speak at a fundraiser for the local Planned Parenthood group. I had read a number of western water cases in law school, but nothing conveys to an easterner the reason for the intensity of fights over water rights like seeing the aridity of the western deserts.

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Bradley made good use of his travels, and his book is replete with what he learned and what judgments he reached on the contemporary condition of the United States and the regions and peoples that comprise it. It is the heart of the book.

Still, the nominating process that Bradley describes is not what the Founding Fathers had in mind. They were suspicious of political parties and direct popular election and looked to the electoral college mechanism to assure that the president would be the best person available: "[T]he immediate election should be made by men capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station. . . . A small number of persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass, will be most likely to possess information and discernment requisite to such complicated investigation" (*The Federalist* No. 68). In short, the successful candidate would be well known to an elite that would select him because they were well acquainted with his qualifications and thought them superior to those of any other candidate.

The Founding Fathers' efforts to prevent parties from being established to contest the presidency quickly collapsed. Nonetheless, until the last few decades the party nominating process largely reflected the indirect method the Founding Fathers had in mind. Delegates to party conventions were chosen by governors and other party leaders and obeyed their instructions. Thus a candidate had primarily to persuade his peers that he was their best choice. After years of working together in the political vineyard the candidate's peers presumably knew his strengths and weaknesses. Senators and House members met in Congress; governors at the National Governors Association conferences. Many had moved from one venue to another. Even without these formal interactions party leaders knew each other—indeed, they still do—and could pass judgment on each other.

The emergence of the primary system has changed all that. To run a presidential campaign, one has to have relationships not only with senators, governors, and members of Congress; one also has to deal with their fundraisers and local supporters. To do that, one has to be on the road all the time. Although the primary system may appear more democratic, the relatively limited primary turnouts raise the question whether a primary reflects the views of a party's supporters or only of its more dedicated—more extreme, some would argue—partisans. Thus Bradley's first campaign for the Senate was aided by the fact that he faced Jeffrey Bell, a conservative Republican who had beaten the incumbent, Clifford Case, a progressive, in the primary.

One also has to ask whether the enormous travel burden the current system puts on candidates diminishes their ability to perform their responsibilities, or causes conflicts between their official responsibilities and their campaigns (as witness the pressure on Robert Dole to resign as Senate majority leader in the spring of 1996 and his ultimate resignation not only as majority leader but also as senator), or gives an advantage to those out of office (for example, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan) or to vice presidents.

It is clear in any event that the Founding Fathers neither contemplated nor wanted a presidential selection process that lacked some means by which those

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who had earned their spurs in the political arena could screen the candidates. Plainly there is no way to turn back the clock, but perhaps the Democratic and Republican parties can reorganize their candidate-selection processes to reflect the kind of system the Founding Fathers contemplated, where those who are senior participants in government have the major role in picking candidates.

Bradley was hurt both personally and politically by winning reelection so narrowly in 1990 against Christine Todd Whitman, then a political unknown and now governor of New Jersey.

It is ironic that New Jersey political events almost defeated Bradley, who is a national political figure, as contrasted, for example, to D'Amato. Bradley advocated lower federal tax rates, though he favored closing loopholes so that, presumably, federal revenues would remain unchanged. However, in 1990 when New Jersey's newly-elected Democratic governor Jim Florio (who supported Bradley in the 1978 primary that won him the Senate nomination) put a major tax increase through the Democratic-controlled legislature, Bradley said only that as a federal official he was not involved (Bradley, pp. 39–42).

Both the narrow margin of his victory and the reason for it made it unlikely that Bradley could be a viable candidate for the 1992 Democratic presidential nomination—and with President Bill Clinton's victory 1996 was also placed beyond his reach. Whether Bradley decided that a 1996 senatorial campaign would reopen the wounds of 1990 and was better avoided on the way to a presidential campaign in 2000, or whether the end of his Senate career represents a permanent departure from the electoral arena remains to be seen.

Bradley's career waned because of the tax issue and (despite his conservative stance on some issues like aid to the Nicaraguan contras—though he backs away from that position in this book [p. 136]) the country's conservative shift. Bradley still sees himself "in politics to take action. . . ." (p.xii) "[to achieve] radical reform . . . [which] only government has the power to effect" (p. 54).

Conservative political trends caused D'Amato's career to wax. He understood that once Democratic urban-ethnics moved to the suburbs as homeowners they were available to the Republican party, and he was among the first to realize that "[w]ith the death of Nelson Rockefeller in January 1979, the world of New York politics changed forever" (D'Amato, p. 73). So, although few gave him any chance of success, and espousing a political philosophy that "freedom—the protection of individual rights from a coercive government—can be the issue that the Republican party can succeed with for many, many years to come" (p. 342), he took on the progressive Javits in the 1980 Republican primary, beat him, won in November, and has twice been reelected.

The late House Speaker Tip O'Neill, among others, has been credited with the observation that "in the United States, all politics is local." D'Amato's book reflects this view. Because he came up through the ranks, the stories he tells convey far more of the flavor of politics on the local level than Bradley's do.

Even with D'Amato's Senate career, the anecdotes continue. My favorite is about a 1981 White House decision to bring President Ronald Reagan to lunch

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with D'Amato in Manhattan's Little Italy. As word got around that a restaurant would be selected, D'Amato got a call from Umberto's Clam House, a local restaurant known primarily as the site of the mob killing of "Crazy Joe" Gallo and some of his associates. Umberto's offered to host the presidential party for free. "You don't have a very good safety record," D'Amato tells us he responded (D'Amato, p. 13). The lunch was held elsewhere.

There is another wonderful anecdote about "a certain boy from Long Island named Rich Bond." Understanding the importance of the Iowa caucuses, Bond "spent years softening up Iowa for Bush," presumably the years leading up to the January 1980 Iowa caucuses. Not only did Bond run the Iowa caucuses, he managed the Bush campaign in two other jurisdictions where Bush won (Connecticut and Pennsylvania) and went on to become chairman of the Republican National Committee at the end of the Bush presidency.

Alas, this story of youthful perseverance rewarded will have to join Parson Weems' tale of George Washington and the cherry tree. I was elected to the House of Representatives in February 1978. Rich Bond was my first press secretary, and he was not commuting daily from Iowa to my office. He did leave to work for the Bush campaign, but since the Iowa caucuses were in January 1980, Bond plainly did not spend "years" in Iowa preparing for them.

D'Amato's fact-checkers have done him an injustice at two other points:

While D'Amato can take pride in being the first Italian-American to be elected in his own right to statewide office in New York, he is not, as his book asserts (p. 98), the first "to hold statewide office." Charles Poletti was elected as Herbert Lehman's lieutenant governor (under the New York Constitution the lieutenant governor is elected jointly with the governor) and served briefly as governor when Lehman resigned in late 1942 to accept a position in the wartime national administration.

D'Amato suggests that Republicans were spared a "bloody primary" for governor in 1994 because only George Pataki got more than 25 percent of the votes at the nominating convention. However, New York law permits candidates to get on the primary ballot by circulating petitions, and former Republican state chairman and national committee member Dick Rosenbaum did just that. So there was a primary, and Dick Morris (who achieved first fame and then notoriety in the Clinton reelection campaign in 1996) ran Rosenbaum's primary effort. However, Pataki handily beat Rosenbaum, so I guess D'Amato can fairly say that the primary was not "bloody"!

Despite D'Amato's assertion that "the protection of individual rights from a coercive government" could be the basis for indefinite Republican success, he recognizes that things are not that simple and that there are conservatives within the Republican party who take a different view. "I part company with Buchanan and Robertson because they seem to believe that the Republican party should be an instrument of cultural domination and control. While I believe in many of the values of the social right . . . I believe that values should be taught by the family and the church and not by government" (p. 342).

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The 1996 Republican convention reflected this dichotomy. The week before the convention when the platform committee was meeting belonged to the "social right," which beat back all efforts to modify the antiabortion plank. The convention itself reflected Republican support for the smaller federal government D'Amato envisages. However, he is not consistent: He has joined the social right in his right-to-life Senate votes but not on issues like gays in the military.

Bradley and D'Amato: They are very different senators. One is like many for whom the Senate was his first elective office, who is of WASP origin, who is a centrist Democrat, and who from the outset of his career has been a potential presidential candidate. The other has worked his way up through the ranks, an American of Italian origin, a conservative Republican who has eschewed the far right and focused on the needs of his state. They have written autobiographies that reflect those differences.

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Book Reviews

At a Century's Ending: Reflections, 1982–1995 *by George F. Kennan. New York, W.W. Norton & Company, 1996. 351 pp. $27.50.*

When John Quincy Adams returned to Washington in 1831 to serve in the House of Representatives for seventeen years—the only retired president who has ever done so—he was soon being called "Old Man Eloquent" for his unremitting attacks on the slave power. Adams died in the House chamber only a few seconds after casting a "No!" vote against awarding medals to army officers in the Mexican War.

George Kennan has been casting "No!" votes for as many and more years against cold war and post–cold war policies he finds misconceived products of an American imagination shaped "under the dominating shadows of Hitler and Stalin," phantoms that have long ceased to have relevance to the real world (p. 333). Interestingly, reviews of these essays in *Foreign Affairs* and the *New York Review of Books* argue that his current preoccupation with American failings have all but blinded him to the success of the original "containment" policy he advocated to blunt Joseph Stalin's westward advance—but too soon abandoned.

Kennan has long insisted that he meant something other than military containment, and he reasserts the claim in several of the articles, book reviews, and occasional pieces collected here. It is a difficult case to argue and still fails to convince. Kennan also slips rather uneasily around another corner: his advocacy of "clandestine defensive operations. . . . " He regrets his role in the "decision to set up such facilities . . . because such operations conflict with our own traditional standards and compromise our diplomacy in other areas" (p. 278).

But perhaps it is our determination to wring out of the Soviet Union's collapse the last full measure of self-congratulatory reassurance that makes some readers uneasy. No one likes a spoil-sport. Kennan keeps reminding his audiences that we will have to think seriously about the consequences of what we have done—and so clearly have not done—in the name of preserving the Free World, if we are ever to recover a sense of proportion about the world and America's role in global affairs.

First on his list, of course, is the continuing problem of nuclear arsenals, not simply how to dispose of the remaining stockpiles of weapons but the far more crucial matter of our addiction to high-tech, high-budget weaponry that the atomic bomb so fatefully induced half a century ago. No president could suddenly go cold turkey to rid the nation of the addiction, he concedes. The impact on the economy would be catastrophic. Yet the very process that supposedly brought the Soviets to their knees now threatens our own undoing, in part because of the expenditures themselves, but in larger measure because of the illusion that a defense budget ten times larger than that of the next power offers solutions to political and social problems. The idea of extending NATO to Russia's very borders is a result, he

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believes, of the distortions caused by reliance upon such a view of the world, imposed on statesmen by the mental weight and burden of the arms themselves. In a particularly trenchant essay, Kennan prints excerpts from his diary decrying the intervention in Somalia as also symptomatic of such thinking. It had no congressional sanction, was undertaken by an outgoing president hoping to relive the Gulf War triumph, and failed the most elementary tests of when and how military force should be employed.

Writing earlier, in 1987, Kennan had asserted, "The truth of the matter is that the greater portion of American society that lies outside the defense establishment is rapidly falling into a position resembling that of much of civilian society in northern Europe toward the end of the Thirty Years' War: reduced to trailing behind the armies as camp followers, hoping to live off the remnants from the military stores and kitchens" (p. 118).

Next in importance is the damage that unbridled growth policies have done to the environment—and in a not unrelated fashion—the unbridled vulgarization of public life. Kennan has long mourned the passing of the train journey as a metaphor for the decline of civilized interaction, whose sights and sounds he once enjoyed so much as he traveled to work summer mornings from the seacoast to his diplomatic post in Riga, Latvia. Within the jeremiads, scattered in various places, there is another George Kennan, the romantic whose love affair with the old Russia—its endless birch forests, the warming glass of vodka in winter, the all-night conversations in tiny Moscow apartments—has persisted through the decades.

Kennan seems never to have decided whether in the final analysis Marxist ideology or personality determined the course of events in Russia after the 1917 revolution. At various points in the essays, he speaks of the seriousness with which Soviet leaders continued to treat their Marxist heritage, defending their course even as it became little more than a Pascalian ritual to control the masses. Other times he suggests that after Stalin, his successors were simply unable to wrench themselves free from the tyrant's oddly paired legacies: the awesome terror juxtaposed to a pondersome bureaucratic inertia that together shaped the drab political life of the Soviet Union in the thirty-some years from the purges to the sad ending of Prague Spring in 1968.

But from essays on the contemporary observations of Timothy Garton Ash and the massive historical output of Arnold Toynbee, it is clear that Kennan finds much to admire in Ash's positive accounts of the differences leaders made in Eastern Europe's groping toward a new life, while much to criticize in Toynbee's submergence of the individual as he records the vast sweep of civilizations rising and falling over the centuries. Dissenting from current fashions in historical writing, Kennan avers that finally, "at the bottom of all human experience, there lies, after all, the mystery of the individual personality—its ultimate autonomy of decision, its interaction with the mass" (p. 316).

Perhaps Kennan will be always remembered for the "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* and for containment. But at the end of this collection, there are these words from the "Old Man Eloquent" of our time—the historian who has taught us so much about the origins of the Great War, the folly of nuclear weapons, the need to understand ourselves as part of the human condition, not as a people apart living in a City on a Hill. "There are, I fear, a great many whose concept of international relations was formed under the dominating shadows of Hitler and Stalin—shadows that at one time served for them as justification for the systematic externalization of evil and for no small measure of collective self-admiration. For these people, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union created a vacuum that they now call upon their imagination to fill" (p. 333).

LLOYD C. GARDNER
Rutgers University

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Arming Japan *by Michael J. Green. New York, Columbia University Press, 1995. 206 pp. $40.00.*

Despite a plethora of books and essays on post-1945 Japanese foreign and defense policies, relatively little has been written on Japan's armament industry. The postwar constitution presumably forbade rearmament, and the nation gives the impression of having focused its energies almost exclusively on the production and global distribution of consumer goods and nonmilitary hardware. Yet, not only does there exist a Japanese armed force, but the nation's defense expenditures are among the highest in the world, a substantial portion of which is accounted for by the cost of procuring weapons.

Where do these weapons come from? From the United States, would be the easy answer, but that is not the whole story. Indeed, the bulk of Japanese weapons today is produced domestically, whether under license from the United States or based on indigenous design and technology. The security alliance between the two nations has necessitated close coordination regarding what military equipment the Japanese defense force should be provided with, and which country and which firms should produce it. It has not always been easy to reach agreement on these issues.

This is an important but inadequately analyzed story, and it is good to have Michael Green's careful, systematic examination of postwar Japanese arms production. Based on a great deal of research in Japanese sources (documentary and oral), the book provides reliable data on the types and origins of weapons in use in Japan since the 1950s. The author pays particular attention to the movement for *kokusanka*, or domestic production ("indigenization," to use the author's expression). Japanese officials were from the beginning wary of too much reliance on U.S. weapons, for this might lead to loss of autonomy and independence in Japanese foreign policy and security strategy. Not that Japan had much autonomy vis-à-vis the United States; so long as its security was ultimately dependent on the protection provided by the latter's conventional and nuclear arms, Japan's margin of flexibility was limited. For this very reason, however, Tokyo's officials felt that domestic arms production would be one area where the country could exercise some measure of autonomy.

The *kokusanka* debate is followed in great detail by Green. The narrative is clear, although a reader not familiar with Japanese terms may be confused by his frequent use of them—not only frequent but erroneous in places, especially in his inconsistent use of the macron to distinguish long from short vowels (see p. 39 for an example). Still, the overall analysis is clear. Japanese officials, the author shows, navigated between the alternatives of autonomy and cooperation, advocates of autonomy (domestic procurement) on the whole being prevalent among Defense Agency and Ministry of International Trade and Industry officials, as well as among some prominent Liberal Democratic Party politicians. The Foreign and Finance Ministries gave priority to cooperation with the United States, especially in order to alleviate the tensions resulting from Japan's increasing trade surpluses. The question became complicated as Japanese industry grew interested in *kokusanka* of arms, which would result in huge procurement orders from the Defense Agency. That the ongoing debate inside Japan had serious implications for U.S.–Japanese relations was revealed in the FSX (jet fighter) controversy between Tokyo and Washington in the second half of the 1980s. Initially adamant about producing the fighter domestically, Japan eventually agreed to its joint development with the United States, only to discover that the U.S. Congress had become alarmed over the possibility of transferring sophisticated weapons technology to Japan. The FSX controversy was not resolved until 1990, when the two governments agreed on a formula for the transfer of some, but not all, technology from the United States to Japan.

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Technology transfer thus is a key theme of the book. The sale of weapons necessarily involves the transmission of highly secret, sophisticated military technology that can, of course, be utilized by civilian industry. Thus defense production is bound up with nonmilitary production, with implications for trade, and for overall economic competitiveness. It is not surprising, therefore, that in both Japan and the United States there should have developed strong technonationalism, particularly in the wake of the cold war. Losing a common target of their military policy, the two nations came to see themselves primarily as trade rivals.

Economic nationalism fueled technonationalism. This phenomenon, too, is ably and dispassionately described by Green. His conclusions, however, are amazingly sanguine. As if to pour water over the flames of nationalistic trends he has been describing, he suggests that "technology need not be a divisive element in alliance." In particular, "[the] global threats from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction . . . call for a harnessing of combined U.S. and Japanese technological strength" (p. 161). Such an optimistic conclusion does not emerge logically from the body of the book nor from the fact that the United States and many other countries (except Japan) continue to export arms. If, even in a successful alliance such as the U.S.–Japanese security partnership, nationalistic rivalry has stood in the way of their technological cooperation, one wonders how such cooperation can be carried out among other nations.

AKIRA IRIYE
Harvard University

The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy *by Dennis T. Yasutomo. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 230 pp. $39.95.*

In this rich empirical study, Dennis Yasutomo argues that Japan, despite its image as following a passive and reactive foreign policy, has increasingly pursued an assertive and activist stance in its foreign aid policies. This new activism, he contends, is particularly evident in its policies toward the multilateral developmental banks but also characterizes its general foreign policy approach as well.

Yasutomo succeeds in demonstrating that Japan uses its Overseas Developmental Assistance (ODA) policies to pursue broader political and diplomatic goals, rather than simply narrowly defined economic gains. Further, he argues that Japan has begun to develop an independent philosophy about aid and development—the so-called Asian development model that is firmly based on Japan's own experiences with development and industrial policy. Yasutomo presents a concise chronicle of how Japan has formulated these ideas and pushed its vision onto the development agenda.

In pointing out that Japan has shaped its ODA policies to serve its independently defined interests, Yasutomo provides a welcome respite from the constant portrayal of Japan as a reactive state. This notion paints an image of a Japan that is incapable of taking foreign policy initiatives, even when its interests are involved and it has the capacity to act. Rather, initiatives come only as the result of foreign pressure, or *gaiatsu*, most often applied by the United States. Certainly, few deny that Japan's postwar foreign policy has been heavily influenced and constrained by U.S. foreign policy. However, proponents of the reactive state have tended to look only at issues in which Japan has not had strong incentives to act or cases in which Tokyo's interests have not conflicted with Washington's; in these cases it

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is difficult to tell if Japan has gone along with U.S. policy out of incapacity or out of calculated self-interest. Scholars who have tried to look for issues in which U.S. and Japanese interests have more clearly diverged have found, not surprisingly, that in many such cases Tokyo has been willing to follow its own policy line. Yasutomo adds two strong case studies in this vein, one focusing on Japan's push for an alternative development model in the World Bank and the other its refusal to blindly follow the U.S. and European lead on the question of aid to Russia.

The notion of the reactive state, then, while providing some useful insights into Japanese foreign policy behavior, loses its practical relevance when analysts take things to simplistic extremes. As Yasutomo points out, this is exactly what has happened. The image of the reactive state has become dominant and unquestioned, blinding analysts to Japan's growing activism; indeed, Yasutomo argues that the reactive state argument cannot even conceive of the possibility of a more assertive Japanese foreign policy. Yasutomo, however, pulls his punches at the end by accepting the reactive state label for Japan so long as we recognize that "all states are basically reactive, adapting to the external environment while reflecting domestic interests" (p. 182). This is a sensible argument, but one that is too subtle for me! Rather than diluting his original message, he might have looked for a new label that is not so loaded down with preexisting images.

Yasutomo's goals go beyond simply debunking the reactive state model in the realm of ODA policy. In his assertion that Japan's activism in foreign aid is indicative of its approach to foreign policy in general, however, he does not present so compelling a case. The problem here is one of case selection: Yasutomo focuses solely on Japan's multilateral ODA policies, which he claims offers "instructive case studies of (Japan's) new activism" (p. vii), but does not put these cases into their necessary context. We are thus not sure how these particular cases fit into Japan's broader foreign policy or the extent to which they are indicative of its likely approach to other issues. In fact, multilateral ODA policy provides the easiest cases to demonstrate activism: in these issues Japanese interests have been clear; domestic constraints have been insignificant; needed resources have been available (at least prior to the collapse of the bubble economy); and a more active role by Japan has been welcomed by all concerned. These conditions do not apply so neatly, if at all, to other foreign policy issues. So Yasutomo's findings may be of limited relevance to Japan's foreign policy as a whole. The reader is thus left with the mere assertion that Japan is likely to take an increasingly active foreign policy stance in the future. This scenario is certainly plausible, but it is not persuasively demonstrated here. Many other analysts have pointed to nascent signs of growing assertiveness, a trend that is likely to continue in the post cold-war era.

The weakest part of the book is Yasutomo's attempt to use international relations theory to provide an alternative explanatory framework to the reactive state. Here the discussion is pro forma, dated, and provides few new theoretical insights. He also derives questionable hypotheses when applying theory to the case of Japanese ODA policy. The discussion of theory seems almost an afterthought and is not at all integrated into the later analysis or discussion.

I suspect, however, that Yasutomo will not mind "failing" on this final score. From what I know of his past work, he has not been so intent on presenting a dramatic reconceptualization of Japan in terms of theoretical constructs or on advancing political science theory in the abstract. Rather, Yasutomo recognizes that there is still ample room—indeed, the necessity—for empirically-grounded research. I thus suspect that he would be content with providing a balanced analytical study, rich in description of important trends and developments. On this score Yasutomo succeeds handsomely, making this book an important one for those

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interested in understanding Japan's past and future ODA policy and its foreign policy in general.

ROBERT M. URIU
Columbia University

Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics *by Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1995. 640 pp. Cloth, $39.95; paper, $17.95.*

Political and other voluntary participation can affect who gets what from government and other institutions in society, so that inequality in participation can adversely affect social, economic, and political equality in America. Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady have written a splendid and engaging empirical treatise—large-scale social science at its very best—on how social and economic resources influence the extent to which, and the ways in which, people participate in politics and voluntary organizations. They also examine the extent to which the overrepresented preferences of participants are different from those of the public at large. This justifiably big book (with 100 additional pages of appendixes for data addicts) is based on an initial telephone survey of 15,053 adults in 1989, which was followed by 2,517 in-person interviews in 1990, oversampling blacks, Latinos, and political activists.

To begin (chapter 2), the authors emphasize different forms of participation: voting, campaign work, campaign contributions, contacting officials, protest, informal community work, membership on a local board, affiliation with a political organization, contributions to political causes. They distinguish these in three ways that bear significantly on inequalities that can emerge: the extent to which these acts can convey detailed preferences or information; the extent to which an individual's volume of activity can be multiplied; and the resources the activities require in terms of time, money, and skills (writing, speaking, cognitive, organizational, interpersonal). While voting is low on these dimensions, requiring little time, community work and being a member of a local board are among the highest, requiring a lot of time and skills. What is missing here and of potential consequence for all these activities is an assessment of the extent to which one participant might intentionally, or by a signaling process, directly or indirectly mobilize others. Nonetheless, the book's important theme and source of methodological leverage is that it is continually necessary to distinguish and compare different activities along the above dimensions.

The authors go on to assess the level and substance of participation. Here, the big picture pitting the United States against other nations shows that except for voting, we are among the most politically active. Most important, they find that American political activity was in general concerned with public issues (that is, abortion loomed large in 1989–1990), *not* personal problems. But, Americans are clearly less active in politics than in voluntary activity outside politics. Further, in unavoidably comparing these findings to Robert Putman's appraisal of the decline in social capital, I found the comparatively robust level of social activity in the United States to be much less of a problem than the persistent socioeconomic inequality in the representation of preferences in the participatory process. For example, the authors show in definitive fashion in chapter 7 that the concerns for basic human needs of the disadvantaged do not get well conveyed, since the disadvantaged are less active in information-rich forms of participation.

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While there is some occasional redundancy, the book covers lots of other ground in detail, including the recruiting of political activists, how civic skills especially are developed and matter (as part of a "civic voluntarism model"), and gender, racial, and ethnic differences.

Additional questions, however, still remain for others to answer. In particular, explaining variations over time in participation cannot be done with even the best cross-sectional data alone. Indeed, this is the subject of a separate book by the authors' other collaborators. Future studies will have to examine to what extent, if any, the mass media and changes in media technology have affected forms of participation and the resources available to citizens.

ROBERT Y. SHAPIRO
Columbia University

Communication in Congress: Members, Staff, and the Search for Information *by David Whiteman. Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 1995. 239 pp. Cloth, $35.00; paper. $15.95.*

The modern Congress is awash in information. The decision-making problem on Capitol Hill is not the availability of sufficient information to support a policy choice, but rather how to sift and winnow relevant information from the vast amount that is readily at hand. Whiteman's approach to policy analysis aims to ferret out congressional communication networks in order to understand how relevant information is sought and found, and how this information flows through the congressional system.

In order to gather data that would allow investigation of communication networks in Congress, Whiteman selected four issues considered during the 99th Congress (1985–1986): the issue of payment for doctors treating Medicare patients; whether to compensate victims of vaccine injuries in childhood; how landing slots at major airports should be allocated to airlines; and how the transportation of hazardous materials should be controlled. In relation to these issues, he systematically interviewed 318 relevant congressional staff members and key members of Congress at various stages in the research process. Interviewing was targeted to congressional offices, or "enterprises," exhibiting theoretically interesting structural variations and thus showing different internal communication styles.

In this prodigious and sensible study, Whiteman credibly pursues the analysis of issue networks in Congress within the selective data collection he amassed. He carefully sets the communication networks within their relevant external contexts and then seeks to unravel how personal communication networks emerge in the congressional environment. Rather than mapping out these networks in detail, or inquiring as to their evolution, Whiteman focuses upon the factors or variables influencing network development. In this light, he analyzes in turn the ways in which the congressional enterprise itself shapes personal communication, the effects of personal factors, the effects of differences in the sizes of networks, the impact of staff turnover, and the influence of different modes of communication.

This exploration provides Whiteman with the grounding to explore the consequences of congressional communication networks. Generally, he finds that congressional enterprises are amply supplied with policy-relevant information, that members and staffs are not particularly dependent upon interest groups or the executive branch, and that the congressional staff resources adequately match the policy analysis challenge of major public issues. In short, Whiteman concludes that Congress is not unduly influenced by external agents and that Congress knows enough to legislate intelligently.

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The case studies upon which Whiteman draws allow him to offer limited inferences about the ways in which congressional enterprises establish their policy agendas. Unsurprisingly, much of the motivation for agenda setting emanates from constituency interests. Moreover, the case studies provide the author with some basis for inferring how congressional enterprises engage in the search for useable, appropriate, policy-relevant information. Here, interestingly, the author finds that policy analysis of the kind conducted and proffered by social scientists typically plays an important role in the information search.

There is much to commend in this study. I believe Whiteman's data admit of considerably deeper probings of congressional communication networks than are reported in this study. The presentation reveals too little of the structural patterns within congressional enterprises and too little of the bases for structural variations. Moreover, the suggestive results here depend upon data drawn in terms of four discrete policy issues and form only two issues areas—medical care and transportation. It is difficult to tell how representative are these case studies of congressional networking in general; and the author neither provides much justification for selecting the four issue areas nor cogitates about generalizing on the basis of his selection of cases. Accordingly, the author's own admonition that further research is needed concerning congressional communication networks is well taken.

SAMUEL C. PATTERSON
Ohio State University

White House to Your House: Media and Politics in Virtual America *by Edwin Diamond and Robert A. Silverman. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995. 168 pp. $20.00.*

In theory and substance, the American people have never had it so good for the practice of democracy. The sophisticated tools of modern communications, the all-but-instantaneous availability of information on matters of political interest, and the ability to go one-on-one or one-to-millions should provide a national town meeting place in which everyone can have a say. But the reality is painfully the opposite. What we get with all the glitzy modern tools, say Diamond and Silverman, is a Virtual America, a construct of reality that reflects the "triumph of politics-as-entertainment and entertainment-as-politics."

They make their case effectively and persuasively, largely through an analysis of the way the 1992 Clinton-Bush presidential race was handled in the various media and the way the Clinton White House and the Congress handled issues after Clinton's election.

In the run-up to their major presentation, they briefly review the history of media and politics since the nation's founding. They note the importance of the Federalist Papers in the selling of the Constitution, the role of the major print media as gatekeepers and interpreters of the contending political forces throughout our history, and then the development of radio and television in the twentieth century.

All of that was just prelude to the multimedia, interactive communications world of the 1990s that now dominates the political process—without, unfortunately, doing much to improve it. A kind of Gresham's law has led inexorably into campaigns that are mostly surface, directed at emotions, and aimed exclusively at winning elections, not setting policy directions.

The tools of the professional communicator—polls, focus groups, clever, subliminal ad copy—are all embraced to discover what moves the election marketplace. And in a mass market—which is surely the national electorate—down market is the way to go. Thus, we

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see the enormous appeal and huge audiences of blowhard talk-show hosts on radio and television, whatever their knowledge or lack of it, on issues.

Ross Perot rocketed into the national political scene on the Larry King CNN show. Other politicians, including Bill Clinton, quickly followed. The idea presumably was to make direct contact with the voter. In turn, the voter could answer back through call-in mechanisms. Democracy in action? Not quite. What we got was sound-bite politics, not discussion or elaboration of issues and proposed solutions.

And all of this occurred before the Internet got into high gear. On the World Wide Web in all its future glory, we should enjoy instantaneous exchange of each person's sniffle and the voyeur's delight in listening to and looking at other people. Already, in the world of trash and tabloid TV we have seen the trivial and the scurrilous dominate the news presentations, even of those media that would prefer more responsible reportage.

A further, more complicated problem is arising, the authors note, with the routine interchange of media personality and political candidate—for example, Pat Buchanan, Jesse Jackson, and most recently, Mario Cuomo. Are they media professionals or are they masquerading as journalists and honing their images between political engagements?

The brave new world of telecommunications has enormously expanded Americans' ability to exchange information and opinions, which surely is the foundation of a functioning and effective democracy. How we have handled these technological gifts so far, say Diamond and Silverman, is at the least sobering and at worst a budding disaster. Virtual America can give us only a virtual democracy, and that's a fraud.

JOHN J. SMEE
Fordham University

Social Movements, Political Violence, and the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany *by Donatella della Porta. Cambridge, England, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 270 pp. $59.95.*

This book is yet another demonstration that the social sciences do not provide a clear explanation of the causes and dynamics of deviant behavior. This is no fault of the author. Indeed, one must admire her valiant effort to weave critically into this ambitious enterprise alternative theoretical approaches to political protest and violence.

The problem is—too many theories! To top things off, della Porta formulates hypotheses of her own, at three levels (total systems, organizations, and individual behavior) and then tries to relate her findings to theories of social conflict, social movements, and individual activism. This is too much to chew on, and predictably some intellectual indigestion ensues.

Does rational choice, as opposed to "garbage can" theory (p. 134) better explicate terrorist organizations? Well, it depends; depending on circumstances, either or both will do. Will small group theory illuminate the internal dynamics of such organizations? Yes, but so will other theoretical formulations that address deviant behavior. And what about pure chance, accident, or the unanticipated consequences of choices made at the individual or group level? These factors, the author tells us, may also be highly salient. To paraphrase Lyndon Johnson, what the social sciences need are fewer two-armed paper hangers.

There are, nevertheless, fascinating insights in these pages. For example, in the countries studied, political violence tends to become more frequent and imbedded as the broader social

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movements from which they derive wane. Too, deterrence in the form of excessive state repression of protest and violence seems to have the perverse effect of further institutionalizing violence itself. Moreover, as broader social protest movements regress, the small residual die-hard enclaves engage in a macabre "out-bidding," in which the common currency of this competitive "product differentiation" is violence itself. There are shrewd and sometimes gripping pages that deal with these phenomena.

The author also shows that ideology is less an initial impulse to terror than it seems to be in both countries, a post-violence justification for the pain and mayhem that are terrorism's hallmark. She adds – but not entirely persuasively – that the "style" of policing protest adopted by the state is a weightier cause of the degeneration of protest movements into isolated, clandestine, and lethal terrorist organizations.

Political scientists will lament in particular della Porta's failure to pursue hypotheses (page 17) about the relationship of political institutions to protest and violence. She suggests that these dependent variables may well relate to such factors as the federal or unitary configuration of the two political systems, to the "permeability" of decision-making structures, to the quality of public bureaucracy, to the incidence of corruption, to the availability of direct legislative options, and so on. But in the pages that follow, one searches in vain for anything like a systematic examination of these interesting conjectures.

I found particularly puzzling the author's repeated assertion that protest and terror may well have reached the highest levels in Italy, because unlike in Germany, organized labor there was brutally repressed. But the revolutionary Workers' Statute, the *scala mobile*, the astonishing number of persons who now draw "disability" payments from the state, to say nothing of the "Pensioners Paradise," were all Italian, and not German, creations.

Similarly, it is not easy to agree with the assertion that protest and, later, terror, are causally related to inadequate or blocked access to political decision makers. By the author's own telling, the cradle of these phenomena in both countries was the university, which is not exactly the place that harbors or trains the downtrodden and unrepresented of the earth, destined to have less-than-average access to the seats of political power.

Only in the concluding pages do we find brief reference to Italy's immensely powerful Communist party. The PCI, and its satellite groups, not only supported mass protest; they fomented and organized it. And when terror did break out, the entire left remained for too long ambiguous in the face of it. And so did the left-leaning press! Surely, in a conceptual scheme that includes the influence of "the environment" on protest and terror, this particular aspect of the Italian case is worth as much attention as the author accords the behavior of the police.

JOSEPH LAPALOMBARA
Yale University

Ideological Profile of Twentieth-Century Italy *by Norberto Bobbio. Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1995. 239 pp. $29.95.*

Sometimes books become classics, influencing an entire generation of scholars and thinkers. This is the case with Norberto Bobbio's *Profile*, arguably the most authoritative Italian book in the field of political hermeneutics, in which all major political movements are analyzed in a philosophical and historical perspective. This interdisciplinary approach gives an extraor-

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dinary flavor to the book and allows the author profound insights into the complex world of Italian political life. The recent electoral results that brought the left to power in Italy for the first time (if we do not consider the brief pre-constitutional government after World War II) are in many ways anticipated here.

The book does not foresee the necessarily "progressive" evolution but certainly does give a key to a better understanding of the ideological background of contemporary Italy as a democracy in the making. The work also offers a stringent analysis of Italian ideological peculiarities, where internationally founded and established ideologies gain new color and different perspective once placed in the Italian environment. It is interesting, for example, to follow Bobbio describing ideological movements like Positivism and Marxism taking a new shape in their Italian interpretation. While not renouncing their roots, these ideologies found new strength in interacting with the Italian historical experience. The Catholic contribution along with those of the Socialists and Communists is analyzed in a broad perspective, which is able to offer an intriguing image of other relevant currents such as anti-democratic thought, especially in the period of Fascism.

The historical development is crucial in Bobbio's work. If a synthetic image should be used to describe this remarkable work, we should probably use Bobbio's own words: "My point of view is that of someone who has followed the tortuous development of democracy in Italy, from the beginning of the century to today, with intense participation in part as an historian who finds indifference impossible, in part as an apprehensive observer forever divided between fear and hope."

The book is about the development of democracy in Italy and is a very oriented reading of this path. Introducing intellectual figures such as Benedetto Croce, Gaetano Salvemini, Luigi Einaudi, Piero Gobetti, Antonio Gramsci, and others, Bobbio clearly offers the perspective of a thinker of the left, always concerned about the very possibility of a true democracy in Italy. Today, while the reference to the ideologies that Bobbio describes in his book are less relevant on all sides, this work offers an essential vision of the sweep of the entire century in Italy—an ideological struggle among different forces. These ideologies succeeded in finding a few moments of convergence, especially in the period just after World War II, building a paradoxical democratic experience. On one hand, stability and democratic institutions were linked to the Atlantic side, while on the other, full participation in the parliamentary and local government was given to all other competitive forces, namely the Communist party.

The political regime found a real and effective way to keep the constitution alive through two conventions: a *conventio ad escludendum* under which the impossibility of Communist participation in the government for reason of international equilibrium was recognized, and a *conventio ad conveniendum* under which, in exchange, the right of the Communist party to have an active opposition voice in the parliament, some local power, and the right of veto in relation to the most important choices were recognized. These agreements were crucial in shaping the possibility of a democratic experience in Italy. Together with these very pragmatic and political features, the ideological debate was able to nourish the Italian experience with its unique voices. Bobbio's work is a classic—able to give a full understanding of this development that made possible the astonishing transformation of Italy in this very ideological century.

ANDREA BARTOLI
Columbia University

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The Monarchy and the Constitution *by Vernon Bogdanor. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, 1995. 328 pp. $39.95.*

In light of the negative publicity surrounding the personal activities of the royal family in recent years, it is refreshing to be reminded of the British monarchy's constitutional responsibilities. Vernon Bogdanor's account is faintly reminiscent of the classic commentaries on the constitution by Walter Bagehot, Sir William Anson, and Ivor Jennings, yet it reckons with the hard realities of Britain in the 1990s, with its empire shorn, its economy in relative decline, and its social values under stress. Far from being an anachronism, the monarchy is portrayed here as a strong, stabilizing force that sustains and strengthens Britain's democratic institutions.

The author furnishes a rationale for this argument first by tracing the evolution of the constitutional monarchy. Consistent with Bagehot's nineteenth-century precepts, emphasis is placed on the accretion of prestige that occurred through a transformation from overt use of power to the less visible exercise of influence during the reign of Queen Victoria. Despite the authority vested in the Crown by statutory rules and prerogative powers to appoint a prime minister and dissolve Parliament, it is through a more subtle series of constitutional conventions and procedures, involving the right to be consulted, to advise, and to warn, that the sovereign has derived its greatest strength. Furthermore, successive extensions of the franchise from 1832 to 1918 and the rise of mass political parties necessitated a neutral agent that could foster a national consensus outside the political arena. "Influence operates best through stealth and suffers from visibility" (p. 70). Equally critical to facilitating democracy, contends Bogdanor, has been the monarchy's financial independence and its autonomy (through the General Synod) in handling church affairs. Hence Britain, despite an appearance of decadence, shares with other constitutional monarchies a distinction of being one of the most stable, prosperous, and free states in the modern world.

How the monarchy wielded its newfound influence is evident historically in crises such as those invoked by the People's Budget in 1909, the passage of Irish home rule in 1914, the formation of the Lloyd George coalition in 1916, and the budgetary imbalance of 1931. Significantly, when the system seemed most on the verge of a breakdown, the monarch's services were deemed most necessary. More hypothetical but no less pertinent is the ongoing possibility of a hung Parliament and proportional representation in an increasingly multiparty system of government. The chapter on private secretaries, an update of Paul Emden's 1934 account, is most valuable, showing how this official not only advises the monarch but serves as a channel of communication with ministers. Also informative and timely is the chapter on the sovereign's role in the Commonwealth. It is "an association which exists, not for any particular *purpose*, but for what it is, a group of countries connected by a common heritage and historical experience, and also by the English language" (p. 270). The institution of monarchy lends credibility to a body of nations linked solely by a common tradition.

This same sensitivity to spiritual bonds pervades Bogdanor's entire work. Indeed, a country's identity is characterized "just as much by feelings and perceptions as by realities" (p. 295), and legitimacy has always been a more operative principle than logic in the British national temper. Furthermore, notwithstanding the escapades of the younger royals and Bagehot's dictum about not letting daylight in upon magic, Bogdanor stresses that the monarchy "needs not only to be *seen*; it has also to *do*" (p. 309). By means of a so-called "welfare conception," epitomized by the public-spirited initiatives of the Prince of Wales on behalf of the unemployed, the disabled, and ethnic minorities, the contemporary monarchy has been able to expand on its traditional role as guardian of the constitution. Such innovations, concludes this masterly account, will strengthen the institution of monarchy into the next

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century, enabling it further to preserve the legitimacy of the state and to act as a force for national unity.

JOHN D. FAIR
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British Politics and European Elections 1994 *edited by David Butler and Martin Westlake. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 348 pp. $59.95.*

David Butler, an emeritus fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford, who has published many books on British politics, and Martin Westlake, a member of the secretariat of the European Council of Ministers, Brussels, who has written several works on the Strasbourg parliament, have together with a dozen British contributors produced an excellent study of an election that stirred little interest in the United Kingdom. The British turnout was Europe's lowest in the previous elections of 1979, 1984, and 1989, but the 36.2 percent of British voters in the 1994 election at least outnumbered the turnouts in the Netherlands and Portugal. The Europe-wide figure for the 1994 election—56.8 per cent—was the lowest since 1979. Voter apathy must disappoint those who regard a directly-elected European parliament as key to the development of a democratic and federal Europe.

A German political scientist has called the European elections "second-order national elections," because they involve neither power distribution nor government formation, as do national presidential or parliamentary elections. Parties and media devote so little attention and resources to the election of members of the European parliament that public ignorance and indifference persist. British journalism gives scant attention to the politics of the European Community. Although British newspapers, television, and radio have many Brussels-based correspondents who cover NATO as well as the EC, they compete unsuccessfully with correspondents in other national capitals for the attention of London-based editors. Westminster's prestigious lobby journalists expend most of their energy covering purely national politics and regard Europe as "an exogenous factor which is primarily of interest because it can have considerable consequences for the careers and fortunes of Westminster politicians" (p. 293). One theme that merited more treatment was Britain's withdrawal from the European Exchange Rate Mechanism after "Black Wednesday" on 16 September 1992 and how this related not only to the Bundesbank, but still matters to those in the City involved with currency speculation.

In addition to such basic considerations, the book covers how the European elections came only a few weeks after the Conservatives faced a huge loss in the local elections of 1994, how John Major has had to keep a growing number of Euro-skeptics and a diminishing number of Euro-enthusiasts within his party, why the Conservatives adopted a negative stance on Europe in the 1994 campaign while wrapping themselves in the cloak of patriotism, how the death of John Smith left Labour without a leader as most of their candidates for Strasbourg emphasized domestic problems rather than Europe in their successful bids for election, and the "Blair effect" from the media's treatment of Tony Blair as the new Labour leader.

Butler and Westlake's book is very well organized and presented. The first third of the book provides two background chapters on Britain's entry into Europe and the years since the 1989 election, as well as a particularly useful chapter on the varied procedures member countries use to elect their members to Strasbourg. The middle third of the book investigates

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how the Conservatives, Labour, Liberal Democrat, and other parties waged their national campaigns. After examining the peculiarities of the southwest, southeast, eastern, midland, northwest, and northeastern regions, as well as in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, the book concludes with a chapter on the outcome of the elections and some questions they raise. With an appendix, seven chronologies, thirty-eight tables, two figures, eleven cartoons, eighteen photographs, a bibliography, and an index, the book is as exhaustive an account of the 1994 European elections in Britain as is ever likely to be done.

ROGER ADELSON
Arizona State University

The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines *by Mark R. Thompson. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 258 pp. $32.50.*

Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire Revolution *by Robert H. Reid and Eileen Guerrero. Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University, 1995. 260 pp. $29.95.*

The February 1986 People Power uprising against Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos was perhaps the most closely observed coup d'etat that ever occurred. International, especially American, media—through telephone, television, and radio—covered nearly every detail of the drama as it unfolded in Manila from the inconclusive election on February 7 to the evacuation of the Marcos family on the 25th. The success of the revolt was for some a miracle, for others a triumph of nonviolent activism. For nearly everyone it was a victory of "the people" and democracy over a fourteen-year old dictatorship. The coup ushered in the new government of President Corazon "Cory" Aquino, whose husband, Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, was the most celebrated martyr of the Marcos regime. For the next six years she presided over the government, reinstated pre-1972 democratic institutions, and attempted to solve the social and economic ills inherited from the authoritarian era. In the years that followed the euphoria of 1986, few paused to analyze the struggle that led to the ouster of Marcos, and the many existing accounts are in large part descriptive and polemical, written mostly by participants, journalists, critics, and well-wishers. The two books under review here seek deeper explanations of both the 1986 revolt and the Aquino regime that followed it.

The Anti-Marcos Struggle by Mark Thompson is the first major analytical study of the complex movement that challenged and eventually brought an end to authoritarian rule. For Thompson, the fall of Marcos is a case study in "democratic transition"—an early, perhaps catalytic example of "the third wave," a global phenomenon that in the past decade has led to the replacement of other authoritarian regimes by democratic governments. The central question for the Philippines, as posed by Thompson, is "why the democrats, not their armed rivals, won the race to topple the dictatorship" (p. 2).

To answer this question, Thompson combines an analysis of over four decades of Philippine politics and political culture with theories of political transition drawn from a global perspective. His study pulls together an impressive variety of source materials and insightful observations. After providing a concise overview of postwar clientelistic and electoral politics, he describes how the Marcos dictatorship dismantled the pre-1972 democratic institutions and the system of clientelism that sustained it. Rejecting previous conceptualizations of the Marcos regime as bureaucratic or constitutional authoritarianism, Thompson characterizes it as "sultanistic"—nonideological, personalistic, and "organized around family and friends"

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(p. 5). With external support from the United States and effective control of the military, there was little need for Marcos and his cronies to negotiate with opposition groups and, without legitimate institutional bases, their wealth and positions could only be protected by retaining power.

Faced with an unyielding, increasingly corrupt, dictatorial regime, the traditional opposition employed a range of strategies and alliances, each carefully reconstructed in Thompson's narrative. Frustrated in their efforts to win in the manipulated election of 1978, some turned to urban terrorism and subsequently to an uneasy and short-lived alliance with elements of Communist party, which by the early 1980s was leading an increasingly popular armed struggle in many regions of the country. After the Aquino assassination in August 1983, the opposition increased its determination and broadened its base with backing from the Catholic Church, influential Manila business interests, and "some U.S. officials." At this time, the core of the anti-Marcos movement turned to more familiar terrain—elections. Successfully capturing the moral high ground, through "appeals for honest government and the preservation of democracy", the opposition, led now by Aquino, rejected violence and "saw elections as a way both to defeat Marcos and outmaneuver the Left" (p. 182-83). Although we have known for some time that a far more complex movement lay behind the people power uprising of the February 1986, Thompson's study provides a well reasoned explanation for the ultimate victory of the traditional opposition. Aquino had established a popular legitimacy that not only facilitated her electoral victory over Marcos and her political ascendancy in February 1986, but, argues Thompson, also guaranteed the transition to democracy and permitted her government to overcome both military conspirators and communist rebels in the post-Marcos era.

Corazon Aquino and the Brushfire Revolution by Robert Reid and Eileen Guerrero covers similar ground, but is more descriptive, less analytical, and nontheoretical. The book covers the "six turbulent years" of Aquino's administration—from the "brushfire revolution" of February 1986 to her retirement from politics in June 1992. Based on interviews and materials collected mostly from their journalistic experiences, Reid and Guerrero provide the reader with a lively and detailed account of the personalities and events at the center of the government during the Aquino years. Following a chronological format, the book describes the regime's efforts to establish a stable government in the midst of challenges from Marcos loyalists, the military, communists and Muslim rebels, and an increasingly hostile political opposition that soon emerged within the reinstituted democratic system. Plagued by natural disasters (earthquakes and volcanic eruptions) and continuing human rights violations and pressured by the conflict-ridden negotiations over the future of American military bases, the Aquino government was overwhelmed in its efforts to solve many of the country's long-standing problems. Among other things, the authors set out to demystify Cory Aquino. Neither housewife nor saint, she is depicted as a wealthy, somewhat pampered woman, quite familiar with the political culture in which she operated, but in the final analysis, an ineffective leader. Above all, the book reiterates the widely held sentiment that Aquino "squandered a unique, historic opportunity to correct the injustices of Philippine society and to set the country on a positive course for the next century" (p. 249). Both the strength and the weakness of this book lie in the wealth of information contained in it—enough to make it an informative and useful source but too much for the authors to draw any significant analytical conclusions.

MICHAEL CULLINANE
University of Wisconsin

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Fascism: Past, Present, Future *by Walter Laqueur. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 263 pp. $25.00.*

The Radical Right in Western Europe: A Comparative Analysis *by Herbert Kitschelt. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1996. 332 pp. $49.50.*

During the past several years, right-wing radical and extremist movements and parties have once again emerged as a significant and serious political challenge to Western-style democracy. The recent electoral gains of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe, the upsurge of nationalist and religious fundamentalism in India, Northern Africa, Russia, and Turkey, and the mobilization of antigovernment movements in North America suggest that despite the collapse of communism the end of the twentieth century is still very much part of "the age of extremes" (E.J. Hobsbawm). Among the growing literature on the latest wave of right-wing radicalism and extremism, Walter Laqueur's essay on fascism and Herbert Kitschelt's comparative analysis of right-wing radicalism in Western Europe stand out in terms of their depth of knowledge, intellectual rigor, and dispassionate approach. Despite their merits, however, neither of the two books is entirely convincing.

The argument guiding Laqueur's analysis is already contained in the title. Unlike some historians, who have argued that fascism was an historical phenomenon that came to an end with the demise of Nazism, Laqueur approaches fascism as an ideology bound by neither time nor place. He sees fascism largely as a populist movement expressing the frustration and resentment of those layers of society that feel left behind by the process of modernization and fear social marginalization. The first part of the study shows how Mussolini and especially Hitler skillfully exploited these sentiments to rally considerable support for systems of authoritarian or totalitarian rule whose underlying ideology inevitably would lead to violence and destruction. The second part explores how economic insecurity and growing resentment against immigrants have given rise to neofascist parties and movements in Europe during the past few years. The third, and by far most original part, discusses how widespread resentment against the West and growing social tensions have given rise to "clerical fascism" and other "fascistlike movements" in a number of developing countries and in the former Soviet Union.

Despite its eloquence and wealth of evidence and information, *Fascism: Past, Present, Future* leaves the reader somewhat confused. Laqueur fails to provide a clear and unequivocal definition of fascism, which would allow readers to distinguish it from other movements on the far right. As a result, the reader is left somewhat bewildered with a plethora of labels whose relationship to each other is far from clear.

Herbert Kitschelt's latest book seeks to advance an explanation for the recent success (and failure) of radical right-wing parties in Western Europe. Contrary to Walter Laqueur, Kitschelt rejects the notion of continuity between historical fascism and contemporary European right-wing radicalism. In his view, the radical right in Western Europe is a political response to the current large-scale sociostructural transformation of advanced capitalist societies. Sociostructural change gives rise to new political issues, which open up political opportunities for new politician entrepreneurs to make electoral gains, provided the established political parties fail to respond to the new demands. In Kitschelt's view, the large-scale transformation of contemporary postindustrial capitalism creates a significant demand for a combination of authoritarian, ethnocentric, and market liberal appeals. Parties that are able to integrate these demands into a winning formula (authoritarianism *cum* market liberalism) and manage to appeal to an electoral coalition of blue-collar workers and the petty bourgeoisie

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can be expected to do well at the polls. Kitschelt classifies these parties as new radical right-wing parties. Parties that emphasize a neoliberal or market libertarian agenda, such as the Austrian Freedom party or the Italian Northern League, he classifies as populist antistatist parties expecting their support to come from a cross-section of the electorate. Finally, parties that promote a largely authoritarian agenda (for example, the German Republikaner) he classifies as welfare chauvinist parties expecting their very limited support to come predominantly from blue-collar voters.

Based on empirical evidence from the 1990 World Values Survey, Kitschelt demonstrates that this model can be usefully employed not only to explain the recent success of new radical right-wing parties such as the French National Front or the Scandinavian Progress parties, but also the failure of the British National Front to establish themselves as viable contenders in their respective party systems. Unfortunately, lack of data prevents Kitschelt from analyzing the Swiss radical right and especially the Belgian Flemish Block, one of the most successful and outright racist far-right parties in Western Europe.

As in his earlier works, Kitschelt bolsters his case with an impressive array of theoretical insights and evidence from secondary sources. Unfortunately, the outcome is not entirely convincing. Most simply put, both his model and his classification scheme have failed the test of time. This is most obvious in the case of the Italian Movimento Socialo Italiano, which, despite not having found the winning formula and thus supposedly being doomed to further decline, has emerged as a leading political contender in post-1992 Italian politics. A second example is the Austrian Freedom party, which has been attracting a disproportionate share of the blue-collar vote, thus increasingly resembling the French National Front. The social base of the Northern League has experienced a similar evolution. These developments make clear that Kitschelt's distinction between radical right-wing parties and populist antistatist parties is less useful than he claims. They suggest that the new radical right in Western Europe is much more flexible in its political strategies than Kitschelt would allow. It might well be, for example, that the radical right will in the future abandon market liberalism in favor of a return to Keynesianism and some form of protectionism should the ideological tide turn in Western Europe and elsewhere. The rise of the New Zealand First party in early 1996 might show the way.

Notwithstanding these reservations, both books provide a comprehensive and stimulating introduction to an important contemporary political phenomenon. Their conceptual and analytical breadth makes the books useful reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in European politics, party politics, and political culture, as well as for the interested general reader.

HANS-GEORG BETZ
The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies

Reconsidering American Liberalism: The Troubled Odyssey of the Liberal Idea *by James P. Young. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1996. 437 pp. Cloth, $65.00; paper, $20.00.*

This volume surveys American political thought with a view to giving new currency to Louis Hartz's ideas about American liberalism and to altering them to meet the political and intellectual developments of the last half-century. According to Young, Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* (1955) is valuable, but its thesis concerning a quasi-liberal Puritanism

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needs to be modified in the interest of both accuracy and relevance. Most of the historical material covers very well trod ground in a conventional way from Puritanism to the New Left. Young intersperses every page of his narrative with conscientious and diligent attempts to parse the views of prominent historians who have written on one or another phase of American political history since Hartz. Thus when we are introduced to Jacksonianism, we also are asked to digest the interpretations of Marvin Meyers, J.G.A. Pocock, Sean Wilentz, and Richard Hofstadter.

When we get to the present, Young similarly explicates thinking about affirmative action, feminism, postmodernism, neoconservatism, and so on. But in every section his own voice must be distinguished from that of other critics—for example on p. 289 from that of Michael Sandel, John Rawls, John Dewey, George Kateb, and Mary Ann Glendon.

The basic point of Young's analysis is that while the Hartz paradigm still has a lot going for it, Hartz underestimated the importance of the corporate influence of the Puritans. A similar point has recently been argued for by Barry Alan Shain in *The Myth of American Individualism* (1994). Thus, to solve present problems, Young finds it appropriate that the liberal emphasis on rights be enriched (or diluted) by considerations of community.

It seems to me plausible to argue that the American political tradition has within it the resources to confront issues that otherwise may seem insoluble at the present time. On the other hand, Young goes beyond this to say that to renew democracy and reinvigorate the liberalism that Hartz tried to explicate we need new theories that make up for his deficiencies. In Young's words, we must have an "interpretative politics" that synthesizes the ideas of George Kateb, the Berkeley school, and Michael Walzer (p. 340). I think I am understanding Young aright here, and confess to believing that academic theories have very little to do with what will happen, good or bad, in our political life.

The conventional nature of Young's treatment of political thought has, from within his framework, led him astray in one crucial area of concern. In the colonial period, the only people treated are the Puritans, who are reinterpreted as less than modern liberals. But when he gets to the late-eighteenth century, Young has no way of explaining the rise of constitutional thought. The federalists—Alexander Hamilton, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and George Washington—are all from the middle colonies and Virginia. As Young well knows, the early republic was dominated by the aristocracy of Virginia. The dynasty from 1788 to 1824 was broken only by the one failed term of John Adams from Massachusetts. The striking thing about the early republic is that it is only nominally Christian and as far away from New England Calvinism as America could get. It is no longer acceptable to try to understand political thought in America by the focus on the Puritans; indeed, focusing on them—as either proto-liberals or as pre-moderns— makes it impossible to understand the development of politics in the United States. The question is not how to reinterpret the Puritan tradition but to place it properly in competition with other traditions that Young's ruminations do not even consider.

BRUCE KUKLICK
University of Pennsylvania

State and Party in America's New Deal *by Kenneth Finegold and Theda Skocpol. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1995. 342 pp. Cloth, $54.00; paper, $19.95.*

How to explain public policy in capitalist democracies? Those familiar with Theda Skocpol's approach will be interested in how she and Kenneth Finegold make sense of the New Deal

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and situate their account in relation to other explanatory contenders. Their clearly written book serves an analytic and a pedagogical purpose, aiming both to explain and to instruct. It proposes a model focusing on the state and party system, and it compares two major policy innovations—the National Recovery Administration (NRA) and the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA)—to explain the failure of the first and the qualified success of the second. The book also systematically evaluates four alternative approaches (pluralist, elitist, Marxist, and rational choice), in addition to their own, to see which best explains the origins, implementation, and consequences of the two policies. In so doing, the authors offer a paradigm for constructing macropolitical comparisons to develop and test social theory.

The two policies make a wonderfully puzzling pair. Both represented dramatic and innovative responses to the great economic crisis of twentieth-century capitalism, substantially increasing the federal government's role in industry and agriculture. Both were intended to speed recovery by adjusting prices, production, and employment. Yet, the NRA was ineffectual and soon became discredited, especially in the eyes of its initial business supporters. Ironically, its major effect was to boost organized labor and improve the condition of industrial workers—hardly what its capitalist proponents had in mind. The AAA, in contrast, was deemed a great success and enjoyed substantial support among farmers. It did little, however, to improve the lives of agricultural workers, tenant farmers, or sharecroppers. As Finegold and Skocpol point out, economic differences between industry and agriculture cannot account for these varied fates.

Two key differences explain the diverging trajectories of the two policies, one related to the state and the other to political parties. First, the AAA was able to draw upon a substantial pre-existing pool of expertise in devising and implementing its policies. Agricultural economists affiliated with the Department of Agriculture and land-grant colleges had long studied the problems of American farmers and had a good sense of what was feasible. The NRA, in contrast, had to build from scratch and was forced to incorporate large numbers of business people. As amateur bureaucrats, they were ill equipped to resolve unprecedented problems of regulation and control. In agriculture, the American state had the capacity to act autonomously, while in industry it did not.

The key political difference was that northern industrial workers formed an important part of the electorate, whereas agricultural workers, especially in the South and West, did not. The latter could be excluded from the benefits of public policy with almost no political cost. Both parties tried hard to win over midwestern and western farmers. Thus the AAA simply reinforced existing inequalities in the agricultural sector.

Supporters of the theoretical alternatives may not be entirely happy with Finegold and Skocpol's treatment. The authors are unenthusiastic advocates of the other alternatives, clearly preferring their own state-and-party approach. I suspect that rational choice theorists, for example, can remedy some of the explanatory failings attributed to them. Structural Marxists will recognize the authors' emphasis on the importance of state autonomy. Nevertheless, the treatment of the alternatives is even-handed and systematic. The authors summarize by noting how each theory presupposes particular institutional conditions of state and party. To consider systematically the organization of party systems and the capacity and autonomy of the state is to encompass the other four theories within a single, more general analytic framework—one that puts the spotlight on institutions.

BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS
Northwestern University

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Saving the Constitution from the Courts *by William Gangi. Norman, The University of Oklahoma Press, 1995. 352 pp. $45.00.*

If you have been meaning to get reacquainted with Raoul Berger's arguments against "government by judiciary," you might as well start with William Gangi's faithful (and at times, uncomfortably personal) reiteration.

Gangi, a self-described "ENTJ" (which we learn from an appendix on "Temperament and Personality Types" stands for Extrovert, Intuitive, Thinker, Judger), adopts the tone of a patient teacher who urges skeptical students to open their minds to his "polemic" against the "scandalous" assault on self-government by modern judges and the "liberal legal intelligentsia" (pp. 126, 267, 282). His evidence mostly consists of fawning summaries of the Federalist Papers, selected Marshall Court opinions, and the writings of contemporary advocates of judicial restraint. Gangi sets the stage for his normative critique by arguing that: the Framers were preoccupied with establishing virtually unfettered self-government rather than constitutional limits on power; the early Court was deferential to representative policy making; and the turn-of-the-century Court rejected originalism and thus ushered in the modern practice of judicial activism.

Gangi reviews the 1970s discussion of "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism," but more recent developments in constitutional theory and history are not addressed. No attention is paid to debates associated with the work of Ronald Dworkin, Stanley Fish (a.k.a., Stanley "Fisk," p. 117), Richard Posner, Bruce Ackerman, and critical theorists; and his discussion of the development of judicial power is uninformed by the most current historiography of the origins of Lochner-era jurisprudence. Gangi's unwillingness to engage this literature may be a product of his belief that readers get bored when authors offer point-by-point refutations of competing arguments (p. xvii) but it also seems influenced by his preference for the way these debates were framed in the years following his professional training (pp. 258–59).

Gangi is right to complain that the Framers' commitment to original intent has been underappreciated by contemporary scholars, and his discussion of the evidence for this claim is useful. However, like most works of this genre, the claim that originalism leads to judicial restraint is premised on argumentative sleight-of-hand. He contends that the Framers set up a system of delegated powers and that courts are not authorized either to expand or contract the intended scope of the delegation. He uses originalism to criticize judicial protection of unanticipated rights, but there is no similar effort to urge courts to resist unanticipated expansions of the government's limited powers. In an extraordinary reversal of the original design, Gangi offers us a stingy originalism with respect to rights but a boundless nonoriginalism with respect to powers. The result is consistent with the perspectives of pragmatist supporters of legislative authority, such as Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter, but would have been unimaginable to the Framers: a government of expanding powers that is unfettered by the fixed terms of the original delegation.

Once Gangi acknowledges that he is willing to apply his originalism to rights but not to powers, it becomes clear that the analysis is driven, not by a desire to save the Constitution, but rather by a desire to shield government from the inconveniences associated with judicial enforcement of the Framers' conception of the scope of government powers. This is no surprise; the attempt to escape these inconveniences is a hallmark of both liberal and conservative jurisprudence in the post-New Deal era. Gangi et al. might respond that at least their side only approves of departures from originalism that are initiated by popular majorities,

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but nevertheless the resulting practices can no more be legitimated by the original design than those advocated by their opponents.

HOWARD GILLMAN
University of Southern California

Defense Conversion: Transforming the Arsenal of Democracy *by Jacques Gansler. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1995. 277 pp. $25.00.*

The title of this book is misleading. Jacques Gansler neither examines nor contemplates a wholesale conversion of defense industries to commercial purposes. The subtitle, however, is quite revealing: this book develops and defends a blueprint for transforming the defense industries into a leaner and meaner "arsenal of democracy." His pragmatic agenda notwithstanding, Gansler offers sharp criticisms of the policies, budget priorities, and operating procedures of the Pentagon. He makes passing reference to some of the more visible critics of the Pentagon (including Seymour Melman, Ann Markusen, and Gordon Adams). However, he relies primarily upon governmental studies and reports issued by the Washington, DC think tank establishment.

Jacques Gansler is well prepared for analyzing the post-cold war transformation of the defense industries. He has served as a deputy assistant secretary of defense and has worked for defense firms and inside the beltway think tanks. He has written two influential books: *The Defense Industry* (MIT Press, 1980) analyzed the history and operations of the defense industries in the midst of the cold war; and *Affording Defense* (MIT Press, 1989) documented the inefficiencies of the highly insulated defense industries at the peak of the Reagan-era military buildup.

In the post–cold war era, the Pentagon and its suppliers confront enormous problems. The defense industries are large, complex, and highly concentrated. For a number of essential items, the Pentagon relies on one or two suppliers, and a number of components are being supplied by foreign firms. As the post–cold war world continues to be a dangerous place, the United States is committed to maintaining the world's most powerful military, even if this force is significantly smaller than the cold war force structure.

Under the current system of defense production, the Pentagon relies upon voluminous regulations to insure quality and fairness in defense production. In this period of rapid transition, these regulations generate inefficiencies and long delays in making common-sense adjustments to defense procurement. Defense firms have adapted to the peculiarities of the defense market, but they are ineffective in commercial production and marketing. The federal government's antitrust statutes are especially costly. Consolidation of defense firms is obstructed if the resulting firm controls too much of the market. As such, the Pentagon maintains two or more dependent and inefficient firms in a host of sectors.

Gansler contends the system is unworkable and advocates abandoning "the current adversarial, legalistic structure of defense market operations." Instead, he recommends that "policymakers should use free market forces and normal commercial laws to do the government's business" (p. 86–87). This shift in the manner through which the Pentagon conducts business will make it and defense firms better able to take advantage of the vibrant and technologically aggressive commercial firms. Today, commercial firms not only manufacture goods that are more reliable and more cost effective than those manufactured by defense firms, but commer-

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cial firms are also on par with or ahead of defense firms for incorporating state-of-the-art technologies in the goods they produce.

This book is informative, well-written, and competently documented. In all likelihood, it will play an important role in framing debates over post-cold war defense procurement. This is an important book for social scientists who study defense economics, economic planning, or civil-military relations. However, because it concentrates on a specific issue and does not address the debates and literature that are most central to academia, I do not think it is appropriate for undergraduate or graduate survey courses. I would, however, recommend it for specialized graduate courses.

GREGORY HOOKS
Washington State University

On the Origins of War and the Preservation of Peace *by Donald Kagan. New York, Doubleday, 1995. 606 pp. $30.00.*

Based on his lectures for a course at Yale, Kagan's *On the Origins of War* has sections dealing with the Peloponnesian war (431–404 BC), World War I, Hannibal's second Punic war (218–201 BC); World War II, and the Cuban missile crisis.

Kagan's account of the Peloponnesian war was interesting, and his conclusion that the Athenians' policy was not consistent with their strategic capacity is convincing. In his story of the origins of World War I, Otto von Bismarck is the hero, and his dismissal was the first of the kaiser's many mistakes. But Kagan convincingly argues that Britain shares the blame for the war. If it had built an army as large as those of the continental powers, Germany would have been deterred. Instead, Britain clung to its tradition of relying on its navy and of maintaining only a small, volunteer army.

For Hannibal's war and his "devastating, almost fatal" sixteen-year rampage over Italy, Kagan blames Rome, which pursued "a policy that was both too hard and too soft, unclear, self-deceptive, and, therefore, dangerous" (p. 274).

As to the causes of World War II, Kagan rejects the view that the root cause was the harsh terms of the Versailles treaty ending World War I. If viewed from a comparative perspective, he argues, the treaty was not unduly harsh. But the Germans could reject as hypocritical and unjust a peace that was based on President Woodrow Wilson's moralism and insistence on self-determination for the peoples of Eastern and Central Europe, but which at the same time forbade the Germans of Austria to join the German Republic. The Versailles treaty, Kagan argues, was neither conciliatory enough to remove the desire for change nor harsh enough to make another war impossible. Kagan concludes that it may not have been possible to deter the fanatical Hitler from war, "but *Germany* could have been prevented from launching any serious adventure down to the occupation of the Rhineland" in 1936. (Kagan's emphasis.) "The means for preserving the peace were not lacking, only the understanding for will" (p. 417).

Kagan's final section is on the Cuban missile crisis. He says that the United States deployed missiles to Europe "as a response to the perceived 'missile gap'" (p. 450). But in fact, the decision was made in response to the massive Soviet deployment of intermediate-range missiles targeted at the NATO allies, not because of a supposed missile gap.

Kagan writes that the "the new high-flying U-2 revealed how limited was the deployment of Soviet missiles. Insiders in the American government, at least, knew that there was no

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'missile gap' . . ." (p. 451). But the U-2 was shot down on its way to Plesetsk, where intelligence suggested that the very first of the ICBMs were being deployed, and President Dwight Eisenhower promised not to fly it over the Soviet Union again.

Kagan writes, "As early as February [1961] . . . McNamara let slip that 'there is no missile gap'" (p. 490). Robert McNamara did indeed have a gut feeling that there was no missile gap and said so in a press backgrounder. But he had no evidence whatsoever. In fact, it was not until the summer of 1961 that satellite photography showed that when the Soviets tried to deploy the first ICBMs to Plesetsk, they turned out to be just too big and unwieldy to be used as weapons.

Kagan uses the fact that John McCone, the head of CIA, told John Kennedy that he believed the Soviets would put missiles in Cuba as evidence that the administration knew about them. But McCone later said, "Let me make it unmistakably clear that there was no—I repeat no—hard evidence supporting my view in August that there were offensive missiles going into Cuba. It was wholly a question of judgment" (Thomas L. Hughes, *The Fate of Facts in a World of Men, Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making*, 44).

In fact, almost all the senior American officials, including Kennedy, shared McCone's suspicion that the Soviets might put missiles in Cuba. But no one in the government had any shred of evidence until the U-2 took its pictures on 14 October, 1962.

Kagan says that in its 19 September 1962 estimate the United States Intelligence Board wrote of the "continued deployment of nuclear missiles in Cuba" (p. 505). In fact, the estimate noted that some *refugees* had said that there was "continued deployment" of missiles but rejected their contentions. At the time of the refugee reports no missiles had yet arrived.

Yet Kagan writes "United States intelligence sources reported what seemed to be MRBMs unloading at the Cuban port of Mariet from the fifteenth to the seventeenth [of September] and in seeing at least eight of them on a convoy going to San Cristobal, where the first missile site was built" (p. 505). The citation Kagan gives notes that *after* the crisis was over, intelligence deduced that the missiles were unloaded at those times, but no such evidence was available before the U-2 flight on 14 October.

In addition to the inaccuracies and misquotations in the last section of Kagan's book, the reader is struck by the large number of anti-Kennedy assertions and judgments. To give only one example, Kagan says flatly, without offering any evidence, that Kennedy was "obsessed" with Fidel Castro (p. 493) and that this was the reason for many of Kennedy's decisions during the crisis. Yet when the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research sent Kennedy a memo in the midst of the crisis recommending that removing Castro be added to the demand for removing the missiles, he tartly refused, saying that Castro was simply an annoyance, while the missiles threatened our very survival.

ROGER HILSMAN
Columbia University

Consolidating Democracy in Poland *by Raymond Taras, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995. 276 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper $19.95.*

Raymond Taras has crafted a densely layered account of Poland's transition that integrates the major approaches to democratization and a very rich variety of empirical evidence about the case. Taking an updated version of the crisis, choice, and change approach developed

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by Gabriel Almond, Scott Flanagan, and Robert Mundt, as a frame for ordering his analysis, the author seeks to explain the complexities of democratization in Poland as systematically as possible, without claiming to establish causal relationships valid for all cases of democratization. In large measure, he succeeds.

After laying out his levels and methods of analysis in an extensive introduction, Taras begins with a fine historical chapter that highlights several referents for the political culture and institutions evident in both the communist and postcommunist periods without overly skewing the historical narrative. His structural-functional study of the communist system extends into an analysis of major economic, social, and international trends during that period and the resulting macro and micro level changes in political alignments and values that prepared the ground for Poland's democratic breakthrough. Recognizing the institutional fluidity and extraordinary scope for strategic action during transition periods, Taras then switches to a rational choice analysis of the major actors, their goals and strategies, and the change in these factors over the course of negotiation. Once the course of events takes the transition further than the pact negotiated, the author returns to a structural-functional analysis of the emerging system, asking not only what the features of that system are, but also whether we can consider Poland as having consolidated democratic rule.

From the beginning, Taras acknowledges the strongest potential criticism that could be levied at this approach—that it leaves nothing out. Indeed, he is deliberately as inclusive as possible of both varying approaches and different types of evidence. The result is a rich study of the case that incorporates a great deal of evidence in order to capture the complexity of the transition and at least partially fill some of the empirical holes remaining in our understanding of this process. No source is left unturned. The drawback to this strategy, both at the overall level and in a few specific sections (for example, voting theory on pp. 187–88) is a tendency to give several approaches even weight, leaving the reader wanting more adjudication among explanations. This problem is most visible in the last phase of analysis. The author argues that this section has to be more tentative given the new system's short duration, the enormity and complexity of change, and the partial nature of the evidence that can be brought to bear on the many questions associated with the transformation. Still, one way to strengthen the discrimination among approaches and several different types of evidence would have been a longer and stronger conclusion, one that placed this material more solidly into the overarching framework of the book. Although Taras is careful to set out this framework at the beginning of the book and carry it through his first three analyses and to the beginning of his fourth (consolidation), the sheer amount of empirical discussion in the last phase begins to swamp the ordering framework he has designed. What the conclusion does well, however, is bring us back to the overall questions concerning democratic consolidation, arguing that we are seeing consolidation even if a full shift in political culture has not yet occurred.

In sum, this book is the most comprehensive analysis of this case yet published in the West; it is skillfully organized and researched. Anyone who wants to understand the Polish transition should read it. The author's theoretical inclusiveness also allows him to speak to many audiences in comparative politics and suggests several important research projects associated with transitions to democracy.

BARBARA HICKS
University of North Carolina

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Citizens, Politics, and Social Communication: Information and Influence in an Election Campaign *by Robert Huckfelt and John Sprague. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 292 pp. $49.95.*

With this book, the authors have presented an impressive study of social communication and its influence on political practice. The theoretical model developed is translated into an effective empirical research design able to measure their hypothetical assertions. Along the way, they acknowledge where the model presents testing bias and what designs might best serve future research.

The authors challenge a number of influential political science perspectives. One such view asserts that social communication has little or no influence on the political opinions held by discussants. Several reasons for this ineffectiveness are presented. First, individuals choose with whom they discuss politics, self-selecting those whose opinions agree with their own. Also, citizens reinterpret and even misperceive disturbing information that they disagree with to minimize cognitive dissonance.

In designing a theoretical model with an expectation that social interaction does indeed influence political practice the authors set forth a key principle. To counter the individual choice/self-selection model, they assert that the social interactions of everyday life are largely constrained by the wider social structure, which does not allow citizens to totally define the social environments within which interaction takes place. For example, people choose neighborhoods for good schools, proximity to work, or affordability. They choose jobs that pay well and match their skills. They go to churches according to denomination and location. Although these decisions are not politically motivated, citizens interact politically with others, especially nonrelatives in these settings. They may see political buttons, bumper stickers, or candidate posters. Political information also emerges during social interaction at work or at church and is, therefore, not uniquely political in nature. In this way, the study locates political practice, including candidate preference etc., within the broader social communication patterns of everyday life.

The authors assert that following national random probability samples, voting studies have become highly individualistic, emphasizing psychological explanations for political behavior while ignoring "sociologically rich, community based studies" (p. 104). The empirical model and testing procedures convey the authors' commitment to understand politics as it is embedded within local geographic and social environments. They are intentionally nonrandom and community based. Residents of sixteen selected neighborhoods in South Bend, Indiana, were interviewed extensively by telephone on three different occasions during the 1984 presidential election—initially after the Indiana primary, but before the national conventions, then after Labor Day, and finally postelection in conjunction with a subsequent snowball survey of discussion partners.

One important finding of this multilayered study clarifies the social context within which citizens misperceive political information. Persons holding opinions divergent from those of the majority perceive more accurately when disagreement occurs. In contrast, the authors found that members holding majority opinions are less likely to encounter disagreement; and when they do, they are less likely to recognize it. This asymmetry in political perception, arising from majority and minority political status, results in a type of "informational coercion" (p. 143) in which minority members are more socially vulnerable by virtue of their differing views. Majority members, on the other hand, are generally able to ignore such dissonant information. These findings are enormously relevant to understanding political communication and social interaction, and for analyzing mass media campaign discourse designed to

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appeal to the majority through vague and standardized messages. In addition, contemporary political organizations, such as the Christian Coalition, may be best understood as the development of powerful cohesive social groups in response to minority political status vis à vis mainstream political discourse.

ROBIN ANDERSEN
Fordham University

Nothing to Read: Newspapers and Elections in a Social Experiment *by Jeffery J. Mondak. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1995. 191 pp. Cloth, $39.50; paper, $16.95.*

As the 1992 election approached, Jeffery Mondak found his research program stymied by real-world events. He was planning a study of contextual influences on electoral behavior, based on survey research in the Pittsburgh metropolitan area. However, the area's two major newspapers were on strike, altering the information environment and thereby undermining the generalizability of findings drawn from his survey. Because of the strike, voters in Pittsburgh would comprise a unique case—the only voters in the United States who lived in a major metropolitan area with no major local paper.

Nothing to Read represents Mondak's response—his attempt to turn lemons into lemonade. Rather than being deterred by the strike, he shifted focus and strategy by making the strike the core of his project, which he reconceptualized as a "social experiment" that could shed light on the role of local newspapers in disseminating political information. Under normal circumstances, it is hard to get a clear fix on the electoral impact of newspapers, which are an omnipresent component of the metropolitan environment. To be sure, one could compare newspaper readers with nonreaders, but the two groups differ in many other ways as well, such as socioeconomic status and interest in politics, making it extremely difficult to isolate the effect of newspaper reading. The strike ensured that no one in Pittsburgh was reading a major local daily; so residents were gathering and forming opinions with the local press totally removed from the picture. Mondak's strategic challenge, then, was to compare information gathering and opinion formation in this newspaperless setting to the same processes in a setting where the press was operating as usual. For this role, he selected Cleveland, a city very much like Pittsburgh, and conducted parallel postelection surveys in the two settings.

The result is a thoroughly competent two-city study of political knowledge, discussion, and vote choice. The findings, which are too far-ranging and nuanced to summarize here, contain no real bombshells, but do flesh out what was previously known or suspected. For example, there was little or no difference between the two settings in voters' levels of information about current events, the campaign, and presidential candidates' policy positions; but voters in the Pittsburgh area scored significantly lower in self-reported knowledge of the race for U.S. House in their district. Apparently any deficit in information about national affairs or highly salient state affairs caused by missing the newspaper can be overcome by attending more closely to other information sources; but for House races, which are more localized events, the newspaper is not so easily replaceable. Students of the impact of the press in political campaigns will find much of interest in *Nothing to Read*, not because Mondak strikes off in a wholly new direction or advances a strikingly new argument, but because he carefully documents plausible interpretations that had not previously been systematically tested.

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The primary shortcoming of the study is the possibility that Pittsburgh and Cleveland differed in politically consequential ways other than the availability of local newspapers in the latter but not the former. There is one American city more like Pittsburgh than Cleveland is: Pittsburgh itself. For some purposes, Mondak's comparisons of newspaperless 1992 Pittsburgh with Cleveland are on point. For other purposes (analysis of voters' information about House races), though, comparisons of newspaperless 1992 Pittsburgh with poststrike 1994 Pittsburgh would have been more telling. Had Mondak complemented his cross-sectional two-city comparison with a longitudinal comparison focused on Pittsburgh during and after the strike, the results reported in *Nothing to Read* would have been all the more conclusive.

LEE SIGELMAN
The George Washington University

Reversals of Fortune: Public Policy and Private Interests *by Gary Mucciaroni. Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1995. 225 pp. Cloth, $34.95; paper, $14.95.*

During the last quarter-century, several industries that had held privileged positions in Washington since the New Deal have had those positions successfully challenged. At the same time, clientelism has by no means disappeared from American politics. Many producer interests have managed to come through the last quarter-century with their concentrated benefits intact. Mucciaroni's book attempts to explain these diverse outcomes: why did some producers experience a "reversal of fortune," while others did not?

Mucciaroni draws on four policy clusters, namely tax expenditures, economic regulation, trade policy, and agricultural subsidies. He divides each into two distinct time periods, providing him with a total of eight cases. In three of these cases, agricultural subsidies and tax expenditures during the 1980s, and economic regulation prior to the 1970s, the fortunes of producer interests improved. Trade policy during the 1970s and 1980s and agricultural subsidies during the 1990s were relatively stable. In the remaining three cases, namely trade policy prior to the 1970s, tax expenditures after 1981, and economic regulation since 1970, producer interests lost ground.

Mucciaroni accounts for these outcomes in terms of two variables: issue context and institutional context. Issue context refers to the terms of political debate, or more specifically the way policy makers assess the legitimacy of a particular claim. Are a group's benefits regarded as in the public interest, as was the case with business tax expenditures during the economic stagnation of the 1970s? Or are they viewed as unnecessary, as was the case of business tax expenditures during the relative prosperity of the 1980s.

Institutional context has to do with the way producer privileges, or the challenges to them, are processed by the political system. It encompasses such factors as the committee structure, the preferences of powerful politicians, partisan divisions, and the nature of coalitions and political alliances.

Mucciaroni claims that in six of his cases, the two contexts reinforced one another. In the remaining two, namely agricultural price supports during the 1990s and trade policy during the 1980s and 1990s, the issue context does not explain the outcome. In these cases, it was the structure of political decision making that enabled prosperous farmers to continue to receive generous subsidies, while import relief was denied to a number of hard-pressed domestic industries.

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Mucciaroni's analysis challenges the work of those who have chosen to study business influence by relying on policy inputs such as business lobbying and campaign expenditures. He demonstrates that differences in the degree of political mobilization of producer interests had only a modest impact on their fates. Nor were entrenched economic interests successfully challenged by other interest groups, since diffused interests remain difficult to mobilize. Rather it was governmental actors who played the most critical role in challenging the status quo.

This book synthesizes developments in a number of different policy areas into a clearly written and coherent analysis. It occupies an important and vital niche between more general analyses of business power and case studies of specific policies, both of which have spawned a large literature. As such, *Reversals of Fortune* fills an important gap in the literature on the power of business in American politics.

Nonetheless, in the final analysis, Mucciaroni's analysis is unsatisfying: it does a better job of explaining the past than of predicting the future. There is an ad hoc quality about the book's independent variables. They are clearly important—both ideas and institutions do matter—but I am skeptical about whether either the issue or institutional context as Mucciaroni defines them can be measured with sufficient precision to generate testable predictions. Admittedly, this represents a test few scholars have successfully met.

DAVID VOGEL
University of California, Berkeley

Catastrophic Politics: The Rise and Fall of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988 *by Richard Himelfarb, University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995. 132 pp. Cloth, $28.50; paper, $13.95.*

Given the current debate over Medicare financing in the U.S. Congress, the timing of this book is especially appropriate. Himelfarb begins by describing the legislative history of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (MCCA) of 1988. He includes the policy environment of budgetary politics leading up to consideration of MCCA proposals (chapter 1); the development of various catastrophic coverage proposals (chapter 2); how policy makers came to an ability-to-pay financing scheme that imposed all the costs of expansions on the elderly (chapter 3); and how policy makers gathered support for MCCA and its eventual passage (chapter 4). Although these chapters will be useful for those wanting to learn about the details of Medicare politics, particularly in the late 1980s, Himelfarb doesn't seek to give us a better theoretical understanding about the process of public policy—either how legislation is enacted or how politics related to social policies for the elderly is similar or different from policies for other age groups.

The most interesting parts of the book are chapters 5 and 6, where he provides an argument for why MCCA was repealed. As Himelfarb points out, the repeal of MCCA—due to dissatisfaction on the part of the majority of the elderly—is particularly interesting and puzzling because the vast majority of elderly (60 percent) were due to receive benefits well in excess of their personal costs. To make sense of this puzzle, Himelfarb analyzes opinion data of senior citizens from six surveys conducted by the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP). Three surveys were conducted before and three after passage of MCCA.

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From this analysis Himelfarb finds that although high-income elderly people were more likely than low-income elderly to oppose the program, opposition to MCCA continued to increase (from the time of passage to repeal) among all income groups. To understand why opposition to the program grew even among low-income elderly, he looks at demonstrated knowledge of the program. He finds that all the elderly, but particularly those with low incomes, misunderstood a number of key aspects about the program. Particularly noteworthy is that while about 50 percent of low-income elderly understood certain aspects of MCCA, the vast majority did not know that MCCA included an ability-to-pay financing scheme—exactly the provision that should have appealed to low- and moderate-income elderly.

Himelfarb analyzes the relationship between knowledge about *any* aspect of MCCA and opinions about MCCA and finds that "knowledgeable" low-income elderly were more likely to be opposed to MCCA than their less informed counterparts. From this finding he argues that progressive financing, where the elderly are specifically asked to contribute more, is politically infeasible. Although Himelfarb provides a rich description of how policy makers also arrived at this conclusion, Himelfarb's data do not support the political infeasibility claim. Because so few low- and moderate-income elderly actually understood the progressive financing aspect of MCCA, we don't know whether there would be widespread opposition to such a financing scheme if low-income elderly people were informed. Indeed, Himelfarb himself argues that one of the reasons policy makers were never able to garner widespread support for the program was because advocates downplayed MCCA's progressive financing structure and instead sold the program as offering significant benefits to all senior citizens regardless of income. This suggests the need for better political strategy, and better marketing and education to increase public understanding. It may be that the federal government is simply incapable of competing with special interest groups in efforts to inform the public. But this is a different conclusion from saying there would be no support among an informed public for elderly-based progressive financing, as argued by Himelfarb.

COLLEEN M. GROGAN
Yale University

Telltale Hearts: The Origins and Impact of the Vietnam Antiwar Movement *by Adam Garfinkle. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1995. 302 pp. $24.95.*

Adam Garfinkle hopes to correct what he considers the mislearned lessons of the Vietnam antiwar movement that continue to influence contemporary policy, politics, and culture. Based upon secondary literature, the book offers little that is new, but this ambitiously broad synthesis of the movement's history from its origins in traditions of twentieth-century dissent to its present legacy is thoughtfully contentious and kicks everyone's sacred cows. Unfortunately, uneven treatments (political analyses are stronger than cultural) and extensive scope give the book an unruly feel.

The key argument challenges both hawks' and doves' conviction that the antiwar movement played a decisive role in the Vietnam war's outcome. According to Garfinkle, the antiwar movement did not influence military or civilian leaders, nor according to opinion data did it shape public opposition to the war. Especially between 1966 and 1969, when it was captured by radicals and counterculturalists, the movement provoked enormous public animosity, which stifled moderate opposition reluctant to ally with anti-establishment hippies.

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This negative follower effect prolonged the war, costing many additional lives. This criticism is clearly directed at radicals. Liberal dissent expressed (appropriately) within the system was moderately effective in limiting America's role in Vietnam by preventing escalation before 1965 and limiting Richard Nixon's actions. The New Left's crime was its cynical resistance to playing pragmatic, two-party politics.

This argument is ultimately unconvincing. Consistently, the determination of nonimpact is asserted but not demonstrated; the argument suffers from the same speculative qualities Garfinkle criticizes in others. Garfinkle does not address opinion data's general reliability, nor is his reading of this evidence unimpeachable. Specifically, unilateral withdrawal should not be the sole measure of antiwar sentiment. Ambivalence, read as nonimpact, might as logically be read as success. It was also perfectly possible to dislike the antiwar movement and the war (Garfinkle's own position). A vote for Richard Nixon in 1968 may have represented cultural backlash, but it was also a vote for a president running on an end-the-war platform. Because the relationship between the antiwar movement and public opinion is difficult to discern does not mean that it doesn't exist. Garfinkle argues that the American people's independent evaluation of the war's developments and costs led to opposition. But social movements generate public discussion and create a milieu of examination. The movement fostered a cast of mind that made it possible to conceive of peace without victory; without it the public's interpretations and calculations might have been different. Finally, while it is now standard on the left to fault the movement's (especially Students for a Democratic Society) capitulation to revolutionary politics, Garfinkle's explanation misses the point that radicalism escalated because temperate tactics were not working. Garfinkle places his faith in the very liberal insiders who failed to respond to moderate dissent.

The movement didn't end the war, but among its significant legacies: the Vietnam generation's cynicism, negativism about America, and isolationism; the dismantling of the Democratic coalition; increased power of public opinion and thus pollsters; shift of power from executive to legislative branches; and the cultural critique abiding in eco-anarchism. Distinctions between the antiwar movement and other actors or developments are too easily elided here. On the positive side, despite its failure and short-term damage, radicalism demonstrated that "there are limits as to what the executive can do in the face of public opposition" (p. 293) and illustrated the essential health of American democracy, which integrated criticism without significant change. Garfinkle's lesson? Youth rebellion arose to counter spiritual suffocation and social malaise but the search for meaning slipped into nihilism (now political correctness and deconstruction). The era's greatest lesson should be that value—knowing the difference between right and wrong and confidently communicating it—is central to our culture's health. The adversarial culture's multiple roles in this spiritual quest is perhaps Garfinkle's greatest irony.

ELIZABETH FEDER
Colorado College

The Secret World of American Communism *by Harvey Klehr, John Earl Haynes, and Fridrikh Igorevich Firsov. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1995. 384 pp. $25.00.*

This is a fascinating and sloppy book. It presents and evaluates almost one hundred documents from ex-Soviet records about relations between Soviet political and intelligence agencies and

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the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA). These documents show extensive political ties between Soviet leaders and American Communists. They indicate that the CPUSA made a large investment in maintaining a clandestine organization, and they show that American Communists repeatedly provided information to Soviet political and intelligence agencies. Yet the authors overstate their impressive evidence, especially in charging individuals with espionage and criminal conspiracy. Here are the core claims of *The Secret World of American Communism*: "The documents in this book demonstrate with unmistakable clarity that the common perception that 'American communism was a Soviet weapon in the Cold War' was indeed well founded, and they reveal the process through which the CPUSA became an instrument of Soviet espionage. Because so many of the party's activities required secrecy and subterfuge, not only to launder Soviet money but also to avoid government prosecution, the CPUSA very early developed the habits and customs of conspiracy. And this conspiratorial organization later assisted Soviet intelligence and placed loyalty to the Soviet Union ahead of loyalty to the United States" (p. 323).

Several pages later the authors strengthen their indictment: "American communism was certainly a radical political movement—a heretical dissent from the American tradition. But the Communist Party of the United States of America was also a conspiracy financed by a hostile foreign power that recruited members for clandestine work, developed an elaborate underground apparatus, and used that apparatus to collaborate with espionage services of that power" (p. 326).

The authors' charges can be divided as follows. There is a political critique: on page 1, the CPUSA was politically pro-Soviet in a relentless and unqualified way. On page 2, the CPUSA was on major issues guided by Soviet leaders. On page 3, Soviet influence permeated both the top party leadership and the entire party organization. There is also an indictment of the CPUSA as a criminal conspiracy: the CPUSA typically maintained a clandestine organization, which it formed on the basis of its Leninist understanding of its political tasks; the organization provided political support for Soviet policies and organizations and channeled Soviet financial support for the CPUSA; the organization provided a range of espionage services for the Soviet Union, including the transfer of military information.

The book's strength concerns the political charges. Showing the CPUSA was pro-Soviet is no trick; the documents illustrate the depth and importance of ties between the CPUSA and the Soviet Union. CPUSA leaders saw themselves as engaged in a common project with Soviet leaders, and welcomed their leadership.

The third political charge is also substantiated by the documents, which make a strong contribution to arguments still going on among political scientists and historians. Analysts more sympathetic to the CPUSA's role in the 1930s and 1940s do not deny its pro-Soviet orientation, but they minimize the extent to which support for and links to the Communist party of the Soviet Union influenced the choices of Communist activists in workplaces, communities, and local politics. *The Secret World of American Communism* emphasizes that the CPUSA was a political organization organized in a hierarchical fashion with a committed and self-conscious membership. These qualities make it unreasonable to posit a sharp separation between a rigidly pro-Soviet national Communist leadership and local Communists simply fighting to improve the conditions of workers and blacks. The two dimensions of Communist activity were intertwined.

On the conspiracy indictment the book is much weaker. The documents show that secret work was always a major part of CPUSA activities. They make clear that this clandestine network shared the purposes of the party and sought to support the Soviet Union. They establish that major Soviet financial support for the CPUSA was channeled through clandestine

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networks. If the authors were satisfied to claim that their documents demonstrated their political claims and provide significant support for the first two of their conspiracy charges, their book would be more persuasive. But they aim at a real criminal conspiracy indictment, which they do not sustain. Future research may prove them right, but in trying to make their strongest charges stick, the authors reach too far.

There is another problem with their use of the documents. The authors present them in a naive way, as not only authentic but entirely accurate, so the only puzzles to be solved are those of incompleteness or decoding. They briefly note possible problems but proceed as though the authors of the comments were doing their best to depict actual relations.

For the political charges, neither the problem of time nor that of the reliability of particular documents is crucial. The merit of these charges depends on establishing institutional ties and durable patterns of influence that are not disproved by problems with one or another document. Regarding the conspiracy indictment, things look different. Here naming names and dates accurately is essential. Klehr and his coauthors face a tricky problem: how should one assess claims made in secret documents about secret activities, given that both the authors of the documents and the participants in the activities considered it legitimate to lie to serve their political goals? As with all intelligence files, claims made in the documents might have been for strategic purposes beyond reporting what happened, such as credit-claiming by agents or creating files for the purpose of compromising people named in them. There are real problems with using the documents to prove criminal charges.

The effort to indict individuals and especially the CPUSA as an organization for criminal conspiracy is on balance not successful. And the authors are not entirely comfortable with the indictment: "It is difficult to regard Senator Joseph McCarthy's assault on political civility as much more than the vicious partisanship of a political bully" (p. 325). Would this judgment be true if the CPUSA in 1946–1955 were a conspiracy to commit espionage for the Soviet Union? Then it would be a criminal organization and even making it illegal might well be warranted. The authors often present their material as though it shows the CPUSA to have been equivalent to a spy ring. But they are hesitant to defend this position and criticize political figures who recommended treating the CPUSA as purely the agent of a hostile foreign power.

So the cold war continues. *The Secret World of American Communism* links a powerful political critique with a dubious effort to show criminal responsibility. Perhaps defenders of the CPUSA will seek to use the book's excesses to discredit its main political claims. That would be a shame, as Klehr and his coauthors demonstrate the political dishonesty of the CPUSA, its uncritical dependence on the Soviet leadership, and its hostility to democratic norms.

DAVID PLOTKE
New School for Social Research

Heeding the Voices of Our Ancestors: Kahnawake Mohawk Politics and the Rise of Native Nationalism *by Gerald R. Alfred. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 220 pp. Paper, $29.95.*

Gerald Alfred examines the emergence of claims for a "radical form of Native [American] sovereignty" (p. 3), which would not settle for a more just integration with Canada or the

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United States. In doing so, he offers the dual perspectives of scholar and engaged participant. Reflecting its origins as a doctoral dissertation at Cornell University, his book offers a disciplined analysis of nationalism "informed by the need to create a framework in which the concepts, values and ideals of Mohawk nationalism can be appreciated by others." Writing as a Mohawk of Kahnawake, Alfred, heeding the voices of his ancestors, seeks "an authentic and uncompromised description of the passion that infuses Mohawk nationalism" (p. 1). Indeed, he intends to articulate a syncretic nationalism that will unify the Kahnawake and serve as a model for other native communities.

The Kahnawake (or Caughnawaga) Mohawk reserve consists of 12,000 acres on the southern outskirts of Montreal. The Kahnawake emerged as a distinct community when they moved to this locale around 1700. Their conversion to Christianity splintered them from the other Mohawk and the Iroquois Confederacy, and they moved to the protection of their French Jesuit missionaries. Today they are the most prosperous native community in Canada (annual income of $30,000 per capita); they are also, according to Alfred, in the vanguard in asserting a native or ethnonationalism, an ideology and strategy designed to revitalize the autonomy of the Kahnawake. He attributes that position to the interplay between a cultural tradition rich in syncretism and a history of conflict with Canadian efforts to incorporate the Kahnawake. Issues of territory and membership have been especially divisive.

Chapters two through seven provide the historical analysis to substantiate his thesis. Following an extended time of autonomy [1680–1815], the Kahnawake accommodated to Canadian trusteeship, albeit with a growing concern about the failure of the federal government to protect their interests. Increasing Canadian disregard for treaty rights led by the 1940s to the emergence of a traditionalist faction calling for a return to Iroquois traditions versus the integrationist supporters of the Canadian sanctioned Band Council. The arbitrary expropriation of crucial real estate on behalf of the St. Lawrence Seaway Project dissipated any trust in Canadian guardianship and undercut the integrationists. The traditionalists, however, sought answers from an idealized, primordial past that failed to speak to the experiences and traditions of most members of the community. By the 1980s a "mainstream nationalist ideology" [p. 87] had emerged, which accepted some elements of the relationship with Canada while negotiating for expanded community autonomy. Appropriate ethnohistorical scholarship, governmental publications and documents, interviews, and a survey of a representative sample of eighty contemporary Kahnawake Mohawk as well as his own experience substantiate his conclusions.

Alfred brackets this historical analysis with an opening chapter, "Reconceptualizing Nationalism," and a concluding chapter that outlines an explanatory model for the "Rise of Native Nationalism." Characterizing the dominant scholarly view of nationalism as State Nationalism, he proposes a more inclusive definition. "Where the state-based nationalist project is geared toward displacing the existing state in the creation of a new one, community sovereignty nationalism accepts the state's present existence and attempts an accommodation that preserves the integrity of both the challenging ethnic group and the state itself" (p. 15). Using an "historical institutionalist" approach (Sven Steinmo, et al. *Structuring Politics* [1992]), he portrays issues of identity, institutional patterns, and historical interactions as the determinants of Kahnawake nationalism. Thus he seeks a middle road between instrumentalist or primordialist explanations of nationalism.

His argument rebuts those Canadians who would dismiss the Kahnawake as simply another ethnic interest group. It also responds to those native advocates who would insist that nationalism must lead to total separation. More generally, his analysis enriches our understanding of tribal politics across the globe. To be sure, his role as a participant invites

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some skepticism. Is he accurate, for example, when he claims the loyalty of most Mohawks to a position that he so clearly favors? On the other hand, his distinctively engaged perspective leads to insights that challenge conventional thinking about an issue of great import in our world. Despite some redundant and overly dense prose, Alfred's effort to integrate scholarly inquiry with the empowerment of peoples places him in the eminent tradition of C. Wright Mills and Barrington Moore, Jr.

WILBERT H. AHERN
University of Minnesota, Morris

Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law *by Lucy E. Salyer. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1995. 338 pp. Cloth, $40.00; paper $17.95.*

The United States Immigration and Naturalization Service holds the dubious distinction of being widely regarded, in the words of Steven O. Ludd, as "almost . . . a free agent in American government." Lucy Salyer offers an explanation of how it got to be that way in this exhaustive study of early immigration law. According to Salyer, founding doctrines of immigration law "arose out of struggles on the West Coast among Chinese immigrants, government officials, and federal judges over the enforcement of the Chinese exclusion laws" (p. 247). These particular historical circumstances, she argues, put immigration law on a different "trajectory" than other branches of administrative law.

For the better part of the nineteenth century, immigration into the United States was unregulated. Moreover, once in America, immigrants – upon whose labor the growing nation depended – were considered analogous to citizens and entitled to the same constitutional rights and protections as citizens. Chinese immigrants, however, faced nativist hostility from the time of their earliest arrival in America. The Chinese exclusion acts (1882, 1892, 1904) barred Chinese laborers from entering the United States.

Chinese resisted exclusion with legal challenges that charged immigration officials with acting arbitrarily and inhumanely in their enforcement of the exclusion laws. In doing so, they claimed rights to core principles and practices of Anglo-American jurisprudence – habeas corpus, due process, rules of evidence, judicial review. But, rather than grant those rights to the "unassimilable" Chinese, immigration officials argued for full discretionary authority over immigration policy. Part I, "Judicial Justice," traces the genealogy of court decisions that increasingly freed the immigration bureau from interference from the federal courts and the constitutional requirements of due process. Chinese won some concessions, notably the right of birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment (*Wong Kim Ark*, 1898), but they were few. In a series of landmark cases the Supreme Court ruled that Congress had "plenary power" over immigration (*Chae Chan Ping*, 1889); that immigrants entered and remained in the United States "except by the sufferance of Congress" and that immigrants in deportation proceedings had no protection under the Constitution (*Fong Yue Ting*, 1893); and that administrative rulings on admissibility were final (*Ju Toy*, 1905). These and other decisions had far-reaching consequences not only for Chinese but all aliens; indeed, the principle of plenary power still undergirds immigration law today.

During the early twentieth century, critics opposing the bureaucratic tyranny of immigration officials and "progressives" crafting rationalized procedures for the emergent administra-

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tive state worked to inject judicial procedures into the work of the immigration bureau. Part II, "Executive Justice," details the rise of proceduralism and legalism within the bureau between 1905 and 1924. But, Salyer argues, the expansion of aliens' procedural rights ultimately strengthened the power of immigration officials. For example, "in extending the (right to subpoena witnesses) to aliens, the bureau appeared to be expanding the boundaries of due process. . . . Yet the bureau undoubtedly expected the power of subpoena to work primarily to its own benefit, improving the ability of inspectors to obtain the necessary evidence to exclude or deport aliens" (p. 230). Despite decades of litigation and political lobbying by and on behalf of Chinese and, increasingly, the "new" European immigrants, Salyer concludes, "the bureau emerged in 1924 virtually unscathed and fundamentally unchanged" (p. 244).

Laws Harsh as Tigers is meticulously researched and presented with nuance, if at times dense. Those interested in immigration history and policy, Asian American studies, and administrative law will find it an important work, as should anyone concerned about the rise of nativism and the legal challenges to the status and rights of immigrants today.

MAE M. NGAI
Columbia University

Business and Democracy in Latin America *edited by Ernest Bartell and Leigh A. Payne. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1995. 292 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $19.95.*

Business has long been considered an enemy of democracy and a supporter of authoritarianism in Latin America. In this unusually well coordinated volume, the authors explore the new relationship between business and democracy during the contemporary period, effectively countering contentions that democracy need be inimical to business interests.

Looking at a number of cases, the authors convincingly demonstrate the decline in business support for authoritarianism. In Argentina and Brazil, where military governments encountered significant economic difficulties, authors Carlos Acuña and Leigh Payne argue that the regimes' economic failures and their exclusion of business from policy decisions left business leaders disillusioned with authoritarianism. Along related lines, Blanca Heredia contends that relations between Mexico's semi-authoritarian government and business have varied considerably over time, with tensions between these players stimulating the growth of the major opposition party. In Chile, where the military regime proved both more successful and more open to business interests than elsewhere, business initially exhibited more "ambivalence" toward democratization (Ernest Bartell, p. 63). However, even in this case, business elites have become more receptive to democracy.

What issues have been most important in determining business attitudes toward democracy? Interestingly, several authors demonstrate that policy decisions are not necessarily business leaders' primary focus. Although such basics as respect for property rights and general government competence emerge as critical (Payne and Bartell, pp. 265–6), and Latin American business leaders increasingly advocate neoliberalism, they seem at least as concerned with the consistency of economic policy (Bartell, p. 94; Payne and Bartell, p. 280) and their own ability to influence policy decisions (Catherine Conaghan, p. 114; Francisco Durand, 141ff.). Policy instability can emerge in a competitive democracy with potentially dramatic swings between administrations, but it also occurs under authoritarian regimes due to their flexibility. Without a stable policy framework, any long-term investment becomes excessively risky; both economic and political stability suffer.

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Democracies prove more clearly beneficial to business with respect to their permeability. Yet business' ability to influence policy also depends heavily on the ability of very diverse groups—that is, industry and agriculture—to overcome their vast differences to organize a united front. Interestingly, business appears most able to unify in the face of adverse economic policies. Unfavorable policies may thus actually help business achieve a more substantial benefit in the long run, an expanded political voice.

According to the perspective in the book, business' increased political presence reduces that sector's need to turn to authoritarianism. This argument builds from the popular, but somewhat problematic, argument that business' threat to democracy stemmed from its very weakness. Presumably, if business had been strong enough to elicit desirable policy choices from democratic governments, then leaders would not have sought authoritarianism. Yet in countries with frequently profound gaps between the poor multitudes and the wealthy few, those with wealth will certainly have significant political power, even if businesses may have been less competitive and more state-dependent than those in more developed countries. Furthermore, judging by these analyses, attitudes of business leaders appear to have changed more than business strength. Discussions of capacity, furthermore, emphasize organization and the growth of business associations, rather than increasing economic power.

In sum, the book's authors have surpassed their original goal of demonstrating business' ability to adapt to democracy. They have also shown—intentionally or not—that such factors as organizational capacity and past experience may influence business attitudes toward democracy more than business' strength. Business retains the ability to destabilize democracy, deliberately or unintentionally, and has perhaps augmented its ability to limit democracy by limiting policy decisions. For now, though, business appears to prefer the democratic game.

DEBORAH L. NORDEN
Colby College

Governance and Reform: India's Political Economy *by John P. Lewis. New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. 401 pp. $29.95.*

In this collection of articles, one of the most seasoned and experienced American observers of India's economic development explores a wide and comprehensive range of policy-related matters. In a first section, Lewis offers broad observations on government/market relations in India, making in particular some novel points about the structural effects of "giantism." He then plunges into a richly textured account of the proliberalization reforms in agriculture and industry in the 1960s. Drawing on his own recollections as head of the USAID Mission to India in the mid-1960s and interviews with some of the key players, Lewis makes a compelling case that successful policy outcomes, most notably the Green Revolution, resulted from a mixture of decisive internal support and critical external inputs, including a strong dose of American arm-twisting. Moving into the 1970s, Lewis analyzes the disappointing performance of the economy, pointing to the dampening effect on growth of Indira Gandhi's populist reforms and highlighting the state's failure to alleviate poverty, or in his apt phrase, to discover a "relevant radicalism." The final section of the book explores the 1980s, including a concise review of the 1991 liberalization and a sober but optimistic evaluation of the developmental challenges that lie ahead. Lewis balances his endorsement of pro-market

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reforms with interventionist policy prescriptions aimed at addressing the dangers of an increasingly pronounced socioeconomic dualism that divides India's highly educated and pampered middle class—the principle beneficiary of liberalization—from the lower classes.

But for all its insights, this book falls short of providing a theoretically compelling overview of the Indian state's performance. Lewis correctly emphasizes the state's innate capacities, underwritten both by the quality of its senior bureaucrats and policy makers and its commitment to democratic constitutionalism. The Indian state has ably maintained order in a vast and heterogeneous society and at critical junctures has shown itself more than capable of instituting reforms. Yet, as Lewis himself amply documents and eloquently argues, it has largely failed to address the problem of mass poverty. And the problem here is one of politics, not policy. Throughout the book, Lewis forcefully makes the case for the increased investment in primary education and employment-generating rural works. These are and have been consensus prescriptions, which only raise the question of why the state has failed so miserably in both these areas. The problem here is not one of "governance"—a term that for all its current popularity in policy circles has little analytical content—but of the state's actual ties to society. Its democratic character notwithstanding, the Indian state is shaped and dominated by elite interests that have severely circumscribed its capacity to undertake redistributive and structural reforms. This is a point that Lewis clearly recognizes, but one that tends to get lost in the can-do policy-oriented framework in which the book is written. Thus, for political scientists and sociologists, Lewis's discussion of the role of the state in India's development lacks a more systematic treatment of the balance of political power and the nature of state-society relations. This book does provide an exceptionally lucid, careful, and sophisticated discussion of policy choices and issues. Moreover, in light of the recent spate of political science writings that have portrayed the Indian state as increasingly ineffectual and prone to rent-seeking, Lewis's account provides a refreshing reminder that despite some institutional decay (especially in the political party system) the Indian state, particularly at its higher levels, continues to display a degree of organizational and planning capacity that compares favorably to most developing countries.

PATRICK HELLER
Columbia University

Urban Leviathan: Mexico City in the Twentieth Century *by Diane E. Davis. Philadelphia, Temple University Press, 1995. 391 pp. Cloth, $49.95; paper, $24.95.*

While Diane Davis's book is largely concerned with the politics of urban development in Mexico City, it is also an historical narrative that illuminates national political development in Mexico. Starting with the Revolution in 1910 and basically concluding in 1988, Davis argues that the history of both Mexico and its capital city is the result of local and national political struggles that interact in ways that most Mexican scholars have not adequately theorized. In her review of previous work by Mexicanists, Davis notes that urban studies have not distinguished local struggles from national ones, and discussion of one-party rule at the national level has generally failed to take local urban dynamics seriously enough. Davis's impressively researched political economy of Mexico City offers compelling evidence that both urban and national politics can only be understood by focusing on the specific interrelationships between local and national actors and institutions.

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Much of the narrative here is told from the perspective of elite decision makers, but Davis clearly believes that the nature and character of resistance by subordinate groups and classes influence policy outcomes. Most of the attempts to explain the exceptional nature of Mexican politics since the Revolution have focused almost exclusively on the importance of decision making by political elites, whether the president or bureaucrats, and assumed that the leadership within the nation's dominant party generally operates independently of pressure from below. In the story here, organized workers and employers struggle and negotiate with political elites, but as important to Davis's analysis is mobilization and coalition building by "popular middle classes" (street vendors, small shopkeepers, and taxi drivers). Policy makers respond to, as well as attempt to manipulate, these mobilized segments of the population. The formation and implementation of Mexico City's transport policies provide much of the evidence for the book's convincing claim that urban policies are embedded in both questions about the national economy and "local balances of power within and between the state and the various classes." (p. 233).

Given her introductory commitment to take space seriously (p. xi), it is unfortunate that Davis's actual discussion of trolley, bus, and subway systems rarely leaves the city's downtown area. The greater metropolitan area, the state of Mexico, or even neighboring cities receive little contextual consideration. Global forces are largely absent from this case study as well. Particularly in recent years, and it is true that Davis makes only a few comments about events since 1988, global changes have certainly had important implications for urban political economics throughout the region. In general, economic structures (global, regional, national, or local) are not central to this urban history.

Although Davis does not refer to other cities in the region as much as a comparativist might have liked, she does suggest that compared to other huge metropolises, Mexico City is in "especially grave peril" (p. 296). While the city may be "worse than a planner's nightmare" and a "living hell" (p. 2), the book gives little treatment to the particular urban spaces and problems that might have helped persuade those of us who think more favorably of Mexico City in a comparative sense.

In the end, the wish that Davis had done more spatially and comparatively speaks to how well written and researched her "quasi-ethnography" (p. 326) of Mexico City is. Readers will find useful insights about both urban development and Mexican politics in the book, and political scientists in particular should heed this work's call to take space, class, and "politics" more seriously in their analysis of local and national government policy in Mexico and elsewhere.

WALTER VANDERBUSH
Miami University

Organizing Civil Society: The Popular Sectors and the Struggle for Democracy in Chile
by Philip D. Oxhorn. University Park, PA, Penn State Press, 1995. 373 pp. Cloth, $55.00; paper $18.95.

This book is a fine example of midrange theorizing. Philip Oxhorn uses a wealth of data on a carefully bounded unit of analysis—popular sector organizations in shanty towns—to

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challenge theories of transitions to democracy and to highlight key opportunities and constraints for the democratization of civil society in Latin America. Using rich, historically contextual analysis, Oxhorn demonstrates the inadequacy of the concept of the resurrection of civil society in the theory of transitions from authoritarianism. Popular sector organization in Chile reveals that the democratization of civil society began long before the transition to democracy, a period in which society was supposed to be atomized. Moreover, popular organizations were models of democratic conduct. The problem now is how to channel that autonomous force into the decision-making processes of democratic Chile.

The import of the central question—conditions for the emergence of self-generated, autonomous popular sector organizations—is augmented by relating it to the participatory and egalitarian dimensions of democratic theory. Citizen participation in decision making is key to moving beyond procedural democracy to achieve the democratization of civil society. The focus on society's poorest, largest, and most marginalized strata links the concern with participation to the egalitarian ideals of democracy. Democracy is not likely to be fully participatory or egalitarian until an autonomous, organized popular sector has meaningful access to the policy-making process. This raises a second key question. Under which conditions can popular sector organizations generate a social movement capable of achieving those broader goals, particularly in national politics?

Beginning with the precondition of popular sector consciousness, Oxhorn argues that four factors affect popular sector organization under authoritarianism: the scope of repression; the socioeconomic model; a protective umbrella organization; and whether there was an extended period of political democracy. In Chile, popular sector organization flourished during the military government because repression mostly tended to be selective. The regime's socioeconomic model forced self-help for survival, gave local government more responsibility (thus providing an accessible focus for popular sector collective action), and, most importantly, banned political parties that had previously stifled autonomous popular sector organization. The Catholic Church provided protection and physical space, and the previous period of democracy yielded cadres of experienced organizers.

The prospects for a popular sector movement and hence the chances for democratizing civil society after authoritarianism depend on three factors: the institutionalization of base level organizations, political party structures, and the dynamics of the transition to democracy. Using Samuel Huntington's measures, Oxhorn argues that Chilean popular sector organizations were relatively well institutionalized. Moreover, social learning within political parties of the center and left made them prone to avoid old tactics of penetration and control. Unfortunately, the process of the transition to democracy led political parties to demobilize the popular sector and to shut it out of the policy-making process. As opposition political parties embraced the main tenets of the neoconservative socioeconomic model and negotiated with the right, they feared that inclusion of the popular sector would alienate middle and upper classes and derail democratization. This concern led to the development of Chile's current technocratic policy-making style. Oxhorn suggests that once political parties of the governing coalition realize that popular sector leaders are moderate in both their demands and expectations, they might be less afraid of including them in the policy-making process.

Oxhorn's arguments are weakest when dealing with the question of how to turn renovation of political party thought and administrative decentralization into an opportunity for a popular

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sector social movement. Wider reading in the literature of social movements, mobilization, and collective action—and their relationship to established political institutions—would have been necessary. Fortunately, this book helps to frame questions for future work.

EDUARDO SILVA
University of Missouri–St. Louis

Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority *edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1995. 446 pp. Cloth $60.00; paper, $19.95.*

This collection includes three introductory, conceptual chapters by the editor and case studies of Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam, followed by the editor's concluding chapter. The case studies, revised versions of papers presented at conferences in Honolulu in 1992 and Chiang Mai in 1993, are contributed by younger scholars, who are Southeast Asian specialists. The editor is a senior fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii and the book is the first in the series, Contemporary Issues in Asia and the Pacific, sponsored by the East-West Center and published by Stanford University Press. Bruce Koppel of the East-West Center is the series editor.

The book is organized around and builds on a Weberian conceptualization of legitimacy. As the editor lays out in chapter one, "a command-obedience relationship may be defined as legitimate if the political order in which it is rooted is based on shared norms and values, if the government in concern acquired power in conformity with established rules, if that power is exercised within prescribed limits for the promotion of the community's collective interest, and if the governed have given their consent to the incumbent government" (p. 15).

The criticisms of this formulation are acknowledged and discussed in detail: the danger that shared norms are the product of government manipulation, the difficulty of empirically verifying or measuring legitimacy against some independent yardstick, and the somewhat limited foundations provided by the Weberian definition for what can be a complex and multifaceted concept. The editor seemingly concedes a number of these points in stating that "as the terms of the interaction between ruler and ruled are defined and redefined continuously, legitimacy, conceived as an outcome of this process, will be subject to continuous redefinition as well. Although more durable in some cases than others, legitimacy is a dynamic feature in need of constant cultivation" (p. 14).

While certainly an attractive way of thinking about legitimacy, this conceptualization also makes it difficult to bring a sense of cohesion and comparability to seven individual country case studies. This is certainly true in this collection. Each of the chapters gives an erudite, informed discussion of the struggle by political elites to achieve and maintain legitimacy. They also provide clear analyses of the cultural resources available to those who wish to challenge the legitimacy of the rulers. But because each chapter relates to a different country with cultures evolving through processes of contestation and compromise, and because each ruler chooses to utilize different strategies to maximize their legitimacy, it is difficult to maintain a tight linkage between the conceptual chapters and the case studies. It also highlights the inherent problems in trying to develop a parsimonious conceptualization of legitimacy.

The concluding chapter reviews some of the bases or rationales that have been used by Southeast Asian rulers in the pursuit of legitimacy—normative goals, performance, personal

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authority, politically defining moments, and international support. However, he concludes that "only when legitimation turns primarily on the procedural element will it become less problematic" (p. 293).

This collection of conceptual essays and case studies is a helpful reminder of the importance of legitimacy in a region that is rapidly changing. It devotes careful, highly detailed attention to a topic which will remain relevant for many decades to come. It also demonstrates just how fluid legitimacy is in Southeast Asia and how quickly governments can lose legitimacy.

GARY HAWES
Ford Foundation-Philippines

Danger and Opportunity: Explaining International Crisis Outcomes *by Eric Herring. Manchester, England, Manchester University Press, 1995. 306 pp. Cloth, $69.95; paper, $24.95.*

Eric Herring's book tackles the critical issue of explaining crisis outcomes. Herring examines several cold war and post–cold war crises: the conflicts over Berlin, U.S. invasion of North Korea, 1954–1955 Taiwan Straits confrontation, Soviet placement of missiles in Cuba, Sino-Soviet border clashes, Argentina's invasion of the Falklands, and Iraq's occupation of Kuwait. He considers these crises in light of several key issues including the role of deterrence-compellence, military balance, interests at stake, psychology of the leaders, and strategic cultural factors. Herring concludes by assessing the importance of these concepts in illuminating why the crises unfolded as they did.

As the title suggests, Herring approaches crises in a manner similar to the Chinese. Just as the Chinese ideograph for crisis is made up of the two characters for "danger" and "opportunity," Herring sensibly sees crises not as simply obstacles to be overcome, but as potential openings for one of the actors to advance its interests. As Herring observes, the end of the U.S.–Soviet competition will not end international crises. Policy makers will still be confronted by the threat of war, with the need to compel or deter opponents, and with the problem of how to communicate resolve. Making crises more understandable remains a vital subject for political scientists.

Herring's major conclusion is that the balance of interests is the best determinant of crisis outcomes. While it is true that it is better to have a favorable military balance, that it is usually easier to deter than to compel, and that strategic culture indirectly affects behavior, nothing is as important as having the stakes mean more to you than your adversary and signaling this in a manner that your opponent understands. As Herring shows, a favorable balance of interests helped the United States force the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba, explained Western success in the two Berlin crises, and helped China stand up to the militarily superior Soviet Union in the 1969 border clashes. But balance of interests is not the whole story. Herring notes that the inclination or aversion to war is also key to understanding crisis outcomes. If your adversary leans towards fighting because it believes it might win, as was the case with Argentina and the Falklands, or because even a loss is better than a withdrawal, as Saddam Hussein arguably felt with regard to Kuwait, even the side with the "lesser" interest may choose to go to war.

There is much to like about this book. Herring is knowledgeable about political science theory and wise in its ability and limitations to guide policy. His notion that theory will

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never predict outcomes perfectly but can be helpful in enhancing the percentage of correct guesses is right on the mark. His insistence that too often strategic culture is used to explain decisions that are perfectly rational by Western standards is persuasive. His emphasis on the centrality of the balance of interests and the inclination to make war is a welcome contribution to the literature, though I wish he had done more to link the two.

Despite its pluses, *Danger and Opportunity*, is a flawed effort. The writing is reminiscent of a political science term paper. Instead of a clear focused argument, Herring allows himself to be driven by his sources (which are annoyingly cited within the text), obscuring his main points. For example, Herring goes on far too long (pp. 19–26) discussing the minutia of the deterrence debate between Paul Huth and Bruce Russett on one side and Richard Lebow and Janice Stein on the other until the reader forgets or no longer cares why this matters to crisis outcomes. This is "inside-baseball" at its worst. At times, Herring will toss out controversial or intriguing notions with little or no explanation. He accepts at face value that a country's interests are simply constructs with virtually no attention to the realist idea that certain interests (security, economic well being, protection of core values) exist regardless of one's interpretation of them.

The case studies, while well researched, are disappointing. There is little that is new and perhaps because Herring included so many crises, they are treated superficially. Where Herring does depart from the conventional wisdom, the chapters lack the detail and argumentation to be convincing. Thus, his argument that Iraqi and American decision making during the Gulf War was seriously flawed by the central role played by Saddam Hussein and George Bush implies an equivalence that is undermined by the overwhelming allied victory over Iraq. Herring's view that China was seriously prepared to invade Taiwan during the Straits crisis and that the United States was ready to use nuclear weapons to stop them also begged for amplification.

In sum, this is a useful book for specialists on crisis behavior and the use of force in international politics. For his next effort, however, I suggest that Herring not allow peripheral issues to detract from a forceful presentation of his own ideas.

STEVEN R. DAVID
Johns Hopkins University

Launching Democracy in South Africa: The First Open Election, April 1994 *edited by R. W. Johnson and Lawrence Schlemmer. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1996. 412 pp. $30.00.*

Few elections this century have been more anticipated than the April 1994 vote that heralded the end of apartheid and the beginning of nonracial rule in South Africa. Surprisingly, after the vote, scholarly attention quickly shifted to the problems facing the new government of Nelson Mandela; relatively little attention was paid to the election itself. Johnson and Schlemmer have now filled this lacunae with a comprehensive study sponsored by the Durban-based Institute for Multi-Party Democracy. Schlemmer and Johnson contribute many of the chapters and draw upon other South African scholars for in-depth studies of particular regions and some specific issues.

Not surprisingly, given the background of the editors, the book is written very much from a white liberal perspective. Thus concerns for the fairness of the conduct of the election

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are as, or more, prominent than celebrations over liberation. As others have cheered the election at length, the book provides a healthy perspective on what actually happened. In particular, Johnson contributes a chapter on the mechanics of the election in KwaZulu-Natal, which, if a country's future was not at stake, would be a minor classic in political comedy for the farce, amateurishness, and complete confusion that it documents. Relying in part on postelection surveys, Johnson concludes in another chapter that while the result was probably fair, the election was far from free. Given the degree of intimidation documented and the number of areas that different political parties could not enter, this conclusion seems nuanced and reasonable.

In their exceptional chapter on the Western Cape region, Robert Mattes, Hermann Giliomee, and Wilmont James provide an excellent analysis of one of the more bewildering questions raised by the election: Why did the colored population, disenfranchised by the National party, vote for F. W. de Klerk over the African National Congress (ANC) led by Mandela? The authors argue persuasively that the election in the Cape region was not simply a matter of non-Africans coming together but that the campaign mattered and that the ANC simply made repeated mistakes in its approach to the colored population in particular. The chapter, which successfully weaves public opinion data, campaign analysis, and political sociology, also has some fascinating asides on the use of polls in the design of the ANC campaign.

Other chapters examine the election in the Gautung region (formerly known as Pretoria/Witwatersrand/Vereeniging) and KwaZulu-Natal. Again, while the election was in the end a census for the white and African populations, Johnson and Schlemmer make the case that the campaign did matter and that the strategic choices of all of the parties were exceptionally important.

The one question that the authors do not address can be likened to the dog that did not bark: what happened to the right wing? While the authors document the decline in support for the white right, there is rather less attention to what had once been a major force in South African politics. Indeed, the virtual disappearance of the right, after years when right-wing extremism and terrorism were major concerns, remains one of the less explicable developments in the new South Africa.

Finally, two exceptionally useful resources for future studies should be mentioned. Chris de Kock provides an excellent review of much of the public opinion work done in the run-up to the election. The editors and Yale University Press should also be commended for publishing in an appendix the election results by province and by district. This is the first time such disaggregated data from the election have been made readily available.

JEFFREY HERBST
Princeton University

Strategies to Combat Poverty in Latin America *edited by Dagmar Raczynski. Washington, DC, Inter-American Development Bank, 1995. 274 pp. Paper, $18.00.*

The neoliberal economic policies implemented in Latin America since the debt crisis may help resolve macroeconomic problems, but they have caused a deterioration in the level of well-being of the lower and even the middle socioeconomic stratum. Yet, as the collection of articles in *Strategies to Combat Poverty in Latin America* testifies, Latin American govern-

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ments, nongovernmental organizations, and international lending agencies are attempting to alleviate both the poverty generated by the new economic reforms and poverty that antedated the reforms.

The book contains articles by Roberto Martinez Nogueria on Argentina; Sonia Miriam Draibe and Marta Teresa Arretche on Brazil; Juan Diego Trejos on Costa Rica; and the volume's editor on Chile. The articles summarize, in regard to the respective countries, aggregate social conditions, trends in post–World War II social policy, and three specific programs that have targeted the poor. The targeted programs are premised on the recognition that earlier, longstanding more universal programs (for example, health and education) left problems of poverty unresolved. The programs focus on prenatal care and nutrition, school retention, small farmer productivity, the extension of urban land ownership rights (to squatters on government-owned land), training in trades for which there are job opportunities, and support of microenterprises and grassroots participation in decision making.

The book provides a useful documentation of types of antipoverty programs that governments in the region have implemented. It also provides a useful description of the types of problems that have impeded effective program implementation, including bureaucratic resistance, clientelism, the politicization of programs, and insufficient (at times) high-level government support. The description, in essence, points to poverty alleviation as a political, not merely an economic issue.

For a book that focuses on antipoverty programs, there is a disturbing lack of clarity of definition of the subject population. There are references to types of poor that are never clearly defined (for example, the indigent versus nonindigent poor, the new versus old poor, the structural poor versus the impoverished). In addition, the essays raise certain important issues that are never adequately addressed. The book never explains why certain programs have received priority and what accounts for differences in the types of programs implemented in the four countries. Programs appear to address symptoms more than the root cause of poverty, so that they will inevitably be of limited effect. Meanwhile, the case studies suggest that the *au courant* emphasis on decentralization and even democratization may make the poor more socially and economically vulnerable than did the antecedent military regimes (in three of the four countries), by subjecting targeted groups to new clientelistic and electoral pressures. On a more positive note, the studies demonstrate that, contrary to neoliberal discourse, the state has not and should not "wither away." However meager have been the effects of the antipoverty programs thus far, the governments provide correctives to the inequities and injustices generated by market forces.

SUSAN ECKSTEIN
Boston University

Non-Governmental Organizations and Rural Poverty Alleviation *by Roger C. Riddell and Mark Robinson with John de Coninck, Ann Muir, and Sarah White. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press with Overseas Development Institute, London, 1995. 303 pp. $65.00.*

Some political scientists might by definition exclude consideration of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) from their professional purview, thinking that the political realm does not embrace such enterprises. Yet NGOs are increasingly cooperative or competitive with state institutions. Either way, they affect and are important to conventional arenas of politics and, therefore, are a subject we should consider.

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NGOs' role in agricultural projects, health clinics, water supply, and other technical and social undertakings overseas is well known, seen in newspaper ads and television programs. Less visible has been their growing engagement in strengthening local organizations, increasing civic participation, and championing human rights. Even before political scientists rediscovered the concept and value of "civil society," NGOs had begun contributing to its expression in many developing countries.

If NGOs accomplish all that they are ideally intended and suited to do, they are vehicles for self-managed progress and paragons of civic virtue. The problem is that they do not, and indeed as human institutions cannot, achieve everything that they are expected to do.

This book seeks to provide a better empirical basis for assessing the claim that NGOs are more successful and cost effective in their efforts than are state institutions. This is an important issue since over $6 billion in development assistance is now flowing through NGO channels, and this amount is growing annually.

The authors offer an excellent overview of the task of Third World poverty alleviation and of the comparative advantages proposed for NGOs in their effort. They address the process and criteria for evaluating NGO performance, noting how NGOs have or have not themselves engaged in systematic evaluation.

The results from sixteen case studies of NGO performance in four countries (Bangladesh, India, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) are presented. The selection of countries and cases struck this reviewer as reasonably representative. Examination of a small number of cases in some depth, rather than attempting to make generalizations from a much larger "N" assessed superficially, was wise. The case studies provide readers with the equivalent of numerous years of field research brought into their office or home between two covers.

Twelve of the sixteen NGOs studied "broadly achieved their objectives, and had a positive impact on alleviating poverty, even if only one was clearly successful in achieving all its objectives" (p. 59). The factors that most often contributed to success were active participation by intended beneficiaries in all aspects of decision making, effective management and leadership, and skilled and committed staff.

This is good news, supported by explanations that will not surprise political scientists who know something of the politics and processes of poverty alleviation. The less happy news is that most of the NGOs were not reaching, or able to reach, the poorest of the poor; were not as low-cost or cost-effective as commonly thought; and were not necessarily producing improvements that would be sustainable without continued inputs of external resources.

The authors conclude that simply expanding the range and number of NGO projects will not have a major impact on world poverty because of its immensity and structural foundations, though NGOs' performance stands up fairly well when compared to state alternatives.

The findings and policy implications the authors present are more extensive than can be amply summarized here. The book makes both discerning empirical observations and apt prescriptive contributions to a field of study that is rapidly expanding for both political scientists and development specialists.

NORMAN UPHOFF
Cornell University

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Reference Books and Other Publications of Interest Received

Encyclopedia of the Reagan-Bush Years *by Peter B. Levy. Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1996. 442 pp. $49.95.*

Fujian: Gateway to Taiwan *by Brian Hook. Hong Kong, Oxford University Press, 1996. 161 pp. $45.00.*

Green Globe Yearbook of International Co-operation on Environment and Development, 1996 *edited by Helge Ole Bergesen and Georg Parmann. New York, Oxford University Press, 1996. 368 pp. $59.95.*

India's Political Administrators: From ICS to IAS *by David C. Potter. Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1996. 301 pp. Paper, $10.95.*

Introduction to United States Government Information Sources, Fifth Edition, *by Joe Morehead. Englewood, CO, 1996. 333 pp. $40.00.*

The League of Nations: From 1919 to 1929 *by Gary B. Ostrower. Garden City Park, NY, Avery Publishing Group, 1996. 192 pp. Paper, $25.00.*

The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The Presidency: The Middle Way, Volumes XIV–XVII *edited by Louis Galambos and Daun van Ee. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins Press, 1996. 3,040 pp. $195.00.*

Political Systems of the World *by J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1996. 684 pp. $95.00.*

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Correspondence

To the Editor:

Richard Sobel's article in the Summer 1995 issue of the *Quarterly* examined the issues surrounding contra funding, while largely accepting the Reagan administration's stated policy aims as fact. Sobel claims that, "[f]rom the Reagan administration's point of view, U.S. government funding of the contras and related pressures pursued four important policy aims: to prevent Sandinista support of the antigovernment rebels in El Salvador; to pressure the Sandinistas to democratize their policies and pluralize their economy; to force the Sandinistas to negotiate security arrangements satisfactory to the United States and the rest of Central America; and perhaps to overthrow the Sandinista regime" (pp. 302–303).

Sobel argues that contra aid policy was "relatively successful in pursuing these goals." He offers no argument as to why he should confine himself to evaluating the policy only within the framework set by the administration. The unsatisfactory nature of this approach is clear if we briefly consider these stated goals.

Sobel claims that the "policies helped to cut off Sandinista funding of the rebels in El Salvador" (p. 303), but then acknowledges that this could not have been a real goal of the policy: "The United States had already successfully encouraged the Sandinistas to curtail support for the Salvadorian rebels" (p. 305).

The second stated goal, that of "bringing democracy to Nicaragua" (p. 305), could not have been furthered because there is no reason to think the goal existed beyond official statements for public consumption. To ask the most obvious question: Where was U.S. concern for democracy in Nicaragua before 1979? "Democracy" is apparently to be equated with "government acceptable to the United States." Sobel does not mention the 1984 elections in Nicaragua and the U.S. role in them, but this is surely relevant in assessing the "goal of bringing democracy to Nicaragua" (p. 305).[1]

Regarding the issue of "security arrangements," Sobel argues that contra aid policies "kept the Sandinistas from expanding into the rest of Central America,"

[1] Robert Pastor writes that "Many observers judged the election of 1984 as fair, but several opposition parties, encouraged by the Reagan administration, withdrew before the election, protesting government harassment." See Robert A. Pastor, *Whirlpool: U.S. Policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 235. For a detailed assessment of the 1984 elections, see Latin American Studies Association, *The Electoral Process in Nicaragua*, 19 November 1984.

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although, he adds, "the Sandinista army did at one point cross over into Honduras in March 1988" (p. 303). Because "Nicaraguan soldiers crossed the frontier in pursuit of contra guerrillas" (as Sobel neglects to mention), one could conclude that in the absence of the contras, this would not have happened.[2] In fact, there is no evidence (beyond Reagan administration claims) that the Sandinistas had any intention of "expanding into the rest of Central America," and they had no reason to do so, given that it would invite an immediate attack by the United States. So *any* policy could be deemed "successful" in preventing this nonexistent threat.[3]

What about the supposed U.S. desire to "pluralize" the economy? Curiously, this was not an issue when the *Somocistas* controlled important sectors of the economy. As E.V.K. Fitzgerald comments, "an irony of history perhaps, was that the enormous properties of Somoza and his direct associates became state property. This was not nationalization in the normal sense, since these enterprises were already 'part of' the state."[4]

More important when considering this official goal of U.S. policy is to ask whether international law permits the United States to try to change other countries' domestic economic policy by force. As with the final stated goal of "dislodg[ing] the Sandinista government" (p. 288), a goal that seems to have been real enough, Sobel apparently views the Boland amendment as the only relevant legal restriction on the administration. Yet the International Court of Justice ruled in 1986 that the U.S. attack on Nicaragua violated international law.[5] To judge from his silence about it, Sobel apparently views this as irrelevant when evaluating U.S. policy.

Instead, the problem supposedly lay in the way the contras were funded, as Sobel examines in great detail. The diversion of funds from arms sales brought "guilt and shame upon the Reagan administration and some of its high officials," while the privatization of funding was incompatible with democratic government. Apparently the contras' record of torture, murder, rape, and destruction (which goes entirely unmentioned) is not a matter of "guilt and shame."[6] Indeed, it is implicitly counted on the benefits side of the cost-benefit calculation as it helped "prevent the

[2] Quoting *The Economist* 16 April 1988, 51.

[3] Administration attempts to document Nicaraguan expansionist plans were quickly debunked. For details, see Wayne Smith, "Lies about Nicaragua," *Foreign Policy* 67 (Summer 1987): 89–90. Walter LaFeber notes that "intensified CIA and U.S. military pressure . . . moved [Nicaragua] closer to Cuba and the Soviet block—exactly the kind of dependency the Reagan policies supposedly sought to prevent." See Walter LaFeber, *Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America* (New York: Norton, 1984), 303.

[4] E.V.K. Fitzgerald, "The Economics of the Revolution" in Thomas W. Walker, ed., *Nicaragua in Revolution* (New York: Praeger, 1982), 209. As James Dunkerley comments, the regime was "reluctant to extend expropriation beyond Somoza's holdings and those enterprises that were structurally inefficient . . . or deliberately undercapitalized." See James Dunkerley, *Power in the Isthmus: A Political History of Modern Central America* (London: Verso, 1988), 292.

[5] International Court of Justice, Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, *Nicaragua v. United States*, Judgement of 27 June 1986.

[6] For some eyewitness testimony, see Reed Brody, *Contra Terror in Nicaragua: Report of a Fact-finding Mission: September 1984–January 1985* (Boston: South End, 1985).

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Sandinistas from . . . sustaining popular support," contributing to their 1990 electoral defeat.

RODERICK HILL
University of New Brunswick

Richard Sobel Replies:

"Contra Aid Fundamentals" sought to disentangle the complexities of funding the Nicaraguan contras as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the Reagan administration aid policies. Most of the article identifies governmental and nongovernmental sources of contra funding and their potential conflicts with Boland amendment restrictions. Most prominent were both contentious congressional allocations ($322 million) and controversial but relatively small diversions of funds to the contras from sales of weapons to Iran ($3.8 million); less familiar were third country ($32 million) and private party ($4.5 million) contributions. The intracacies and relative merits of Sandinista versus contra policies, practices, and politics that Professor Hill raises deserve further examination but were rather peripheral to this disentanglement of U.S. aid.

Evaluating but not accepting Reagan administration policies on their own terms, the article suggests, showed that they were of limited effectiveness and produced some disturbing and counterproductive results: they undermined democratic legitimacy both under the U.S. constitutional system and in trying to build democracy in Central America. Evidence of the failings of their own policy approaches might more likely persuade decision makers and partisans away from the future misguided involvements than critiques based on other premises. Yet elaboration of varied perspectives on the complexities of U.S. interventions into Central America would provide additional insights into the fundamentals of American policies affecting the region.

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

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

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

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

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